Aeon

Abstract: The Son of Man Debate: A History and Evaluation, by Delbert Burkett. SNTSMS 107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv + 176. $54.95. Given the current lack of concord regarding the meaning and origin of the NT's term "the Son of Man," Burkett has given us just what we need at the moment--not one more book promoting yet another thesis or resurrecting an old idea but a comprehensive survey of what everyone has had to say. Earlier surveys were produced by Wessel Scholten (1809), Heinrich Appel (1896), and Mogens Miller (1984). Now Burkett's book, which covers "the main lines of the debate from work from the patristic period to 1996" (p. 3), offers us the best, the most up-to-date, and most comprehensive review of the various views and disputations about the mysterious "Son of Man." Chapter 1 examines the so-called genealogical understanding, according to which "..." identifies Jesus as someone's son--the son of a human (so Ignatius, Bede, Theophylact), the son of Mary (so Tertullian and many in the Middle Ages), the son of Joseph (so Pseudo-Justin, Christoph August Heumann), the son of Adam (so Athanasius, Erasmus, Calvin, John Lightfoot, John Bowman), or the son of a Gnostic aeon or god (so various Gnostic ancient writings). Burkett faults all of these suggestions in part because they interpret the Greek without recognizing that it is based upon a Semitic expression. Chapter 2 reviews those who argued, after the rebirth of Semitic studies after the Reformation, that t't In or whatever Semitic expression Jesus used referred to his humanity without reference to a particular parent (Joseph, Mary, etc.). Some, such as Zwingli, took "the Son of Man" to refer to Jesus' human nature. But Martin Bucer, Heinrich Bullinger, and many after them thought it carried the connotation of lowliness. Still others, including Friedrich Schleiermacher and Augustus Tholuck, thought that "the Son of man" emphasized Jesus' status as a human being different from all other human beings-the preeminent human or ideal human. According to Burkett, this approach, which was popular in the nineteenth century, appeared only occasionally in the twentieth century. His evaluation of this fact is straightforward: "Ultimately the interpretation of `Son of Man' as an expression of Jesus' humanity failed because it made the title superfluous: Jesus had no need to emphasize his simple humanity, since it would have been apparent to all" (p. 20). Chapter 3 looks at the apocalyptic and messianic "Son of Man," which has played such an important role in the modern debate. Burkett documents a tendency to interpret the phrase either in terms of Dan 7 or in terms of the Similitudes of 1 Enoch. He says that although this interpretation prevailed until the 1960s, two questions were never resolved. First, to whom did the title refer on Jesus' lips? Second, which "Son of Man" sayings should be regarded as authentic? The fourth chapter takes up the first question and reviews the main answers-"the Son of man" was a titular (perhaps proleptic) self-designation (Johannes Weiss, Rudolf Otto) or the name for a corporate entity (T. W. Manson, C. F. D. Moule) or a messiah other than Jesus (David Friedrich Strauss, Julius Wellhausen, Rudolf Bultmann). Burkett also includes here the view of William Wrede and Wilhelm Bousset, that the thirdperson speech is a sign that Jesus never used the expression at all. The fifth chapter continues by addressing the question of authenticity. Here Burkett catalogues the opinions and arguments of those who thought only the nonapocalyptic sayings authentic, those who thought only the apocalyptic sayings authentic, those who thought sayings from both groups authentic, and those who thought none of the "Son of man" sayings authentic. Most attention is given to the arguments of Ernst Kasemann, Philipp Vielhauer, and Norman Perrin. After surveying, in chapter 6, "miscellaneous Sons of Men"--examined here are, among other views, the proposal of a connection with Ezekiel's "son of man" and the equation of "the Son of man" with so-called "Primal Man"-Burkett turns in chapter 7 to the debate over the apocalyptic "Son of Man. …

Abstract: The Simpsons and Philosophy: The D'oh! of Homer. William Irwin, Mark T. Conard, and Aeon J. Skoble, eds. Chicago: Open Court, 2001. 303 pp. $17.95 pbk. "What is mind? No matter. What is matter? No mind." The great American philosopher Homer J. Simpson. It's a reasonable question, one that is raised by the three philosopher-editors of The Simpsons and Philosophy: Is it legitimate to write philosophical essays about a pop culture sensation, and a television cartoon series no less? The short answer is, not surprisingly, yes because they argue The Simpsons is just deep enough, and certainly funny enough, to warrant thoughtful consideration. The long answer is as well a resounding yes. And for perhaps a more pragmatic reason. Any cultural phenomenon that attracts millions of viewers, and whose lexicon and symbolic codes have infiltrated everyday customs, is something that should demand serious scholarly reflection. And this compilation of eighteen essays does so admirably by speaking to the themes, characters, and ethical values that constitute Homer as the audacious everyman, and his fellow inhabitants of the stateless Springfield as a reflection and reinforcement of popular American beliefs, foibles, and mores. The fundamental contention that underlies this book is that not only can a popular television program hold the potential to attract and affect a large and extraordinarily diverse audience in a variety of ways, but that comedy, because it can broach certain topics without inciting a great amount of antagonism or appearing to be too heavy handed, may be especially effective in promoting such particular understandings. The common thread that holds these essays together deals with how the show works and what values are represented. Among the more noteworthy selections on how the show works are chapters by Irwin and J.R. Lombardo on allusions, and Carl Matheson on hyper-irony. Allusions are intended references that call for association that goes beyond mere substitution of a referent. It requires that connections flow freely based on the viewer's subjective experiences so there is no accounting for the range and extent of associations that might arise. According to Matheson, hyper-irony is the constant process of undercutting everything. For The Simpsons everything it promotes it does so only to ultimately undercut it. Everything is treated as a target, every stereotypical character, every foible, every institution. It even undercuts its own cynicism. Matheson contends that the series places demands on the audience via quotationalism, a device of referring to or quoting other works of popular culture. Quotationalism requires viewers to first understand what is being ridiculed and then to recognize what the ideal world is supposed to look like. …

Abstract: The logical course of this work stands in a kind of correspondence with the very way in which Origen regards the reality of time, its origin and its perspectives. Thus the procedure in treating the problem is: reality before time; time proper; fundamental principles which determine the conception of time proper; certain aspects of function in time, which establish a certain character of it; the conception of eternal; the end of time and the visualization of the eschatological reality. In chapter 1 we argue that Origen holds a notion of God Himself quite distinct from the conception of God as Creator. We argue that there is an ontological priority of the former notion not only to the latter, but also to any conception of God (such as Judge, Provident, etc.). Having seen the extent of timelessness and time (and rebutted any notion of "sacred time"), we then examine time proper in chapter 2. In the first section we expound all those elements which constitute the essence of time proper. Further, we examine fundamental conceptions which are closely related to time proper, namely prolongation of time and causality. Having seen Origen's view of time proper as well as fundamental principles which determine the conception of it, we go ahead with the enquiry of certain functions in time, which establish a certain character of it. This is the subject discussed in chapter 3. The conceptions of prolongation of time and causality raise the question of the existence of human being throughout an aeon. We enquire in the event of Incarnation of Christ and its significance in Origen's thought; that is, we examine how decisive this event is deemed in forming a theology of history, by "history" meaning the origin and ultimate perspectives of the entire world -and not only of human beings. As the question of the divine reality was treated right from the beginning of this work, namely in chapter 1, what we examine in chapter 4 is Origen's conception of the realities denoted by the expressions "eternal life" and "eternal death". We argue that unless this distinction of different realities, predicated by one and the same word (namely eternal), is made, then Origen's views are bound to be misunderstood. The very teleological character of time is determined by the fact that the world is directed towards an end. The actual meaning of this end is enquired in chapter 5. We discuss how Origen comprehends the reality ir. the end of time as well as the reality ensuing, so to speak, this end. What is the final destination of what came into being out of non-being out of God's benevolent decision? How will the end be reached and why will time reach an end, in the sense of termination? We discuss these problems into that section, in an enquiry from which the raison d' etre of time arises; and the final eschatological reality is portrayed to the extent that it is possible. We assert that what Origen regards as having come into being out of non-being will not pass away. We consider certain views about various kinds of eschatology and make some remarks (though not a full assessment) about the simplistic criteria established in order to classify and discern what is "Greek" and what is "Hebrew". We argue that Origen's eschatology is beyond such criteria, as his eschatology contains both rectification of the world and consummation of nature. We finally argue that Origen's conception of time is profoundly determined by a fact which does not exist either in Greek or Hebraic thought, namely the historical fact of the incarnation of Christ and its crucial eschatological implications. And we conclude that the constant eschatological orientation of Origen's thought is vividly present in his conception of time, too. (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.).