Showing papers on "Centrality published in 1982"
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TL;DR: In this article, Schank and Abelson's script theory has emphasized the temporal sequence of events, while story grammars have focused on events' hierarchical structure or centrality.
127 citations
TL;DR: The history of the recent decline of production and operations management (POM) in academic importance is traced in this article, where POM's fundamental importance as a functional area is argued on the basis of four criteria: (I) centrality in organizations; (2) share of organizational resources; (3) pervasiveness in industrial society; and (4) significance in social change.
Abstract: The history of the recent decline of production and operations management (POM) in academic importance is traced. POM's fundamental importance as a functional area is argued on the basis of four criteria: (I) centrality in organizations; (2) share of organizational resources; (3) pervasiveness in industrial society; and (4) significance in social change.
23 citations
TL;DR: The preparation of counselors for assessment represents one of the more important issues that confronts the counseling profession as discussed by the authors, and the centrality of this issue may be stated as follows: Counseling...
Abstract: The preparation of counselors for assessment represents one of the more important issues that confronts the counseling profession. The centrality of this issue may be stated as follows: Counseling ...
7 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the Parsonian theory of action and the notion of offunctional requirements are investigated and a paradigm for empirical analysis is suggested, and the centrality of the concept to that body of thought is underscored.
Abstract: This article was prompted by recent questioning of the concept offunctional requirements. The author's investigation and analysis of the Parsonian theory of action are the basis of this treatment and clarification of action theory and the notion offunctional requirements. The centrality of the concept to that body of thought is underscored, and a paradigm for empirical analysis is suggested.
6 citations
1 Jan 1982
1 citations
Book•
31 Jul 1982
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied the structure of the international corporate elite and the role of banks in the formation of these elite networks, and they proposed a model for the level-of-analysis problem.
Abstract: 0 Introduction.- I Themes and Problems.- 1.0 Introduction.- 1.1 The theory of finance capital.- 1.2 Interlocking directorates and economic power.- 1.3 Financial groups.- 1.4 Corporate elite and capitalist class.- 1.5 Summary.- II Between Market and Hierarchy.- 2.0 Introduction.- 2.1 The organization of firms and markets: a neo-classical explanation.- 2.2 Some definitions of firms.- 2.3 Power and control.- 2.4 Ownership and control.- 2.5 Competition, cooperation and control.- 2.5.1 Concentration and centralization.- 2.5.2 The level-of-analysis problem.- 2.6 Summary.- III Imperialism in the Seventies: two models.- 3.0 Introduction.- 3.1 Theories of imperialism.- 3.1.1 Their origins.- 3.1.2 After World War II.- 3.2 Two models.- 3.3 Research design.- 3.4 Summary.- IV The International Corporate Elite.- 4.0 Introduction.- 4.1 The organization of the supervising and executive function in different countries.- 4.2 Selection of the international corporate elite.- 4.3 Network characteristics of the international corporate elite.- 4.3.0 Introduction.- 4.3.1 The finance capitalists.- 4.3.2 The big linkers.- 4.4 Types of interlocking directorates.- 4.4.0 Introduction.- 4.4.1 Multiple interlocks.- 4.5 Summary.- V National Versus International Integration.- 5.0 Introduction to some graph-theoretical concepts.- 5.1 General patterns in the international network.- 5.1.1 Compactness of the international network.- 5.1.2 International integration of national networks.- 5.2 The international network of Western firms.- 5.2.0 Introduction.- 5.2.1 Local centrality.- 5.2.2 Global centrality.- 5.2.3 Overall centrality.- 5.3 Industrial concentration versus economic centralization.- 5.4 Summary.- VI Domination and Control.- 6.0 Introduction.- 6.1 Clusters of heavily interlocked firms.- 6.1.1 The network at multiplicity-level two.- 6.1.2 The network at multiplicity-level three.- 6.1.3 Conclusions.- 6.2 The network of officer-interlocks.- 6.2.0 Introduction.- 6.2.1 Domination and control.- 6.2.1.1 The network of all officer-interlocks.- 6.2.1.2 The network of control.- 6.2.2 Financial groups.- 6.2.3 Constellations of interests.- 6.3 Summary.- VII Competition and Cooperation: the role of banks.- 7.0 Introduction.- 7.1 Interlocks among banks.- 7.2 Overlapping spheres of interests.- 7.3 International bank consortia.- 7.4 The American banks.- 7.5 Summary.- VIII The Impact of World Crisis: changes in the network.- 8.0 Introduction.- 8.1 A new economic world order?.- 8.2 Selection of the 1976 sample.- 8.3 The international corporate elite.- 8.3.1 Finance capitalists.- 8.3.2 Big linkers.- 8.4 International versus national integration.- 8.5 Centrality in the nested networks (1976).- 8.6 Domination and control in the 1976 network.- 8.7 Summary.- IX Summary and Conclusions.- 9.1 Introduction.- 9.2 The structure of the international corporate elite.- 9.3 Conflict or cooperation.- 9.4 The meaning of interlocking directorates.- 9.5 The international corporate elite.- References.- Authors Index.- Firms Index.- Appendix A.
TL;DR: In this paper, the reliability and stability of centrality in corporate interlock networks were examined with a test-retest simultaneous equation model and the results confirmed the common, but little tested, assumptions that centrality measures are highly reliable and stable.
Abstract: I There is a terminological difficulty to be noted here. "Centrality" has both a generic and a particular meaning in this paper. Generically, "centrality" refers to any of three intuitive conceptions: degree (connectedness), closeness, and betweenness (Freeman, 1979). In its particular sense, "centrality" refers to any variation of a measurement technique introduced by Phillip Bonacich (1972a, 1972b) and further elaborated in Bearden et al. (1975), Mariolis (1975), and Mariolis, Schwartz, and Mintz (1979). When using it in this latter sense, we generally refer to "centrality scores," or to "directional" and "nondirectional" centrality. In other cases, the context should make clear which of the two meanings we intend. This paper addresses a series of empirical, methodological, and theoretical questions raised by examining the reliability and stability of centrality in corporate interlock networks. Data on the interlocking directorates of 1094 large U.S. corporations in 1962, 1964, and 1966 are analyzed with a test-retest simultaneous equation model. The results confirm the common, but little tested, assumptions that centrality measures are highly reliable and stable. Further, we find that, of three measures examined (number of interlocks, nondirectional centrality, and directional centrality), number of interlocks is slightly more reliable or stable than the other two. Finally, the results show that the centrality of banks is more stable than the centrality of nonbanks. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings.*
TL;DR: A measure of degree of centrality in a social network which is based on a natural extension of the Banzhaf (1965) index of power in an N -person game is presented in this paper.