TL;DR: The method endorsed here regards the problem as one of rights arbitration in which the division is based on interpreting the applicable rules, rather than on weighing the parties' powers and possible benefits.
TL;DR: When court trials (or arbitration) are the mechanism for resolving bargaining impasses, the costs and risks associated with third-party intervention should motivate people to negotiate and reach settlements as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: When court trials (or arbitration) are the
mechanisms for resolving bargaining impasses,
the costs and risks associated with
third-party intervention should motivate
settlement (Henry Farber and Harry Katz,
1979) However, empirical evidence suggests
that impasses and inefficient settlements are
common in the legal system and in contract
negotiations For example, one study of asbestos
suits found that only 37 cents of every dollar
spent by both sides end up in the plaintiffs'
hands (James Kakalik et al, 1983)
TL;DR: Reus-Smit argues that international societies are shaped by deep constitutional structures that are based on prevailing beliefs about the moral purpose of the state, the organizing principle of sovereignty, and the norm of procedural justice as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: This book seeks to explain why different systems of sovereign states have built different types of fundamental institutions to govern interstate relations. Why, for example, did the ancient Greeks operate a successful system of third-party arbitration, while international society today rests on a combination of international law and multilateral diplomacy? Why did the city-states of Renaissance Italy develop a system of oratorical diplomacy, while the states of absolutist Europe relied on naturalist international law and "old diplomacy"? Conventional explanations of basic institutional practices have difficulty accounting for such variation. Christian Reus-Smit addresses this problem by presenting an alternative, "constructivist" theory of international institutional development, one that emphasizes the relationship between the social identity of the state and the nature and origin of basic institutional practices. Reus-Smit argues that international societies are shaped by deep constitutional structures that are based on prevailing beliefs about the moral purpose of the state, the organizing principle of sovereignty, and the norm of procedural justice. These structures inform the imaginations of institutional architects as they develop and adjust institutional arrangements between states. As he shows with detailed reference to ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, absolutist Europe, and the modern world, different cultural and historical contexts lead to profoundly different constitutional structures and institutional practices. The first major study of its kind, this book is a significant addition to our theoretical and empirical understanding of international relations, past and present.
TL;DR: It is shown that the inferior lateral prefrontal and frontopolar cortex encode both reliability signals and the output of a comparison between those signals, implicating these regions in the arbitration process, and suggests that arbitration may work through modulation of the model-free valuation system when the arbitrator deems that themodel-based system should drive behavior.