TL;DR: In the literature on African ethics, one finds relatively little that consists of normative theorization with regard to right action, that is, the articulation and justification of a comprehensive, basic norm that is intended to account for what all permissible acts have in common as distinct from impermissible ones as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: IN the literature on African ethics, one finds relatively little that consists of normative theorization with regard to right action, that is, the articulation and justification of a comprehensive, basic norm that is intended to account for what all permissible acts have in common as distinct from impermissible ones. By “African ethics” I mean values associated with the largely black and Bantu-speaking peoples residing in the sub-Saharan part of the continent, thereby excluding Islamic Arabs in North Africa and white Afrikaners in South Africa, among others. The field lacks a well-defended general principle grounding particular duties that is informed by such values and that could be compared to dominant Western theories such as Hobbesian egoism or Kantian respect for persons. In this article, I aim to help develop such a principle. Some have approximated this project on occasion, but no one has made it a primary aim that has been pursued in a systematic, analytic way. Furthermore,
TL;DR: The General Theory of Norms as mentioned in this paper is the last work of one of the most important legal theorists of the 20th century, which was published in 1979 as Allgemeine Theorie der Normen.
Abstract: Hans Kelsen is considered by many to be one of the foremost legal thinkers of the twentieth century. He made important contributions to many areas, but especially to legal theory and international law. Over a number of decades, he developed an important legal theory which found its first complete exposition in Reine Rechtslehre, 1934 (presently being translated by Stanley Paulson for OUP) and its fullest expression in the second edition of Reine Rechtslehre, 1960. During the last decade of his life he was working on what he called a general theory of norms. When he died in 1973, he left a lengthy manuscript, which was published in 1979 as Allgemeine Theorie der Normen. This book is the translation - General Theory of Norms. It is thus the last work of one of the most important legal theorists this century. In it, Kelsen develops his 'pure theory of law' into a 'general theory of norms'. In so doing, he provides a new basis for some of the positions he espoused earlier on, but also revises some of his earlier positions. The most important new topic is that of the applicability of logic to norms: Kelsen develops an original and extreme position some people have called 'normative irrationalism'. In the book, Kelsen also examines the views of over 200 philosophers and legal theorists on law, morality and logic, ranging from Plato and Aristotle to contemporary thinkers.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the problem of legal positivistic concepts of law and define the concepts of validity and collision of validity in the context of a debate on legal positivism.
Abstract: I THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 1. The Basic Positions 2. The Practical Significance of the Debate II THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1. Central Elements 2. Positivistic Concepts of Law 3. Critique of Positivistic Concepts of Law III THE VALIDITY OF LAW 1. Concepts of Validity 2. Collisions of Validity 3. Basic Norm IV DEFINITION
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that a universal, one-dimensional, normative and procedural definition of the opposite to systemic corruption should be preferred for a post-conflict society to become democratic and prevent a return to violence.
Abstract: Corruption has turned out to be difficult to define and what should be counted as the opposite to corruption remains widely disputed. If the goal for a post-conflict society is not only to become democratic and prevent a return to violence but also to reduce systemic corruption, we need to know what it is that should be fought and how the opposite to systemic corruption should be conceptualised. To define the opposite to corruption, choices have to be made along four conceptual dimensions. These are universalism vs relativism, uni- vs multidimensionality, normative vs empirical and whether the definition should relate to political procedures or policy substance. As a result of this conceptual analysis, it is argued, a universal, one-dimensional, normative and procedural definition should be preferred. The suggested definition is that of impartiality as the basic norm for the implementation of laws and policies. This conceptual analysis ends with a discussion of why such a norm has historically and in the ...
TL;DR: The authors argue that Metz's attempt to find a "comprehensive basic norm" to underpin African ethics is similar to Hans Kelsen's postulation of the Grundnorm in his Pure Theory of Law.
Abstract: I argue that Metz’s undertaking, in seeking a ‘comprehensive basic norm’ to underpin African ethics, is similar to Hans Kelsen’s postulation of the Grundnorm in his Pure Theory of Law. But African ethics does not need to be underpinned by an approach such as Kelsen’s. In my view, Metz’s preference for seeking to develop a Grundnorm rests upon a failure to attend carefully to the distinctness of African ethical thinking from Western ethical thinking. This failure is manifest in a spurious distinction (on which Metz relies) between ‘moral anthropology’ / ‘cultural studies’ and ‘normative theory’. It is also manifest in Metz’s failure to attend carefully to the work of Wiredu and Bujo, both of whom present systematic, critical analyses of African ethical thinking while implicitly rejecting the quest for a Grund norm as being unAfrican.