Topic
Bargaining problem
About: Bargaining problem is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2948 publications have been published within this topic receiving 88061 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
1 / 2
Papers
TL;DR: In this paper, a new treatment is presented of a classical economic problem, one which occurs in many forms, as bargaining, bilateral monopoly, etc It may also be regarded as a nonzero-sum two-person game in which a few general assumptions are made concerning the behavior of a single individual and of a group of two individuals in certain economic environments.
Abstract: A new treatment is presented of a classical economic problem, one which occurs in many forms, as bargaining, bilateral monopoly, etc It may also be regarded as a nonzero-sum two-person game In this treatment a few general assumptions are made concerning the behavior of a single individual and of a group of two individuals in certain economic environments From these, the solution (in the sense of this paper) of classical problem may be obtained In the terms of game theory, values are found for the game См также: Two-person cooperative games, автор - Джо Нэш
8,420 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model was presented, focusing on a strategic approach adopted for the study and details of the bargaining situation used; discussion on perfect equilibrium.
Abstract: Focuses on a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Overview of the strategic approach adopted for the study; Details of the bargaining situation used; Discussion on perfect equilibrium. (From Ebsco)
5,824 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the ultimatum bargaining games with two players and two stages were investigated. But the authors focused on situations with two agents and two stage bargaining games and only one agent has to decide and the set of outcomes is restricted to two results.
Abstract: There are many experimental studies of bargaining behavior, but suprisingly enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on every stage of the bargaining process only one player has to decide and that before the last stage the set of outcomes is already restricted to only two results. To make the ultimatum aspect obvious we concentrated on situations with two players and two stages. In the ‘easy games’ a given amount c has to be distributed among the two players, whereas in the ‘complicated games’ the players have to allocate a bundle of black and white chips with different values for both players. We performed two main experiments for easy games as well as for complicated games. By a special experiment it was investigated how the demands of subjects as player 1 are related to their acceptance decisions as player 2.
5,042 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a new approach involving the elaboration of the threat concept is introduced involving a wider class of situations in which threats can play a role, and the autor extends his previous treatment of "The Bargaining Problem" to a wider set of situations where threats can be played a role.
Abstract: In this paper, the autor extends his previous treatment of «The Bargaining Problem» to a wider class of situations in which threats can play a role/ A new approach is introduced involving the elaboration of the threat concept.
3,138 citations
Book•
1 Jan 1985TL;DR: In this article, the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining is established and the results provide a guide for the application of the Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling.
Abstract: This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the bargainers' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiations. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution with utilities that reflect the incentive to settle and with the proper disagreement point chosen. The results provide a guide for the application of the Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling.
2,557 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2026 | 1 |
| 2025 | 38 |
| 2024 | 49 |
| 2023 | 63 |
| 2022 | 91 |
| 2021 | 75 |