Cartesian Self

Abstract: In the Meditations and related texts from the early 1640s, Descartes argues that the self can be correctly considered as either a mind or a human being, and that the self’s properties vary accordingly. For example, the self is simple considered as a mind, whereas the self is composite considered as a human being. Someone might object that it is unclear how merely considering the self in different ways blocks the conclusion that a single subject of predication—the self—is both simple and composite, which is contradictory. In response to this objection, this paper develops a reading of Descartes’s various ways of considering the self. I argue that the best reading of Descartes’s qualified claims about the self, i.e., about the self qua mind or the self qua human being, presupposes an account of the unqualified self, that is, of the self simpliciter. I argue that the self simpliciter is not a mind, and that it is not a human being either. This result might suggest the pessimistic conclusion that Descartes’s view of the self is incoherent. To avoid this result, I introduce a new metaphysical account of the Cartesian self. On my view, the self is individuated by a unified mental life. The self is constituted by the beings that jointly produce this mental life, and derives its unity from it.

Abstract: Dialogical epistemologies of the self have been influential in rethinking the politics of ethnography. Although critiquing the centered Cartesian self as the locus of knowledge, these approaches fo...

Abstract: Cyberspace has been hailed by some as a medium through which users can experience themselves as disembodied, freed from the corporeal trappings of the “real” world. Literature proclaiming the merits of this disembodied ideal has often described the user’s existential state as a form of Cartesian disembodiment, but without (in our view) giving serious consideration to whether this label is warranted. This paper explores the extent to which alterations to the contingency relation said to exist by Descartes, between mind and body (or physical system), result in experiences of disembodiment that can legitimately be described as Cartesian. After examining various examples of altered contingency relations—from case study reports of pathological experiences of disembodiment to research evidence on online relating—we conclude that cyberspace does not constitute a suitable medium for the realization of the Cartesian self, even in users who intentionally seek to become disembodied. The more we try to disengage with...

Abstract: Part I. Introduction: 1. The West and the self Part II. Basics of Philosophical Psychology: 2. Heideggerian and Cartesian self 3. Free will 4. Cartesian, Lockean and Kantian self 5. Extraordinariness and the two stages of rationality Part III. The Cartesian Self in History: 6. The cause and content of modernity 7. The second-stage rationality in history 8. Economic rationality 9. The Cartesian self in the 20th century Part IV. Value Spheres: 10. A diagnosis and therapy for modernity 11. Value spheres defined and the state 12. The serving spheres 13. Technology 14. Utilitarian or Cartesian approach 15. The media and other professions 16. Science 17. Art and religion 18. Sport 19. Latin and absolute love Part V. A Self-Understanding Not Only for the West: 20. Liberty and equality 21. Harnessing extraordinariness 22. Cartesian modernity 23. The undivided universally developed individual 24. The end of history?