TL;DR: A “jiu jitsu” model of persuasion is developed that places emphasis on creating change by aligning with (rather than competing with) these attitude roots, the underlying fears, ideologies, worldviews, and identity needs that sustain and motivate specific “surface” attitudes like climate skepticism and creationism.
Abstract: There is a worryingly large chasm between scientific consensus and popular opinion. Roughly one third of Americans are skeptical that humans are primarily responsible for climate change; rates of some infectious diseases are climbing in the face of anti-immunization beliefs; and significant numbers of the population worldwide are antievolution creationists. It is easy to assume that resistance to an evidence-based message is a result of ignorance or failure to grasp evidence (the "deficit model" of science communication). But increasingly, theorists understand there are limits to this approach, and that if people are motivated to reject science, then repeating evidence will have little impact. In an effort to create a transtheoretical language for describing these underlying motivations, we introduce the notion of "attitude roots." Attitude roots are the underlying fears, ideologies, worldviews, and identity needs that sustain and motivate specific "surface" attitudes like climate skepticism and creationism. It is the antiscience attitude that people hear and see, but it is the attitude root-what lies under the surface-that allows the surface attitudes to survive even when they are challenged by evidence. We group these attitude roots within 6 themes-worldviews, conspiratorial ideation, vested interests, personal identity expression, social identity needs, and fears and phobias-and review literature relevant to them. We then use these insights to develop a "jiu jitsu" model of persuasion that places emphasis on creating change by aligning with (rather than competing with) these attitude roots. (PsycINFO Database Record
TL;DR: The authors reviewed the relations of political and religious ideologies to science attitudes, discussed the psychological functions and motivational underpinnings of belief in science, and described the role of morality when evaluating science and scientists.
Abstract: As science continues to progress, attitudes toward science seem to become ever more polarized. Whereas some put their faith in science, others routinely reject and dismiss scientific evidence. This chapter provides an integration of recent research on how people evaluate science. We organize our chapter along three research topics that are most relevant to this goal: ideology, motivation, and morality. We review the relations of political and religious ideologies to science attitudes, discuss the psychological functions and motivational underpinnings of belief in science, and describe work looking at the role of morality when evaluating science and scientists. In the final part of the chapter, we apply what we know about science evaluations to the current crisis of faith in science and the open science movement. Here, we also take into account the increased accessibility and popularization of science and the (perceived) relations between science and industry.
TL;DR: This book argues that serious reform of the scientific enterprise will require more consistent methodological rigor and a transformation of the current hypercompetitive scientific culture.
Abstract: Contemporary science has brought about technological advances and an unprecedented understanding of the natural world. However, there are signs of dysfunction in the scientific community as well as threats from diverse antiscience and political forces. Incentives in the current system place scientists under tremendous stress, discourage cooperation, encourage poor scientific practices, and deter new talent from entering the field. It is time for a discussion of how the scientific enterprise can be reformed to become more effective and robust. Serious reform will require more consistent methodological rigor and a transformation of the current hypercompetitive scientific culture.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the historicist claim that there can be no principles that hold across particular times and places is invalid and rests upon a confusion of underlying generative principles with the complexities of the empirical surface of history.
Abstract: Criticisms of the scientific status of sociology possess some validity when applied against narrowly positivist interpretations of sociological methods and metatheory, but do not undermine the scientific project offormulating generalized explanatory models. (1) Critics allege that sociology has made no lawful findings; but valid general principles exist in many areas. (2) Situational interpretation, subjectivity, reflexivity, and emergence are alleged to undermine explanatory sociology, but these topics themselves can be explained by a widened conception of science that allows informal procedures in theorizing aimed at maximizing explanatory coherence. (3) The fact that intellectual discourse itself is a historically changeable social product does not invalidate objective explanatory knowledge. (4) The historicist claim that there can be no principles that hold across particular times and places is invalid and rests upon a confusion of underlying generative principles with the complexities of the empirical surface of history. (5) Metatheoretical criticism of the concept of causality does not undermine a sophisticated conception of scientific sociology. Sociological knowledge can and does advance, but it depends upon building the coherence of theoretical conceptions across different areas and methods of research.
TL;DR: This paper conducted an investigation in which preservice elementary teachers responded to the Thinking about Science survey instrument and found that elementary teachers discriminate with respect to different aspects of culture and science but they are not antiscience.