Topic
Civil confinement
About: Civil confinement is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 24 publications have been published within this topic receiving 349 citations.
Papers
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This paper argued that immigration detention is a form of penal incarceration, and that it should be conceptualized as punishment rather than civil confinement, rather than a civil form of confinement, instead of punishment.
Abstract: Courts and commentators have long assumed, without significant analysis, that immigration detention is a form of civil confinement merely because the immigration proceedings of which it is part are deemed civil. This Article challenges that deeply held assumption. It harnesses the Supreme Court’s instruction that detention’s civil or penal character turns on legislative intent and, buttressed by theoretical understandings of punishment, contends that immigration detention — apart from the deportation that often results — itself constitutes penal incarceration. In particular, legislation enacted over roughly fifteen years in the 1980s and 1990s indicates a palpable desire to wield immigration detention as a tool in fighting the nation’s burgeoning war on drugs by sanctioning and stigmatizing criminal behavior. Indeed, the immigration detention system that has developed has accomplished Congress’s punitive goal: immigration detention is experienced as severe and its occupants viewed as dangerous. Remaining true to the Court’s guidance to draw formalist boundaries between civil and penal confinement, immigration detention should be conceptualized as punishment. Rather than subjecting immigration detention to the constitutional limitations imposed by criminal procedure, this Article contends that, learning from the nation’s failed experience with mass penal incarceration, policymakers should step back from immigration detention’s punitive origins and create a truly civil immigration detention system.
95 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the effects of psychological expert testimony concerning future dangerousness in sexual violent predator commitment trials and found that mock jurors are more influenced by intuitive clinical expert testimony than empirically based actuarial testimony.
Abstract: Past research examining the effects of psychological expert testimony concerning future dangerousness in sexual violent predator commitment trials has produced equivocal results on whether mock jurors are more influenced by intuitive clinical expert testimony than empirically based actuarial testimony. This study advances this line of research by examining these effects using a more ecologically valid sample of 156 venire jurors who watched a simulated, videotaped SVP trial based on a case transcript. As predicted, jurors were more influenced by the less scientific, clinical expert testimony. The data provided only limited support for a theoretical explanation based on Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST). The policy im- plications of these results are discussed. In the United States legal system, predictions of an individual's future likelihood of reoffense or violence have a long history. These predictions are employed in many legal determinations that have significant liberty implications for the individuals involved, from bail decisions to capital sentencing. In the last 20 years, a significant minority of states have adopted Sexually Violent Predator or Person laws (hereinafter SVP laws). These modified civil commitment laws allow for postincarceration civil confinement of sexual offenders who are found likely to commit future acts of sexual violence. In these legal adjudications, mental health experts proffer expert testimony on whether or not a specific individual poses a future danger. Yet, almost since the inception of dangerous- ness-based legal standards, the expertise of mental health professionals on these matters has been questioned (e.g., Krauss & Sales, 2001; LaFond, 2005; see Slobogin, 2006 for a detailed discussion of these issues). Historically, courts have been largely deaf to the cries of critics in these important legal decisions. Beginning with the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision inBare-
48 citations
Book•
29 Jun 2011
TL;DR: The Ethics of Psychological Jurisprudence as mentioned in this paper is a well-known work in the area of psychological jurisprudential reform. But it is not a legal one.
Abstract: Series Foreword Preface Acknowledgements Introduction: On Madness, Citizenship, and Social Justice Chapter 1: The Ethics of Psychological Jurisprudence Chapter 2: Juvenile Transfer, Developmental Maturity, and Competency to Stand Trial Chapter 3: Inmate Mental Health, Solitary Confinement, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Chapter 4: Sexually Violent Predators, Criminal and Civil Confinement, and Community Reentry Chapter 5: Rethinking Total Confinement: Translating Social Theory into Justice Policy Conclusion: Total Confinement, Psychological Jurisprudence, and Transformative Habits of Character: "Almost a Revolution" Appendices Notes References Index
47 citations
TL;DR: For example, during the summer of 2018, the US government detained thousands of migrant parents and their separated children at the United States-Mexico border, resulting in the zero-tolerance policy at the border.
Abstract: During the summer of 2018, the US government detained thousands of migrant parents and their separated children pursuant to its zero-tolerance policy at the United States–Mexico border. The ensuing...
45 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: Arrigo et al. as discussed by the authors examined the present-day vitality and utility of Foucault's social control thesis as revealed in several enduring psycho-legal controversies and examined how the crossroads of clinicolegal science have produced problematic criteria for civil commitment by exhaustively focusing on the meaning of mental illness and dangerousness.
Abstract: Introduction The legal and psychological communities continue to address, with some profound uncertainty, the matter of civil confinement for dangerous mentally ill citizens (Arrigo, 1996a, 1993a; Isaac and Armat, 1990; LaFond and Durham, 1992). Proponents of involuntary hospitalization contend that a temporary loss of freedom, liberty, and right to self-determination is justified in order to protect society from the unstable and potentially injurious behavior of severely disordered psychiatric persons (e.g., Scull, 1989; Chadoff, 1976; Treffert, 1985; Roth and Kroll, 1986; Arrigo, 1993a: 13-17). This decidedly conservative and medical-model perspective has dominated social, political, and economic practice since the Enlightenment (e.g., Szasz, 1987, Scheff, 1984; Sedgwick, 1982). Critical social inquiry, however, articulates a potent rejection concerning the foundations of contemporary psycho-legal theory and practice (Arrigo, 1996a). These criticisms converge on a number of arguably false, morally ensconced, and politically laden assumptions attributable to modern science: 1. That mental illness is a real difference necessitating censorship; 2. That the mentally ill present a greater identifiable threat to society than the mentally healthy; and 3. That science possesses the key to understanding and treating mental disease or defect (Arrigo, 1992: 9-12; 23-29). One of the most influential and time-honored of criticisms is associated with Michel Foucault's social control thesis (e.g., Foucault, 1980; 1977; 1976; 1973; 1972; 1970; 1965). Foucault's critique of institutions (i.e., psychiatric, penal) viewed confinement of the noncriminal as a method of controlling (or isolating) the socially undesirable. Consistent with other justice systems, Foucault (1965, 1977) reasoned that institutionalization w as a means of policing public hygiene that is, ridding society of difference. Whether intended public policy or the likely progeny of society's faith in the prophecies of contemporary science, Foucault (1980) argued that involuntary confinement of the mentally ill and dangerous productively and inventively advanced the state's regime of power in the name of privileged scientific truth. Given Foucault's position, a number of important issues arise that yield alarming, or at least troubling, effects. Specifically, psychiatric and legal systems of control (e.g., the hospital and prison) promote legitimate social welfare interests; however, these interests are based on questionable and, in some cases, inaccurate science (Arrigo, 1993b: 142-157; LaFond and Durham, 1992). Thus, the existential condition of diverse mentally disabled citizens is normalized, depathologized, and homogenized, difference is corrected, indeed, sacrificed at the alter of medical knowledge, and the politics of psychiatric justice prevails (Arrigo, 1996a; see also Arrigo 1997a on the concept of transcarceration and the mentally ill). This article examines the present-day vitality and utility of Foucault's social control thesis as revealed in several enduring psycho-legal controversies. Specifically, we examine how the crossroads of clinicolegal science have produced problematic criteria for civil commitment by exhaustively focusing on the meaning of mental illness and dangerousness. We demonstrate how these criteria effectively promote and maintain the state's realm of power while substantially undermining the fight of vulnerable collectives and/or citizens to be different (Kittrie, 1971). The intent behind our theoretical analysis of confinement and application to civil commitment practices is deliberately limited in scope and depth. We merely wish to tease out several of the more salient conceptual insights contained in Foucault's work and to strategically connect them to mental health law. This approach allows us to draw suggestive and, arguably, provocative linkages to subsequent sections of the article. …
23 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 1 |
| 2020 | 1 |
| 2019 | 2 |
| 2017 | 3 |
| 2015 | 1 |
| 2013 | 2 |