About: Block booking is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 24 publications have been published within this topic receiving 825 citations. The topic is also known as: Block-booking.
TL;DR: In the most recent case, United States v. Loew's Inc., the Court again struck down the block-booking practice, stating flatly: ''The antitrust laws do not permit a compounding of the statutorily conferred monopoly''.
Abstract: The phenomenon of block-booking of movies-the offer of only a combined assortment of movies to an exhibitor-has been the subject of several antitrust cases. In the most recent case, United States v. Loew's Inc.,' Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Court, again struck down the practice, stating flatly: \"The antitrust laws do not permit a compounding of the statutorily conferred monopoly.\" The explanation of the practice of block-booking is not explicit in the decision, but a fair interpretation is this: The owner of two films uses the popularity of one to compel the exhibitor to purchase the other as well. This is not a full explanation, however, for it does not explain why the seller should wish to sell the inferior film. Consider the following simple example. One film, Justice Goldberg cited Gone with the Wind, is worth $10,000 to the buyer, while a second film, the Justice cited Getting Gertie's Garter, is worthless to him. The seller could sell the one for $10,000, and throw away the second, for no matter what its cost, bygones are forever bygones. Instead the seller compels the buyer to take both. But surely he can obtain no more than $10,000, since by hypothesis this
TL;DR: An optimization framework for batch scheduling within a block booking system that maximizes the expected utilization of operating room resources subject to a set of probabilistic capacity constraints is presented.
Abstract: Scheduling elective procedures in an operating suite is a formidable task because of competing performance metrics and uncertain surgery durations. In this paper, we present an optimization framework for batch scheduling within a block booking system that maximizes the expected utilization of operating room resources subject to a set of probabilistic capacity constraints. The algorithm iteratively solves a series of mixed-integer programs that are based on a normal approximation of cumulative surgery durations. This approximation is suitable for high-volume medical specialities but might not be acceptable for the specialties that perform few procedures per block. We test our approach using the data from the ophthalmology department of the Veterans Affairs Pittsburgh Healthcare System. The performance of the schedules obtained by our approach is significantly better than schedules produced by simple heuristic scheduling rules.
TL;DR: The most generally accepted explanation for the practice is that it prevented exhibitors from "oversearching" from rejecting films revealed ex post to be of below-average value from an ex ante average-valued package as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Block booking, banned by the U.S. Supreme Court, involves selling motion pictures as a package. The most generally accepted explanation for the practice is that it prevented exhibitors from “oversearching”—from rejecting films revealed ex post to be of below‐average value from an ex ante average‐valued package. This article examines the way in which block booking developed, the nature of the optimization problem, and the specifics of block‐booking contracts and finds little to support that hypothesis. Block booking emerged at a time when there was no oversearching problem, it was applied much more flexibly than a primary concern with oversearching would suggest, and exhibitors failed to make use of contractually permitted opportunities to behave in ways block booking was posited necessary to avoid. This article proposes instead that block booking was primarily intended to cheaply provide films in quantity, a claim made by movie producers of the time.
TL;DR: The Paramount antitrust litigation was a series of eight actions brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ) beginning in 1938 and ending in 1949 against the major motion picture studios as mentioned in this paper, but it took a decade of litigation to accomplish what the DOJ wanted, which was to break up the studios and force them to sell their theater chains.
Abstract: The Paramount antitrust litigation was a series of eight actions brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ) beginning in 1938 and ending in 1949 against the major motion picture studios. In the early cases the DOJ succeeded in changing industry contracts, but it took a decade of litigation to accomplish what the DOJ wanted, which was to break up the studios and force them to sell their theater chains. We use stock market evidence to evaluate the impact of events in the Paramount litigation on firm value. By the stock market's assessment, the Supreme Court decision was the major event. But the impact of this and other decisions on integrated and nonintegrated defendants, and on a nondefendant, does not support the view that the courts dismantled a successful monopoly; indeed, the contrary may be true. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
TL;DR: In this paper, the role of contract terms in facilitating self-enforcing relationships is examined in the context of block-booking film exhibition contracts, and it is shown that transactors generally combine court-enforced and self-encouraged sanctions by using contract terms to economize on their limited reputational capital.
Abstract: This paper uses the block‐booking film exhibition contracts that were the subject of Paramount to examine the role of contract terms in facilitating self‐enforcing relationships. Because of the large uncertainty in film value at the time of contracting, it is difficult to fully specify optimal exhibitor performance (such as exhibition run length) ex ante. Instead, the efficient contractual arrangement contractually overconstrains exhibitors and relies on the superior reputational capital of distributors to flexibly adjust contract terms ex post. The analysis illustrates that, rather than thinking of contracts as either court enforced or self‐enforced, transactors generally combine court‐enforced and self‐enforced sanctions by using contract terms to economize on their limited reputational capital. Block booking is explained within this framework by its effects on reducing the variance in the value of the film package and, therefore, the demands placed on the distributors' reputational capital.