About: Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 223 publications have been published within this topic receiving 3976 citations. The topic is also known as: APIC.
TL;DR: A new, yet critical, side-channel attack, branch shadowing, that reveals fine-grained control flows (branch granularity) in an enclave and develops two novel exploitation techniques, a last branch record (LBR)-based history-inferring technique and an advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC)-based technique to control the execution of an enclave in a finegrained manner.
Abstract: Intel has introduced a hardware-based trusted execution environment, Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), that provides a secure, isolated execution environment, or enclave, for a user program without trusting any underlying software (e.g., an operating system) or firmware. Researchers have demonstrated that SGX is vulnerable to a page-fault-based attack. However, the attack only reveals page-level memory accesses within an enclave.
In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-channel attack, branch shadowing, that reveals fine-grained control flows (branch granularity) in an enclave. The root cause of this attack is that SGX does not clear branch history when switching from enclave to nonenclave mode, leaving fine-grained traces for the outside world to observe, which gives rise to a branch-prediction side channel. However, exploiting this channel in practice is challenging because 1) measuring branch execution time is too noisy for distinguishing fine-grained controlflow changes and 2) pausing an enclave right after it has executed the code block we target requires sophisticated control. To overcome these challenges, we develop two novel exploitation techniques: 1) a last branch record (LBR)-based history-inferring technique and 2) an advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC)-based technique to control the execution of an enclave in a finegrained manner. An evaluation against RSA shows that our attack infers each private key bit with 99.8% accuracy. Finally, we thoroughly study the feasibility of hardware-based solutions (i.e., branch history flushing) and propose a software-based approach that mitigates the attack.
TL;DR: In this article, a multi-processor programmable interrupt controller system is described, which includes an I/O interrupt controller for receiving interrupt requests from an IO subsystem; multiple processor interrupt controllers, each associated with a specific processor for dispensing of accepted interrupts; and an interrupt controller bus primarily for the transmission of interrupt requests between interrupt controller units and for priority arbitration, using a standard message format and arbitration protocol.
Abstract: A multi-processor programmable interrupt controller system which includes: an I/O interrupt controller for receiving interrupt requests from an I/O subsystem; multiple processor interrupt controllers, each associated with a specific processor for dispensing of accepted interrupts; and an interrupt controller bus primarily for the transmission of interrupt requests between interrupt controller units and for priority arbitration, using a standard message format and arbitration protocol.
TL;DR: SGX-Step, an open-source Linux kernel framework that allows an untrusted host process to configure APIC timer interrupts and track page table entries directly from user space, is presented and an improved approach to single-step enclaved execution at instruction-level granularity is contributed and evaluated.
Abstract: Protected module architectures such as Intel SGX hold the promise of protecting sensitive computations from a potentially compromised operating system. Recent research convincingly demonstrated, however, that SGX's strengthened adversary model also gives rise to to a new class of powerful, low-noise side-channel attacks leveraging first-rate control over hardware. These attacks commonly rely on frequent enclave preemptions to obtain fine-grained side-channel observations. A maximal temporal resolution is achieved when the victim state is measured after every instruction. Current state-of-the-art enclave execution control schemes, however, do not generally achieve such instruction-level granularity.This paper presents SGX-Step, an open-source Linux kernel framework that allows an untrusted host process to configure APIC timer interrupts and track page table entries directly from user space. We contribute and evaluate an improved approach to single-step enclaved execution at instruction-level granularity, and we show how SGX-Step enables several new or improved attacks. Finally, we discuss its implications for the design of effective defense mechanisms.
TL;DR: In this paper, a performance counter determines when to allocate CPU resources to a thread, and when it is time to allocate the CPU resources, the performance counter issues a non-maskable interrupt to an advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC).
Abstract: Methods and computer-executable components for real-time scheduling of CPU resources are disclosed. A performance counter determines when to allocate CPU resources to a thread. When it is time to allocate the CPU resources, the performance counter issues a non-maskable interrupt to an advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC). The APIC then issues a non-maskable interrupt to the CPU. In response to receiving the non-maskable interrupt, the CPU allocates resources to the thread.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a mechanism for handling interrupts on a processor that supports multiple-threads concurrently, where the processor's resources are allocated to provide multiple logical processors, and the logical processors vie for access to a shared register.
Abstract: The present invention provides a mechanism for handling interrupts on a processor that supports multiple-threads concurrently. The processor's resources are allocated to provide multiple logical processors. In response to a common interrupt, the logical processors vie for access to a shared register. The first logical processor to access the shared register handles the common interrupt. The remaining logical processors return from the interrupt.