Abstract: Part 1 Early Islam: the messenger/the mission of Muhammad the notion of monarchy under the Umayyads and Abbasids c.661-900 the development of the Sunni way c.700-900 Shi'ism political culture in the Persian renaissance c.850-1050 the early Falasifa (philosophers) - Plato without the Polis. Part II Religion and state power (din wa dawla): Sunni doctrine and the state c.900-1220 the theory of the Caliphate the order of the realm Ghazali's balance the ethics of power - advice-to-kings (nahisat al-muluk) political philosophy in the 12th century Sufism and politics. Part III The Shari'a and the sword c.1220-1520: the rape of Asia Mamluk ideology and the Sultan-Caliph Nasir al-Din Tusi (1263-1328) - shara'a governance (al-siyasa al-shari'yya) the Delhi sultanate and al-Barani - statecraft and morality Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) - the science of civilization and the governance of Islam the decline of classical Islamic political thought. Part IV Islam and the west: the Age of Modernism - c.1830-1920 the Age of Fundamentalism c.1920-2000.

Abstract: Figures and Maps Preface Notes on Contributors Tributary Empires: Towards a Global and Comparative History P.F.Bang & C.A.Bayly PART I: HISTORIOGRAPHIES OF EMPIRE Religion, Liberalism and Empires: British Historians and their Indian Critics in the Nineteenth Century C.A.Bayly Orientalism and Classicism: the British-Roman Empire of Lord Bryce and his Italian Critics F.De Donno The New Order and the Fate of the Old: The Historiographical Construction of an Ottoman ancien regime in the Nineteenth century B.Tezcan PART II: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMPIRE Empire as a Topic in Comparative Sociology W.G.Runciman Early Imperial Formations in Africa and the Segmentation of Power M.Tymowski Post-Nomadic Empires: From the Mongols to the Mughals A.Wink The Process of Empire: Frontiers and Borderlands D.Ludden The Emblematic Province: Sicily from the Roman Empire to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies G.Salmeri PART III: COMPARATIVE HISTORIES Lord of All the World: the State, Heterogeneous Power and Hegemony in the Roman and Mughal Empires P.F.Bang Fiscal Regimes and the 'First Great Divergence' between Eastern and Western Eurasia W.Scheidel Late Rome and the Arab Caliphate C.Wickham Returning the Household to the Tributary Empire Model: Gender, Succession, and Ritual in the Mughal, Safavid, and Ottoman Empires S.Blake Comparisons Across Empires: The Critical Social Structures of the Ottomans, Russians and Habsburgs during the Seventeenth Century K.Barkey & R.Batzell Endnotes Bibliography Index

Abstract: The author argues that in the case of Islamic history, the growing interest in the economic theory of institutions and their role in economic growth has shifted the scholarly methodology from empirically based research, to theoretical models which favoured sweeping generalizations about the negative roles of the Islamic state and legal institution. Shatzmiller’s examinations of the role of Islamic institutions in periods of economic growth show that economic growth was visible in the key indicators of the Caliphate’s economy between ca. 750 and ca. 1100. The conclusion is that there was nothing intrinsic to Islamic institutions that impaired economic growth.

Abstract: This insightful analysis looks at the power struggles of 1920–1926, a time during which the Ottoman Empire was replaced by a secular and modernist Turkish nationalist regime. Covering a short but eventful period in Ottoman/Turkish history From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic focuses on three major political and judicial maneuvers to demonstrate how opposition to and within the emerging Turkish regime was addressed during those pivotal years, and how the resulting power struggle contributed to the form of the new state that arose. The analysis begins in 1918 when the Ottoman Empire, having lost World War I, was waiting for its fate to be determined by the Allied Powers. The book examines the original intentions and vision of Mustafa Kemal (later known as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk), as well as the effects of the Kurdish uprising in 1925, which helped the new regime silence its critics. The ongoing power struggles and their consequences are examined through 1927, after which the new regime quashed any and all opposition, enabling the new Turkish Republic to emerge as a staunchly secular, modernizing Western state.

Abstract: This article builds upon previous work on the discourse of legal and illegal slavery in Islamic West Africa and on the issue of illegal enslavement as a major cause of the Sokoto jihad. It argues that the protection of freeborn Muslims was a major policy concern for the Sokoto government but that, due to internal factors, the government could not stop the enslavement of freeborn Muslims nor enforce the legally preferred remedy of free release. The government's acceptance of the ransoming of illegally captive individuals by family and friends is interpreted as a demonstration of the weakness of the Sokoto Caliphate government.

Abstract: This insightful analysis looks at the power struggles of 1920-1926, a time during which the Ottoman Empire was replaced by a secular and modernist Turkish nationalist regime. * A bibliography of archival sources from the United States, Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and Turkey, as well as other primary and secondary sources in the Turkish, English, and Ottoman languages

Abstract: LeT, better known as the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, is one of the world's largest Islamist militant organizations that is said to have its roots in Pakistan. Officially banned in Pakistan and in six other regions - India, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the European Union, Russia and Australia - the notorious organization continues to operate in full force. "The Caliphate's Soldiers" is an important and insightful book about this dangerous terrorist outfit. It is an in-depth research on the workings and ideology of the LeT, which condemns democracy as a 'useless practice' rather 'a menace', which they must fight and replace with Islam. The author delves into the aspirations of this militant group and presents a close reading of its copious literature, leaders' speeches, and other resources available in public records. It is written in an accessible format which will be appreciated not only by experts on terrorism and intelligence analysts, but also by lay people.

Abstract: The crisis that unfolded after Iran's June 2009 presidential election exposed the absolutist nature of the state's highest religious authority (wali-ye faqih), Ayatullah ‘Ali Khamena'i. It also revealed the urgent need to critically interrogate Ayatullah Khomeini's doctrinal justifications for the governance of the jurist (wilayat al-faqih) in light of how ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, the first Shi‘i Imam, assumed the caliphate: divine bestowal (nass) combined with public investiture that took the form of bay‘a (oath of allegiance). Ayatullahs Husayn ‘Ali Montazeri, Mohsen Kadivar, Yousef Saanei, Bayat Zanjani and Mehdi Karrubi have attempted to devise a model in which sovereignty belongs to the public and limits the clergy's role in daily matters of the state to oversight and guidance. In contrast, Ayatullahs Kazemeyni Boroujerdi and Mojteba Shabestari argue for a clear-cut separation between the church and the state so that the public can choose its form of government since no specific form is prescribed in Isla...

Abstract: The rapid expansion of the early Islamic world is conventionally ascribed to a combination of brilliant military leadership and religious fervor. In this book, Abd-Al-Aziz Duri demonstrates how the growth, development, and durability of early Islamic governance derived from highly sophisticated systems of administration (in which the idea of a Muslim ummah was the central feature) as well as efficient mechanisms for taxation and tax collection. The fact that in a highly dynamic period of Islamic history a seamless system of administration could endure for several centuries, from the early Muslim conquests and the later Umayyad era to the end of Abbasid rule, is testimony to the political and organizational skills of these early Muslim leaders. Duri's work makes a major contribution to our understanding of how Islam established itself and flourished as a lasting major force in the development of world history.

Abstract: Revolutions often step in to speedily finish off, in their own way , the reformist undertakings of the old regimes. This was as true for the Ottomans as it was for the Iranians; the seeds of revolution were cast during the reform era of the nineteenth century. The late Ottoman Empire was ripe for a revolution. The rationalizing and centralizing reforms of the nineteenth century had partially transformed the patrimonial bureaucracy and tightened the state’s grip on its far-flung territories, but the state was held back because of severe financial strains. The overwhelming geopolitical pressures on an agrarian state vying to hold its own amidst the well-financed armies of industrial or industrializing nations, internal rebellions, and tax-collection problems forced the state to declare bankruptcy in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Abdulhamid, the monarch that assumed power at this time of crisis, aggravated the tensions. His novel policies were not a reflection of the personal idiosyncrasies that are favored in some accounts, but one logical response to the multiple and contradictory challenges facing the empire. While insisting on the previous mission of the reformists, he broke with preceding reformers by introducing an alternative model of modernity that sought to make the European-inspired reforms consonant with religious and bureaucratic traditions of the empire. This resulted in his well-known Islamist policies, among them the new importance of the title “caliph.” Within the bureaucratic and military realms, it resulted in combining rational bureaucratic norms with some aspects of past patrimonial traditions, such as placing loyalty to the person before loyalty to the office, and basing advancements and rewards partially on this criterion. It also meant revamping the Palace as the center of all bureaucratic and military decision-making. These became major points of contention for a growing internal opposition.

Abstract: Introduction A.Afsaruddin Medieval Section Justification of Political Authority in Medieval Sunni Thought H.Yucesoy Alfarabi and the Foundation of Political Theology in Islam M.Campanini Alfarabi's Goal: Political Philosophy, not Political Theology C.Butterworth Prophecy, Imamate, and Political Rule among the Ikhwan al-Safa C.Baffioni Responsibilities of Political Office in a Shi'I Caliphate and the Delineation of Public Duties under the Fatimids P.Walker Ibn Taymiyya on Islamic Governance B.Malkawi & T.Sonn Modern Section Theologizing about Democracy: A Critical Appraisal of Mawdudi's Thought A.Afsaruddin The Political Philosophy of Islamic Resurgence M.Khan Rethinking the Relationship between Religion and Liberal Democracy: Overcoming the Problems of Secularism in Muslim Societies N.Hashemi Minarchist Political Islam A.Malik Wilayat al-Faqih and Democracy M.Kadivar Anwar al-'Awlaqi against the Islamic Legal Tradition A.March

Abstract: The article argues that al-abarī’s History of the Prophets and the Kings provides a free rider-analysis of the decline of Abbasid state power. Al-abarī’s historical analysis considers state policy on land tax, and religion as a legal norm related to the social contract between the head of state and the landlords. It is concluded that al-abarī saw the misāa tax system and ‘rule of law’ as the principal conditions for imperial rule, and that al-abarī’s History already provides an answer to modern historians’ questions as to why the Abbasid state crumbled, and what role religion played in the political economy.

Abstract: If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development. (1) --Aristotle Introduction To someone familiar with the history of Ancient Greece, the story will seem at first quite recognizable. In a bipolar world, the two great superpowers of the day wage a decades-long struggle to establish complete hegemony over the other. The conflict ebbs and flows for years, with one side occasionally gaining the upper hand, only to relinquish it later. The belligerents include allies beholden to one superpower or the other, and a great amphibious expedition helps determine the war's outcome. When the fighting finally ends, both superpowers are so depleted by battlefield losses, plague, and spent treasure that neither is prepared to confront a burgeoning superpower emerging on their periphery. This new force quickly expands across thousands of miles, creating a colossal empire and bringing with it sweeping cultural changes that still profoundly shape the world today. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the tale of the Peloponnesian War and the ensuing rise of Macedon. Rather, it is the story of the last great war of antiquity, the late sixth and early seventh century struggle between the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires. (2) More notably, it is the story of the great Arab conquests that followed in that war's aftermath, and the remarkable creation of an Islamic empire that soon stretched from the Atlantic coast to the Chinese frontier. Thucydides' celebrated history and Alexander's epochal expansion of the Hellenic world certainly merit the close study they receive. (3) Because of its pertinence to our own time, the early history of Islam deserves equal, if not more, attention, ideally in our nation's high schools and colleges. A more acute problem--and one that could be readily tackled--is the absence of this immensely important period from war college syllabi. If the United States is to ensure its future policy makers and senior joint force leaders are adequately prepared to perform their duties effectively, Joint Professional Military Education needs to incorporate an objectively focused block of instruction on the formative period in Islamic history, beginning with the birth of the Prophet Mohammed in 570, and ending with collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate in 1258. In advocating for this course, it is first helpful to recall the exacting price too often paid when strategists fail to consider--or understand-- historical matters of context in their planning. A brief assessment of what the proposed block of instruction ought to include demonstrates how this record of past failures can be improved. Understanding Islam's early history is an essential foundation for anyone confronting the Middle East's most-enduring challenges, such as the Sunni-Shiite struggle, the future of the Saudi regime, and the dispute over Jerusalem. A review of the proposed curricula also helps explain how a proper appreciation of Islam's first centuries helps undercut essentialist, anti-Muslim narratives, thereby inhibiting misguided assumptions. Of course, teaching Islamic history could invite controversy; indeed there is an intense debate among academics about how to approach the subject. Nonetheless, the potential for disagreement cannot become an excuse for avoiding it, even if it does call for an important note of caution. We Know What We Don't Know Justifiably, Americans are often criticized for their short memories, (4) and their regrettable indifference towards the subject of history. (5) In the field of foreign affairs, the failure of US leaders to sufficiently appreciate the history of other nations is an all too common lament. (6) An appalling misconstruction of Vietnam's history--in particular its ancient, troubled affiliation with China--helped cause the United States to approach that war with an unwinnable strategy. (7) When the Eisenhower administration used the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to overthrow Iran's government in 1953, it gave no heed to that country's proud past, and planted the seed for the "first wave" of Islamic revolutions twenty-five years later. …

Abstract: The Fulani Jihad (1804-1810) led by Shehu, Uthman Dan Fodio was successfully prosecuted against the established Hausa dynasty in Northern Nigeria It led to the emergence of a theocratic state, the Sokoto Caliphate, which was administered largely as a federation, due to its wide expanse and diverse composition of its people The causes, management and impact of the Jihad as well as important lessons for national integration and development in contemporary Nigerian political life form the basic themes of this paper Key words : Jihad, Integration, Theocracy, National Development, Caliphate

Abstract: The Fatimids rose to political dominion in North Africa in 909. The new caliph, al-Mahdi, was already imam of the Shici followers but, until then, he had not actually ruled a politically defined territory. However, he and his successors thereafter were both imams in the religious sense and also rulers of an empire that grew from its original base in what is now Tunisia, Algeria, and Sicily. In 969, the Fatimids added Egypt, much of Syria, and the holy cities of Arabia to their growing empire. As imams of the Isma‘ilis, the Fatimids controlled a network of missions (da cwas) that reached deep into areas dominated by their opponents, and, as caliphs, they governed a populace that comprised a substantial majority who were not and never became Isma‘ilis. Most of them were Sunnis. Fatimid caliphs therefore played two roles. On the one hand, they were the leaders of the various Muslim communities within their realm; on the other, they were imams of a religious movement, the Isma‘ilis, a sub-branch of the Shica. A Shici imam is the infallible, divinely chosen guardian of those who adhere to his cause. His word is absolute; the devotion of his followers is total and unconditional. In theory he is the single agent of God on earth. As rulers of a varied population, however, it was essential for the Fatimids to communicate, not merely with Isma‘ilis, but with the rest as well. The pertinent question here then is how this dynasty articulated a principle of public duty that recognized the august supremacy of the imam and yet assured the loyalty of all the citizens of the state, most especially those individuals appointed to administer the offices of government.

Abstract: I wish in this chapter to set up a comparison between the late Roman Empire and the early Arab Caliphate, as state structures. Before I do, however, some points about comparison in itself seem to me to be helpful. There are always, before very recent times, three main problems confronting anyone who wishes to compare across historical societies. The first is the nature of our evidence. Different cultures produce different sorts of documentation, and think it important to record — and to preserve the records of — different sorts of things. When one adds to that the hugely different survival rates of our documentation across the vicissitudes of the centuries, the problem of comparing like with like only increases. In the late Roman Empire, outside the tax records of Egypt, the main evidence for state and fiscal structures comes from imperial laws. In the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid Caliphate of the mid-seventh to early tenth centuries, again outside the tax records of Egypt, the evidence for state and fiscal structures comes from the huge political narratives compiled around AD 900 by al-Baladhuri and al-Tabari. You would think that Egypt would therefore be the axis of any comparison between Rome and the Caliphate, and on one level it is, but actually sixth-century (i.e. Roman) and eighth-century (i.e. caliphal) tax and administrative records for Egypt are not that different. The fiscal structures of the two states, or empires, were in reality very different, in many ways, but it is the other sources which show this, and we have to use them differently and expect different information to be privileged in them.1

Abstract: The end of the Carolingian dynasty shortly after the death of King Lothar III (954–86) has tended to overwrite that king’s considerable activity in his reign. This is especially evident in the counties of the old Spanish March, now mostly parts of Catalonia, as they came under renewed pressure from the caliphate of Cordoba. This article examines three counts of this area circa 981, when one of them received a letter from Lothar, and finds each of them using a different strategy to justify their possession of what had once been regalian rights. By examining changes in their representations, it goes on to show that the rulers here relied on royalist ideological arguments sufficiently to enable a king to make his voice heard at their courts even in the very last years of the Carolingian era

Abstract: The rapid expansion of the early Islamic world is conventionally ascribed to a combination of brilliant military leadership and religious fervour. In this book, Abd al-Aziz Duri demonstrates how the growth, development and durability of early Islamic governance derived from highly sophisticated systems of administration (in which the idea of a Muslim ummah was the central feature) as well as efficient mechanisms for taxation and tax collection. The fact that in a highly dynamic period of Islamic history a seamless system of administration could endure for several centuries, from the early Muslim conquests and the later Umayyad era to the end of Abbasid rule, is testimony to the political and organisational skills of these early Muslim leaders. Duri's work makes a major contribution to our understanding of how Islam established itself and flourished as a lasting major force in the development of world history.

Abstract: Ninth century is conceived a period of important cultural changes in Byz- antium. At that time, written culture of the empire emerges from the "Dark Age" in which literary production was in decline. The most important participants of these changes are few larger-than-life and easy to pick out figures. Interestingly, all of the most important Byzantine 9th-century men of letters were sent as emissaries to the Abbasid capital: John the Grammarian, Photius, Constantine/st. Cyril, Leon Choirosphaktes. The only one who was not - Leon the mathematician, was actually said to have been invited avidly to Baghdad by the caliph. It cannot be just a coinci- dence. In my opinion it is connected with the growing consciousness in Byzantium of the cultural prowess of the Arabs. In 9th century the Byzantines were starting to consider the caliphate as not only a temporary phenomenon at its eastern bor- der, but as a permanent rival. This recognition was not only political. The Byzan- tines seemingly became aware of the cultural excellence of the caliphate, in which the impressive, large-scale Graeco-Arabic translation movement was taking place at that time. At the same point, the Byzantines constituted the main axis of ideo- logical rhetoric of the Abbasids of the Graeco-Arabic translation movement. They were presented in the sources of the period as not worthy the ancient Greek culture which they accidentally fell heirs to, and the Arabs as the true, worthy inheritors. The big embassies provided an opportunity to this kind of interaction. That being the case, they gained particular cultural character. They appear to have been re- garded by both parties as a way to get political affairs resolved, but furthermore as an occasion to display the supremacy over the rival empire. Consequently, the lead- ers of the embassies between Byzantium and the Abbasids seem to be on a centre stage of the supposedly conscious cultural rivalry.

Abstract: Since its formation, Baghdad was a flourishing source of mythologies and local legends due to its unusual form and symbolism. Usually, when one thinks of the capital of the Abbasid dynasty, one of the most familiar figure is that of the most charming caliphs, Harun al-Rashid. This luxuriant city which became the symbol of the Islamic empire was settled during the reign of the ambitious caliph al-Mansur (d. 136/754- 158/775), known as Djafar al-Mansur (Mansur the builder), a legendary figure in the whole Islamic chronology. The caliph's intention was to build an imperial city, an enormous fortress destined for eternal glory. Despite its unusual shape, a perfect circle, undoubtedly inspired by ancient Mesopotamian cities, the symbolical purpose was to recreate at the level of urban planning the imagine of the Paradise. A series of hypothesis regarding the meanings of "The Round City" of Baghdad has been released; most of them trying to relate the urban template with deep symbolical levels and local legends, specific to the Islamic thought, at that time. The shape can be explained in relation with the ancient Mesopotamian towns and with an esoteric lecture of the Koran, especially those regarding the Paradise. At the same time, the inner organisation of the city follows a well known pattern which has been established at Medina by the Prophet himself. Thus, the continuity of the Medina template proves once more the importance of the Shari'ah inside the Islamic Community. The first planned structure of the city of Baghdad was based on the preconceived plan of one individual, the caliph. This, the second capital of the Abbasid Caliphate was designed to showcase and glorify the Islamic system. Its layout mainly reflected the imperial symbolism of the main city of the Islamic empire at the time. "The Round City" of Baghdad respected the conceptual structure of the Medina model; even its shape was not copied in other examples of Muslim urbanism.

Abstract: As the international community becomes more globalized so do Islamic terror networks. The technological advancements of the 21 st century continue to aid Islamic terror networks in their ability to implement global communication strategies. Implementing worldwide communication strategies has brought the terrorists closer to achieving their desired end result, an Islamic caliphate. In order to impede any further advancement in their asymmetrical battle with the West, apostate Muslim regimes, Israel, and the counterterrorism community need to understand the threat before them. Through a thorough investigation of Islamic terrorist networks strategic communications approach alongside the use of network technologies it is the hope to better understand the capabilities of the 21 st jihadist. By understanding the capabilities of the 21 st century terrorist effective policy recommendations

Abstract: The second half of the third/ninth and the fourth/tenth centuries are of particular importance for the development of the judiciary in the central lands of the Abbasid caliphate. At the end of the mihna period and the victory of Sunnism under al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-247/847-861), the caliphate agreed not to interfere further within the legal sphere, thus allowing the principal schools of law to complete their development toward their classical structure. In Iraq, thanks to the growing independence of the legal sphere and to the political weakness of the caliphate, the qadis increased their judicial freedom. Meanwhile, the political situation in Egypt was very different. The provincial rulers and two successive dynasties, the Tulunids (254-292/868-905) and the Ikhshidids (323-358/935-969), profited from the weakness of the caliphate, and imposed their autonomy de facto. The role played by the judiciary in this process is still unclear, as is the impact of Egyptian autonomy on the development of the local judiciary. In this paper, I discuss the evolution of the relationship between the Egyptian governors and the judiciary, from the accession of Ahmad b. Tulun in 254/868 until the arrival of the Fatimids in 358/969. Several elements are taken into consideration: (1) The institutional links between political power and the judiciary: Who appointed the qadis? How were they selected? Did the government choose to rely on local scholars or did the qadis come from outside the province? (2) The financial connection between the governors and the qadis, which was not only symbolic of the delegation of power, but could also denote the submission of the judiciary to the government. (3) The daily interactions between the qadis and the governors. (4) The judicial practice of the qadis. (5) Their reputation. I study to what extent the judiciary and its control was a political issue for the Tulunids and the Ikhshidids, and how the efforts of these two dynasties to build an Egyptian autonomy had important consequences on the structure of the legal milieu.

Abstract: The Arab world is awakening; especially Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, countries trying to change their destiny. Turkey has been shown as a model instead of those authoritarian governments and corrupt systems. According to two surveys conducted by Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and KA Research Limited in seven Arabic countries, 61% of survey respondents (in 2009) and 66% of survey respondents (in 2010) think that Turkey can be a role model for the other Muslim countries in the Middle East. in the Peninsula. It created this unity from many disconnected and even hostile tribes under the control of one leader and spread Islam rapidly to Asia, Africa and Europe. Subsequently the four caliphate era Umayyad and Abbasside continued to conquer new countries and spread Islam. When Turks arrived in Mesopotamia in the early 11th century they created great empires like Seljuk and Ottoman and they took control of the Mediterranean basin. Following the Ottoman Empire's sovereignty, for hundreds of years this area has been colonised by France, United Kingdom and Italy and Muslim lands have lost their unity. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia gained their independence in the twentieth century but they could not escape from the influence of western countries. In these countries in which settled repressive authoritarian administrations, a small minority owned all the business by exploiting the countries' resources, enriching themselves and living a life of luxury. This resulted in huge inequalities and poverty which grew to intolerable proportions. The lack of a democratic system and the existence of a repressive policing administration, corruption, injustice and human rights violations did not allow citizens to live in dignity in these countries. Meanwhile, thanks to the development of communication tools, Arabic people have raised up against oppression in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria and some others countries. While some of these countries are trying to reform their systems; Turkey which was built on the Ottoman Empire's remains, has been shown as a model for them. Can Turkey really serve as a model for the Middle Eastern and North African countries? How and why? To answer these questions we will have a look into the political situation in the Middle East and try to analyse the Turkish political system. 2. Control of The Region Mediterranean basin countries have constantly been a focus of the superpowers because of their extremely important geo-strategic location and natural resources like water, oil and natural gas. Therefore, the superpowers have always tried to be present there to dominate the region, to control the natural resources

Abstract: The Akhbār majmū‘a, or 'Collected Accounts', deal with the Muslim conquest of the Iberian peninsula in 711 and subsequent events in al-Andalus, down to and including the reign of ‘Abd al-Rahmān III (912-961), founder of the Umayyad caliphate of al-Andalus No Arabic text dealing with the early history of al-Andalus has aroused more controversy, and its contents and origin have occupied the attention of leading scholars of Islamic Spain since its publication in 1867 This book gives the first complete English translation of this key contemporary text, together with notes, comments, appendices and maps It is introduced by a survey of scholarly opinion on the text from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century in which all the - often heated - arguments around the text are explained The translator concludes his introduction with an in-depth examination of the manuscript containing the only surviving copy of the text and presents some interesting new evidence provided by scribe which has gone unnoticed until now Providing new insights into this significant Arabic text, this book will be of great interest to scholars of the history of Spain and Portugal, Islamic history, and Mediaeval European history

Abstract: The aftermath of First World War (1914-1918) left a tremendous impact on the Muslim world due to the defeat of the Ottoman Caliphate in the war. Consequently, this gave an opportunity for the British to control the Middle East region which led to the seizure of the Palestinian land by the immigrant Jews. This article discusses how the British after defeating the Ottoman Caliphate in 1917 went on to conquer Jerusalem. The promulgation of the Balfour Declaration by the British in the same year offered Palestine as ‘a national home’ for the Jew nation. Subsequently,the British were given a mandate by the League of Nations to rule Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan while France was given a mandate over Syria. Using historical analysis, this article evaluates how the British manipulated the mandate given to them to enable this to settle in western Palestine,namely between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. The rights to settle by the Jews was provided for in the Conference of San Remo. The analysis concludes that the formation of the state of Israel on 25th April, 12948, was directly influenced by the implementation of the British mandate in Palestine. This article also shows that the occupation of the Jews threatened the rights of the Palestinians. As a result of suppression and deprivation, the spirit of nationalism were raised among the Palestinians and the Arabs, with the Palestinians struggling to free their homeland from the Jews occupation

Abstract: Ali Allawi, Crisis of Islamic Civilization. Yale University Press, 2009. Ah Allawi' s book is a masterful analysis of the complex theological, political, social, economic, and cultural features of Islam. The theme of the book is rooted in Islamic orthodoxy. Allawi is an able advocate and a brilliant defender of the causes of Islam. He is dedicated to its authenticity, to its historical evolutions, and to the struggles that the Faith encountered throughout its marches in history. The book has eleven chapters that can be divided into the historical decline and the requisites for the recovery of Islam. In each of these chapters, the author assembles a wealth of scholarly context to the argument that Islamic civilization in the last century and half experienced persistent assault by "reformers and secularists." Islamists with different ideological intensity are attempting to restore "the pivotal role of Islam in society" (p. 41). Their vision is no less than the restoration of the last caliphate that was "folded" in 1924 when the last Ottoman Caliph was deposed. The geographical features of the envisioned caliphate are described as follows: The geographical space of Islam was by far the widest known to man before the advent of the empire of Europe. It stretched right across the Eurasia land mass and into Africa, forming a distinct religious and cultural community, even though it was divided into different political states (p. 44). This contiguous "abode of Islam" was fragmented by the abode of the secular, meaning European modernization and "scientism." The concept of the nation-state had epitomized national unity, but the way nationalism is framed by the secular nonIslamic world is not adequate. The European version of the nation-state is wholly antithetical to that vast theocratic and Quranic caliphate. The spirit of Enlightenment and the intellectual renaissance that have emasculated Christianity have indirectly contributed to the emasculating of Islam also. The onset of "colonialism", "modernism", "secularism", regional conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, Afghanistan and the rise of Wahhabism and Salafism have combined to weaken Islamic civilization. The decline and eventual fall of the Ottoman Empire was the last calamity that had befallen Islam and sealed its decline permanently. In the waning years of colonialism, Islamic scholars emerged calling for an Islamic revival. The author discusses two influential Islamic scholars, Mohammed Iqbal (1877 - 1938) of Punjab and Said Nursi (1877-1960) of Turkey. Both of these scholars "were deeply concerned with regaining the self-confidence of the Muslim in the face of huge threats affecting the integrity of Islamic civilization and the commitments of Muslims to the legacies of their past" (p.50). They called for the return of Sharia and the promotion of strict Islam. They entertained a "vision of Islam that preserved the vitality of the faith" (P .58). Iqbal called on the believer to express his faith as an activist and a relentless promoter of Islam. He instructed by stating that "the individual can only be a realized being if he or she strives for perfection through moral action" (p. 58). "Moral action" in this case is an instructive hint to Allawi's argument. Reading deeper into the context of this statement, it is easy to see that the author presents Iqbal as having been in favor of a temporized jihad, a strategy where jihad would begin as passive "struggle" to be realized in an open holy war at propitious times. The believer is duty bound to preserve, revitalize and publicize Islam and jihad is a sacramental duty of all believers. Said Nursi, a Kurd born in Anatolia, lamented the assault of modernism that was already rampant in Europe at the end of 19th century. He too is said to have advocated a gradual return to authentic Islam. Other Islamic scholars from Egypt, Sudan, India, and Indonesia voiced similar views. …