Topic
Cartesian doubt
About: Cartesian doubt is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 249 publications have been published within this topic receiving 2374 citations. The topic is also known as: Cartesian skepticism & methodic doubt.
Papers published on a yearly basis
1 / 2
Papers
TL;DR: The Kantian approach to moral philosophy is to try to show that ethics is based on practical reason: that our ethical judgments can be explained in terms of rational standards that apply directly to conduct or to deliberation.
Abstract: The Kantian approach to moral philosophy is to try to show that ethics is based on practical reason: that is, that our ethical judgments can be explained in terms of rational standards that apply directly to conduct or to deliberation. Part of the appeal of this approach lies in the way that it avoids certain sources of skepticism that some other approaches meet with inevitably. If ethically good action is simply rational action, we do not need to postulate special ethical properties in the world or faculties in the mind, in order to provide ethics with a foundation. But the Kantian approach gives rise to its own specific form of skepticism, skepticism about practical reason. By skepticism about practical reason , I mean doubts about the extent to which human action is or could possibly be directed by reason. One form that such skepticism takes is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice; doubts, that is to say, about whether “formal” principles have any content and can give substantive guidance to choice and action. An example of this would be the common doubt about whether the contradiction tests associated with the first formulation of the categorical imperative succeed in ruling out anything. I will refer to this as content skepticism . A second form taken by skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive.
796 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of Cartesian skepticism about the external world has its roots in the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and it can be seen as a case of inference to the best explanation.
Abstract: CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION* T he problem of skepticism about the external world, or Cartesian skepticism, has its roots in the underdetermination of theory by evidence. We each adopt a body of common-sense beliefs about the world which answers to our sensory experience. In principle, however, the beliefs we base on that experience are subject to underdetermination, and we can devise radical alternatives to the common-sense account. Such alternatives take the form of skeptical hypotheses, like Descartes's fiction that his experiences are caused by an evil demon. Certainly, when the choice arises, we hold to the common-sense view, and reject its skeptical competitors. l But what (epistemic) reasons can we have for doing so? In cases of underdeterniination generally, principles of inference to the best explanation can license the choice of one theory over others. Accordingly, we would be justified in preferring the common-sense account to skeptical hypotheses, if the common-sense account provides better explanations of why our experience is the way it is. 2 My purpose here is to inquire into the explanatory advantages of the common-sense view, and to develop a response to skepticism along the lines just indicated. 3 One obstacle to carrying out this project is that the standards by
350 citations
25 Sep 2008
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a survey of the main arguments against and responses to the regress argument and present a set of alternatives to the regression argument, as well as a discussion of the relationship between rationalism and belief in the external world.
Abstract: Introduction - John Greco Part One. Varieties of Skepticism and Skeptical Arguments 1. The Pyrrhonian Problematic- Markus Lammenranta 2. The Problem of the Criterion- Richard Fumerton 3. Cartesian Skepticism: Arguments and Antecedents- Jose Luis Bermudez 4. Hume's Skepticism- Michael Williams 5. Skepticism about the External World- John Greco 6. Skepticism about Induction- Weintraub 7. Skepticism about A Priori Justification: Self-evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions- Robert Audi 8. Moral Realism, Quasi-Realism and Skepticism- Terence Cuneo 9. Religious Skepticism - Paul K. Moser 10. Live Skeptical Hypotheses - Bryan Frances Part Two. Responses to Skepticism 11. Berkeley's Treatment of Skepticism - George Pappas 12. Kant's Response to Skepticism- Robert Stern 13. Reid's Response to Skepticism- James Van Cleve 14. Peirce and Skepticism - Christopher Hookway 15. Moore's Common Sense Response- Noah Lemos 16. Austin's Way with Skepticism - Mark Kaplan 17. Wittgentein on Certainty -Marie McGinn 18. Relativism as a Response to Skepticism- Peter J. Graham Part Three. Contemporary Issues 19. Ascriber Contextualism- Stewart Cohen 20. Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology - Duncan Pritchard 21. Closure and Alternative Possibilities - Jonathan Kvanvig 22. Contemporary Responses to the Regress Argument- Peter D. Klein 23. Externalist Responses to Skepticism -Michael Bergmann 24. Internalist Responses to Skepticism - Jonathan Vogel 25. Virtue-theoretic Responses to Skepticism - Guy Axtell 26. Disjunctivism and Skepticism- Alan Millar
204 citations
TL;DR: In the Critique of Pure Reason as discussed by the authors, Kant attempts to formulate a distinctive refutation of an extreme Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of the existence of physical objects, since one cannot rule out some possibilities which, if they obtained, would entail that there are no physical objects.
Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attempts to formulate a distinctive refutation of an extreme Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of the existence of physical objects. According to this skeptical view, one cannot know whether there exist any physical objects, since one cannot rule out some possibilities which, if they obtained, would entail that there are no physical objects. Since one cannot know that a possibility such as that of a Cartesian evil genius does not obtain, one is not entitled to claim to know the truth of propositions about the existence of physical objects which would be false if the possibility did obtain. I Kant's general aim is to supply us with an internal refutation of such a view, i.e., one which would proceed from a premise which would itself form a part of the skeptic's position, or which he would accept. The crucial premise would be that one is the subject of self-conscious experience. An examination of the conditions for the possibility of self-conscious experience would yield the result that the existence of physical objects is such a condition. Therefore, the falsity of the skeptic's claim about lack of knowledge of the existence of physical objects would follow from his acknowledgement that he is a self-conscious experience. A weaker kind of skeptical position regarding knowledge of physical objects is suggested by Descartes' dream argument. On such a position, it would be conceded that one can know that there are physical objects, but it would be argued that one cannot know whether any of one's beliefs about the particular physical objects one seems to encounter are in fact true. This skeptical position could be supported in the following way. One cannot rule out the possibility that one's current experience is merely a dream experience. If one is dreaming, then one's current experience is not a waking experience. One cannot, then, claim to know that one is awake. From this it would appear to follow that one is not entitled to claim to know that one's current experience as of physical objects is veridical. It would appear to follow, in other
182 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 4 |
| 2020 | 2 |
| 2019 | 6 |
| 2018 | 6 |
| 2017 | 7 |
| 2016 | 10 |