Buddhist logic

Abstract: I AM WRITING ON the Buddhist logic of the four alternatives (catuskoti), as it appears for the first time in the Pali Nikdyas, for three reasons. First, it appears to be a typical "East-West problem" in philosophy. Secondly, it is evident that if the thesis adduced in this article is correct, the problem has baffled both Indian as well as Western scholars, and among these Indian scholars we have to reckon classical scholars held in great esteem, such as NMgdrjuna. Finally, this system of logic should be of some interest to modern students of logic, not only because it provides a novel method of classifying propositions into logical alternatives, but also because it does so in such a manner that the alternatives are not dependent on the number of truthvalues assumed in the system of logic. The nature and significance of these reasons would become evident if we give an exact exposition of this logic of four alternatives, which was known in the later Buddhist tradition as the catuskoti (tetralemma). But it must be borne in mind that to call this the "logic of four alternatives" is already to adduce a theory which needs to be proved in the light of all the available evidence. I have previously given some account of this system of logic,' but it stands in need of further clarification and exact definition, which I propose to attempt in this article, avoiding as far as possible any repetition of what I have already said on the subject. In the Pali Nikdyas the four alternatives are referred to as "these four positions" (imesu catusu thanesu) 2 and it is said that religious teachers at the time were trying to state the nature of the existence of the perfect person after death without going "outside these four positions" (aiiiiatra imehi catuhi thanehi).3 These references seem to suggest that they were regarded as four logical alternatives and it was believed that the truth with regard to any matter lay, perhaps, in one of these alternatives.

Abstract: The history of Indian logic may be divided into three periods, old Nyâya, Buddhist logic, and new Nyaya. The sixth century A.D., the efflorescence of the second period, was characterized by the establishment of the doc trine of Dignaga (circa A.D. 480-540).1 aankarasvamin, who is said to have been a disciple of Dignâga,2 composed the Nyâyapravesa as an in troduction to Dignâga's doctrine.3 This work seems to have been popular even among the Jains, for Haribhadra, a Jain, wrote a commentary on it in the eleventh century or slightly earlier.4 Hsuan Tsang (A.D. 602-664) made a Chinese translation of the Nyâyapravesa,5 and his disciple K'uei Chi6 and others commented on it. Hsuan Tsang's translation has been one of the most important textbooks for the science of Buddhist logic in China as well as in Japan. We have two Tibetan translations, one from the Sanskrit,7 and the other from Hsuan Tsang's Chinese translation.8 The Sanskrit text was published by B. Dhruva for the first time in 1930 (G.O.S. ed. No. 38).9 N. D. Mironov had another edition printed in T'oung Pao the next year.10 Having compared these Sanskrit texts with the Chinese translation, H. Ui concluded that the Chinese translation represents the form closest to the original, and that there should be some later interpolations in those Sanskrit editions which have been published so far. Thus realizing the value of the Chinese translation, he published another edition in 1944.11 I will use Dhruva's edition (D) as the basic text of the following trans lation, and point out differences between the Sanskrit text and the Chinese translation in the notes.