About: Chosen-plaintext attack is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 405 publications have been published within this topic receiving 9712 citations.
TL;DR: In this article, the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes are compared under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack, and the goals of privacy and non-malleability are considered.
Abstract: We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of privacy and non-malleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove either an implication (every scheme meeting one notion must meet the other) or a separation (there is a scheme meeting one notion but not the other, assuming the first notion can be met at all). We similarly treat plaintext awareness, a notion of security in the random oracle model. An additional contribution of this paper is a new definition of non-malleability which we believe is simpler than the previous one.
TL;DR: A probabilistic method is presented which cryptanalyzes any N key cryptosystem in N 2/3 operational with N2/3 words of memory after a precomputation which requires N operations, and works in a chosen plaintext attack and can also be used in a ciphertext-only attack.
Abstract: A probabilistic method is presented which cryptanalyzes any N key cryptosystem in N^{2/3} operational with N^{2/3} words of memory (average values) after a precomputation which requires N operations. If the precomputation can be performed in a reasonable time period (e.g, several years), the additional computation required to recover each key compares very favorably with the N operations required by an exhaustive search and the N words of memory required by table lookup. When applied to the Data Encryption Standard (DES) used in block mode, it indicates that solutions should cost between 1 and 100 each. The method works in a chosen plaintext attack and, if cipher block chaining is not used, can also be used in a ciphertext-only attack.
TL;DR: Simulations and performance evaluations show that the proposed system is able to produce many 1D chaotic maps with larger chaotic ranges and better chaotic behaviors compared with their seed maps.
TL;DR: A new block image encryption scheme based on hybrid chaotic maps and dynamic random growth technique, which can completely eliminate the cyclical phenomenon and resist chosen plaintext attack is proposed.
TL;DR: It is shown that although either technique significantly improves security over single encryption, the new technique does not significantly increase security over simple double encryption.
Abstract: Double encryption has been suggested to strengthen the Federal Data Encryption Standard (DES). A recent proposal suggests that using two 56-bit keys but enciphering 3 times (encrypt with a first key, decrypt with a second key, then encrypt with the first key again) increases security over simple double encryption. This paper shows that although either technique significantly improves security over single encryption, the new technique does not significantly increase security over simple double encryption. Cryptanalysis of the 112-bit key requires about 256 operations and words of memory, using a chosen plaintext attack. While DES is used as an example, the technique is applicable to any similar cipher.