Topic
Apparent authority
About: Apparent authority is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 45 publications have been published within this topic receiving 179 citations.
Papers
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) recently made substantial revisions to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations (the "Guidelines"), with the changes going into effect on November 1, 2004.
Abstract: INTRODUCTION The United States Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") recently made substantial revisions to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations (the "Guidelines"), with the changes going into effect on November 1, 2004.' In making these revisions, the Commission promised to create a "new era of corporate compliance" where organizations would focus "on ethical corporate behavior" and being a "good corporate citizen."2 According to the Vice Chairman of the Commission, the new Guidelines seek to build a "model company" and stress that "a good corporate citizen must first and foremost operate ethically."3 To accomplish this, the new Guidelines toughen the criteria an organization must follow to create an effective compliance program. Perhaps most importantly, the Guidelines require that organizations establish an effective compliance and ethics program that promotes an organizational culture that "encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law."4 Although organizations are not required to comply with the new Guidelines,5 the Guidelines set the benchmark for proper corporate conduct. If an organization is subsequently convicted of a federal crime, its failure to maintain "an effective compliance and ethics program" may result in the assessment of harsher penalties against the organization by the court.6 This article reviews the changes to the Guidelines and assesses their ability to integrate notions of a "good corporate citizen" from law, management, and ethics. Linking these perspectives, we argue, is the concept of trust. We characterize trust as consisting of three distinct but interrelated types of trust that are drawn from the fields of law and economics, organizational sociology, and philosophy. We argue that seeking effective compliance and ethics programs would be further enhanced by an authentic, symbiotic corporate governance strategy that integrates these three types of trust. This article is a step in the direction of showing how such a symbiotic integration is now legally mandated, as well as being a potentially fruitful exercise of interdisciplinary academic inquiry. This article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the Guidelines as originally formulated and the criticisms of the Guidelines in terms of achieving compliance with the law. Part II discusses the 2004 revisions of the Guidelines and assesses their potential impact. Part III analyzes the Guidelines in terms of establishing trust within organizations and between organizations and society, and considers the role of the law in fostering such trust. Part IV provides concluding comments. I. THE "OLD" ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES A. Organizational Criminal Liability and the 1991 Sentencing Guidelines An organization is vicariously liable for the criminal acts of its employees and agents done within the scope of their actual or apparent authority and with the intent to benefit the organization.7 Thus, an organization is liable when it knowingly and intentionally authorizes an agent to act illegally on its behalf (i.e., actual authority) or where a third party reasonably believes that the agent was expressly authorized to take the action resulting in the criminal violation (i.e., apparent authority).8 In federal court, criminal liability is imposed regardless of the agent's position within the organization.9 Moreover, criminal liability may be imputed to an organization even where the organization received no actual benefit from the criminal conduct; the agent must only intend to bestow some benefit, however minimal, on the organization. 10 Even if an organization expressly prohibits the illegal conduct and uses its best efforts to prevent any wrongdoing, it may still be held criminally liable for its agents' illegal acts.11 Although an organization may not be imprisoned, it can be fined, sentenced to probation, ordered to make restitution, required to issue public notices of conviction and apology, or to forfeit assets. …
26 citations
Book•
17 Dec 2013
TL;DR: In this article, the actual authority of an agent is discussed, as well as the apparent authority of the agent and the agent's apparent authority in relation to the agent, and legal relations between agent and third party.
Abstract: 1 Introductory Matters 2 The Actual Authority of an Agent 3 The Apparent Authority of an Agent 4 Agency of Necessity 5 Want of Authority and Ratification 6 Legal Relations between Principal and Agent 7 Legal Relations between Principal and Third Party 8 Unauthorised Dispositions of Property by the Agent 9 Principal's Liability for the Torts of the Agent 10 Legal Relations between Agent and Third Party 11 Sub-agency 12 Termination of Agency
19 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the legal aspects of contract notice requirements are described and a guide for contract administrators and contractors to help determine if the requirement for written notice has been satisfied as a prerequisite for a claim for an equitable adjustment.
Abstract: This paper describes the legal aspects of contract notice requirements. It is intended as a guide for contract administrators and contractors to help determine if the requirement for written notice has been satisfied as a prerequisite for a claim for an equitable adjustment. Based on an examination of case law, four primary rules are given. Does the notice clause apply? Was the requirement satisfied? Was the owner prejudiced? Can the requirement be waived and was it? Issues under each rule are identified, and examples are given. Other related aspects are also discussed, such as the importance of contract breach, form of communication, role of schedules, requirements for additional detail, and apparent authority. Recommended practices are also given.
19 citations
Book•
11 Feb 2011
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a discussion of the legal foundations for third-party claims in the context of Arbitral Estoppel, and conclude that the current legal framework does not work and the need for a broader Third-Party Effect.
Abstract: 1. INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DISCUSSION a The Issue b Scope and Limitation c Existing Literature and Contribution of the Work d Structure of the Work e Final Remarks I:LEGAL BASES FOR THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS I: TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF CONTRACT AND CORPORATE LAW, TERMS IN ARBITRATION CLAUSES, RULES AND LAWS 2. Third-Party Claims Pursuant to Traditional Theories of Contract and Corporate Law a Assignment and Other Forms of Transfer, Including the Cases of Bills of Lading, Subrogation, Merger and Transfer of Debt b Representation: Agency and Apparent Authority c Third-Party Beneficiary d Incorporation by Reference e Third Party Claims Pursuant to Principles of Corporate Law f The 'Grey Area': Third Party Situations that Fall Short of Privity and will not Normally Allow for Third-Party Claims 3. Further Legal Bases for Third-Party Claims: Arbitration Agreements, and Arbitration Rules and Laws a Arbitration Agreements Allowing for Third-Party Claims b Third-Party Claims Based on Institutional Rules and Arbitration Laws II. LEGAL BASES FOR THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS II: IMPLIED CONSENT AND NON-SIGNATORY THEORIES 4. The Doctrine of Arbitral Estoppel a Overview of the Doctrine b The Two Alternative Versions of the Doctrine of Arbitration Estoppel c Does Arbitral Estoppel Depart from the Consensual Origins of Arbitration? d Concluding Observations on the Arbitral Estoppel Doctrine 5. The Doctrine of Group of Companies a Overview of the Doctrine b Legal Basis of the Doctrine c Conditions for Application of the Doctrine d Applicable Law e The Theories of Alter Ego, Lifting teh Corporate Veil, and Group of Companies: Similarities and Distinctions 6. Critique on the 'Non-Signatory Theories' and the Contractual Approach to Third Parties a Interrelatedness of the Theories Concerning Non-signatory Parties b Positive Contribution of Non-Signatory Theories c Conceptual Limitations of the Non-Signatory Theories d Conclusions on the Non-Signatory Theories and Conceptual Approach III. A JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH TO THE DISCUSSION ON ARBITRATIOIN AND THIRD PARTIES 7. Why and Under Which Conditions Tribunals Can Assume Jurisdiction Over a Third-Party Claim a Disputes before a Tribunal may Affect the Jurisidictional Position of Third Parties b Tribunals may Assume Jurisdiction over Third-Party Claims that are Inseperable from the Main Dispute in Arbitration Proceedings c Rectifying the Artificial Discepancy between Commercial Reality and the Scope of Arbitration Proceedings d Summing up the Jurisdictional Approach e 'Third-Party' Claims Put Forward by A Party in Arbitration The Peterson Farms Scenario 8. When a Tribunal Should Assume Jurisdiction Over a Third-Party Claim a Exercising its Discretion: When should a Tribunal Assume Jurisdiction over a Third-Party Claim b Further Issues in Relation to the Jurisdictional Approach c Advantages of the Jurisdictional Approach and Concluding Remarks IV. ARBITRAL AWARDS AND THIRD PARTIES 9. The Legal Effects of Arbitral Awards a The Arbitral Effect b The Current Legal Framework of Arbitral Effect c Arbitral Awards and Third Parties d The 'Same Parties' Requirement: Rule and Exceptions e Why the Current Legal Framework does not Work: The need for a Broader Third-Party Effect 10. The Suggested Third-Party effect of Arbitral Awards a Content and Characteristics of the Suggested Third-Party Effect of Arbitral Awards b Examples of Third-Party Effect of Arbitral Awards in Case Law c Distinction between Third-Party Effect and Res Judicata d Relevant Factors and Circumstances for the Application of the Third-Party Effect e Parties Able to Can Rely on a Previous Arbitral Award 11. Special Issues on the Effect of Arbitral Awards a Should the Effect of an Arbitral Award Depend on the Previous Review by the Second Forum in Terms of Procedure b Contractual Obligation of a Third Party to be Bound by an Award c Which Law should Govern the Effects of an International Award 12. Summary of Findings a Arbitration Agreement and Third Parties b Arbitration Awards and Third Parties
18 citations
Book•
1 Jun 2004
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a range of management frameworks and personal examples to illustrate what a primary-care-led NHS means, and explain the NHS as a political environment, and concentrates on understanding the relationships of power rather than on the role of apparent authority.
Abstract: Explains the NHS as a political environment, and concentrates on understanding the relationships of power rather than on the role of apparent authority. The book presents a range of management frameworks and personal examples to illustrate what a primary-care-led NHS means.
16 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
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| 2021 | 2 |
| 2020 | 1 |
| 2018 | 1 |
| 2017 | 3 |
| 2015 | 2 |
| 2014 | 3 |