About: Certification Practice Statement is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 284 publications have been published within this topic receiving 6003 citations.
TL;DR: In this paper, a public key cryptographic system is disclosed with enhanced digital signature certification which authenticates the identity of the public key holder, and a hierarchy of nested certifications and signatures are employed which indicate the authority and responsibility levels of the individual whose signature is being certified.
Abstract: A public key cryptographic system is disclosed with enhanced digital signature certification which authenticates the identity of the public key holder. A hierarchy of nested certifications and signatures are employed which indicate the authority and responsibility levels of the individual whose signature is being certified. The certifier in constructing a certificate generates a special message that includes fields identifying the public key which is being certified, and the name of the certifiee. The certificate is constructed by the certifier to define the authority which is being granted and which may relate to a wide range of authorizations, delegation responsibilities or restrictions given to, or placed on the certifiee. Methodology is also disclosed by which multiple objects such as, for example, a cover letter, an associated enclosed letter, an associated graphics file, etc., are signed together. Methodology is also disclosed for digitally signing documents in which a digital signature is generated for both computer verification and for reverification if a document needs to be reconfirmed by reentering from a paper rendition.
TL;DR: It is shown that authentication can not be based on public key certi cates alone, but also needs to include the binding between the key used for certification and it's owner, as well as the trust relationships between users.
Abstract: Open networks allow users to communicate without any prior arrangements such as contractual agreement or organisation membership. However, the very nature of open networks makes authenticity di cult to verify. We show that authentication can not be based on public key certi cates alone, but also needs to include the binding between the key used for certi cation and it's owner, as well as the trust relationships between users. We develop a simple algebra around these elements and describe how it can be used to compute measures of authenticity.
TL;DR: In this article, a method of managing certificates in a communication system having a certifying authority and a directory is proposed, which obviates the use of certification revocation lists communicated between the certificate authority and the directory.
Abstract: A method of managing certificates in a communication system having a certifying authority and a directory. Preferably, the method begins by having the certifying authority generate certificates by digitally signing a given piece of data. At a later point time, the certifying authority may produce a string that proves whether a particular certificate is currently valid without also proving the validity of at least some other certificates. The technique obviates use of certification revocation lists communicated between the certifying authority and the directory.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a framework to assist the writers of certificate policies or certification practice statements for participants within public key infrastructures, such as certification authorities, policy authorities, and communities of interest that wish to rely on certificates.
Abstract: This document presents a framework to assist the writers of certificate policies or certification practice statements for participants within public key infrastructures, such as certification authorities, policy authorities, and communities of interest that wish to rely on certificates. In particular, the framework provides a comprehensive list of topics that potentially (at the writer's discretion) need to be covered in a certificate policy or a certification practice statement. This document supersedes RFC 2527.
TL;DR: The notion of secret-key certificates is introduced and formalized in this paper, which is an alternative to the traditional public-key certificate scheme and can be used for the design of privacy-protecting mechanisms for signature transport.
Abstract: The notion of secret-key certificate schemes is introduced and formalized. As with public-key certificates, triples consisting of a secret key, a corresponding public key, and a secret-key certificate on the public key can only be retrieved by engaging in an issuing protocol with the issuer. The difference with public-key certificates is that pairs consisting of a public key and a secret-key certificate on the public key can be generated by anyone, with a distribution that is indistinguishable from the distribution according to which they are generated in the issuing protocol. Secret-key certificates offer the same functionality as do public-key certificates, because there is no point in using a public-key certificate scheme if the cryptographic actions that are to be performed with respect to a certified public key can be performed without knowing a corresponding secret key. The existence of efficient and secure secret-key certificate schemes is demonstrated by a generally applicable technique for deriving such schemes from signature schemes of a well-known type. The new notion is believed to be of interest in its own right, as it demonstrates an alternative to a stale paradigm in cryptography. More important are the practical advantages: secret-key certificates are better suited for the design of privacy-protecting mechanisms for signature transport, and can be used to construct secure public-key directories and conditional access mechanisms that provably do not leak information that can be of help to forge certificates.