Authority

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions) within organizations, and it illustrates how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. After spelling out (some of) the main determinants of the delegation of formal authority within organizations, the paper examines a number of factors that increase the subordinates' real authority in a formally integrated structure: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decision, reputation, performance measurement, and multiplicity of superiors. Finally, the amount of communication in an organization is shown to depend on the allocation of formal authority.

Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on one particular aspect of authoritativeness: voluntary compliance with the decisions of authorities. Social psychologists have long distinguished between obedience that is the result of coercion, and obedience that is the result of internal attitudes. Opinions describe “reward power” and “coercive power”, in which obedience is contingent on positive and negative outcomes, and distinguish both of these types of power from legitimate power, in which obedience flows from judgments about the legitimacy of the authority. Legitimate power depends on people taking the obligation on themselves to obey and voluntarily follow the decisions made by authorities. The chapter also focuses on legitimacy because it is important to recognize, that legitimacy is not the only attitudinal factor influencing effectiveness. It is also influenced by other cognitions about the authority, most notably judgments of his or her expertise with respect to the problem at hand. The willingness of group members to accept a leader's directives is only helpful when the leader knows what directives to issue.

Abstract: On the basis of fairness heuristic theory, the authors argue that when information about whether an authority can be trusted is not available, people will resolve the question of how they should interpret the decisions of the authority by relying on perceived procedural fairness. As a consequence, people who do not have information about authority's trustworthiness react more positively toward the outcomes of authority's decisions if the authority is using fair as opposed to unfair procedures. However, when people know that the authority either can or cannot be trusted, they are less in need of procedural fairness information, yielding less strong effects of procedural fairness on people's reactions. The findings of 2 experiments support the authors' line of reasoning. It is concluded that people especially need procedural fairness when information about an authority's trustworthiness is lacking.

Abstract: Current usages of the terms patrimonial and neopatrimonial in the context of Africa are conceptually problematical and amount to a serious misreading of Weber. His use of the term patrimonial delineated a legitimate type of authority, not a type of regime, and included notions of reciprocity and voluntary compliance between rulers and the ruled. Those reciprocities enabled subjects to check the actions of rulers, which most analyses of (neo) patrimonialism overlook. We apply these insights to a case study of Botswana and suggest that scholars reconsider the application of Weber's concepts to African states. Introduction Is "neopatrimonialism" a pathology, analogy, cause, effect - or a term for all of Africa's troubles? How is it linked to Weber's notion of patrimonial authority, and what parts of it, precisely, are "neo"? Is it an attribute of most African states only, or are its causes and consequences generalizable to other countries and regions of the world? Indeed, given its myriad uses by scholars, does the term neopatrimonialism retain any analytical utility at all? We argue that the answer to that last question is "yes" - but that the meaning and its implications can be surprising. We begin with a survey of the uses and misuses of neopatrimonialism as an idea, and of the analytical and policy consequences that may flow from its abuse. We then return to Weber to explore the core concept of patrimonial authority. Our focus - like Weber's over a century ago - is on the contrasting ways rulers may establish legitimate authority by securing consent (compliance) from their subjects. Throughout the analysis we draw a distinction between types of authority and types of regime - the latter referring to the means by which positions of power are filled in a state and the degree to which citizens are allowed to participate in that process. Larry Diamond's classification (2002), extending from liberal democracies to politically closed authoritarian regimes, embodies well our understanding of regime types. We suggest that many applications of neopatrimonialism wrongly assume a direct causal connection between types of authority and types of regime, or even treat the two as synonymous. To illustrate the fundamental difference between the two, and to illustrate the critical role of human agency in shaping both, we examine the case of Botswana, where a modern democratic state has been erected on historical foundations of patrimonial authority. We conclude by exploring some implications of our analysis, arguing that a misreading of Weber has turned African countries into examples of an imagined common pathology and caused a mistaken identification of this pathology with a type of legitimacy or authority. As deGrassi (2008) has noted, too often the term neopatrimonialism is invoked in the absence of detailed historical and ethnographic attention to particular times and places. Scholars consequently ignore variations in the interactions of power and accountability within African states that might lend themselves to insightful comparisons with countries elsewhere. Diverse Roots of Legitimacy For Weber, patrimonialism was not a synonym for corruption, "bad governance," violence, tribalism, or a weak state. It was instead a specific form of authority and source of legitimacy. Weber (1947 [1922]) defined power (Macht) as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (152).1 While he understood such power as pervading all human interactions, he was fascinated with how certain structural positions were allocated the right to expect compliance by others - or "the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (1947[1922]:152). Almost all structural subordinates retain some power to resist or subvert the desires of those in authority, but they also agree that certain individuals are entitled to their obedience. …