Aboutness

Abstract: The central idea behind this paper is that presuppositions of soft triggers arise from the way our attention structures the informational content of a sentence. Some aspects of the information conveyed are such that we pay attention to them by default, even in the absence of contextual information. On the other hand, contextual cues or conversational goals can divert attention to types of information that we would not pay attention to by default. Either way, whatever we do not pay attention to, be it by default, or in context, is what ends up presupposed by soft triggers. This paper attempts to predict what information in the sentence is likely to end up being the main point (i.e. what we pay attention to) and what information is independent from this, and therefore likely presupposed. It is proposed that this can be calculated by making reference to event times. The notion of aboutness used to calculate independence is based on that of Demolombe and Farinas del Cerro (In: Holdobler S (ed) Intellectics and computational logic: papers in honor of Wolfgang Bibel, 2000).

Abstract: In this paper we argue for a typology of various information-structural functions in terms of three privative features: [topic], [focus] and [contrast] (see also Vallduv'i and Vilkuna 1998, Molnar 2002, McCoy 2003, and Giusti 2006). Aboutness topics and contrastive topics share the feature [topic], new-information foci and contrastive foci share the feature [focus], and contrastive topics and contrastive foci share the feature [contrast]. This typology is supported by data from Dutch (where only contrastive elements may undergo A'-scrambling), Japanese (where aboutness topics and contrastive topics must appear sentence-initially), and Russian (where the new-information foci and contrastive foci share the same underlying position). To the best of our knowledge, there are no generalizations over information-structural functions that do not share one of the features adopted here.

Abstract: Analytical Table of Contents.- I/Intentionality and Intensionality.- 1. The Intentionality of Acts of Consciousness.- 1.1. Intentionality.- 1.2. "Acts" of Consciousness.- 1.3. The Objects of Acts.- 1.4. Direct-Object Acts versus Propositional Acts.- 1.5. Propositional Acts and Intending "About" Something.- 2. Some Main Characteristics of "Intentional Relations".- 2.1. "Intentional Relations".- 2.2. The Existence-Independence of Intentional Relations.- 2.3. The Conception-Dependence of Intentional Relations.- 2.4. Conception-Dependence and the Individuation of Intentions.- 2.5. The "Indeterminacy" in Intentions of Transcendent Objects.- 2.6. Definite and Indefinite Intentions.- 3. The Intensionality of Act-Contexts.- 3.1. Intensionality.- 3.2. The Failure of Substitutivity of Identity for Act-Contexts.- 3.3. Failure of Existential Generalization for Act-Contexts, Case 1: Failure of Existence.- 3.4. Failure of Existential Generalization for Act-Contexts, Case 2: Indefiniteness.- 3.5. "De Dicto" and "De Re" Modalities.- 4. Intensionality vis-a-vis Intentionality.- II/Some Classical Approaches to the Problems of Intentionality and Intensionality.- 1. Theories of Intentionality as Theories About the Objects of Intention.- 1.1. The Object-Approach to Intentionality.- 1.2. "Intentional Objects".- 1.3. Ambiguities in the Notion of "Intentional Object".- 2. Object-Theories of Intentionality.- 2.1. Mind-Dependent Entities as Objects of Intention: An Interpretation of Brentano's Early Theory.- 2.2. Problems with Mind-Dependent Entities as Objects of Intention.- 2.3. Intentional Objects as "Objects Beyond Being": Meinong's Theory of Objects.- 2.4. Intentional Objects as "Fictions": Brentano's Later Theory.- 3. Frege's Approach to Meaning, Reference, and the Problems of Intensionality.- 3.1. Parallels Between Frege's Semantics of Act-Sentences and the Object- Approach to Intentionality.- 3.2. Frege's Theory of Meaning and Reference.- 3.3. Meanings as Abstract "Intensional Entities".- 3.4. Frege's Semantics for Sentences of Propositional Attitude.- 3.5. Intensional Entities in Intentionality: Objects or Mediators of Intention?.- III/Fundamentals of Husserl's Theory of Intentionality.- 1. Husserl's Phenomenological Approach to Intentionality.- 1.1. Husserl's Conception of Intentionality.- 1.2. Husserlian Phenomenology and Phenomenological Method.- 1.3. Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Intentionality.- 2. "Phenomenological Content".- 2.1. Act, Content, and Object: Twardowski's Formulation of the Distinction.- 2.2. Husserl's Conception of Content in Logical Investigations.- 2.3. Husserl's Mature Conception of Content: Noesis and Noema.- 2.4. The Structure of an Act's Noema: its "Sinn" and "Thetic" components.- 2.5. Content, Noesis, and Noema in Review.- 2.6. The Content of Perception: its Sensory (or Hyletic) and Noetic Phases.- 3. Husserl's Basic Theory: Intention via Sinn.- 3.1. Noematic Sinne as Mediators.- 3.2. The Theory and Its Account of the Peculiarities of Intention.- IV/Husserl's Theory of Noematic Sinn.- 1. Interpreting Noematic Sinn.- 1.1. Noema as Content and as Meaning.- 1.2. What is the "Intended as Such"?.- 1.3. Sinne versus Meinongian "Incomplete" Objects.- 1.4. Noema versus Essence.- 2. Husserl's Identification of Linguistic Meaning and Noematic Sinn.- 2.1. Husserl's Conception of Linguistic Meaning.- 2.2. Husserl on Meaning and Reference.- 2.3. Every Linguistic Meaning is a Noematic Sinn.- 2.4. Every Noematic Sinn is Expressible as a Linguistic Meaning.- 2.5. Qualifications and Extensions of the Expressibility Thesis.- 2.6. Noematic Description.- 2.7. Noemata as a Kind of Propositions (Satze).- 3. How Is Intention Achieved via Sinn?.- 3.1. Husserl's Account of the Structure of a Noematic Sinn: the "X" and the "Predicate-Senses".- 3.2. Some Problems for a "Definite-Description" Model of Intentionality.- 3.3. The Problem of Definite, or De Re, Intentions.- 3.4. The Sinn of Perception as "Demonstrative".- 3.5. Intentionality and Pragmatics: Contextual Influences on Intention.- V/Husserl's Notion of Horizon.- 1. Meaning and Possible Experience: The Turn to Husserl's Notion of Horizon.- 1.1. The "Indeterminacy" in Intentions of Transcendent Objects.- 1.2. Husserl's Notions of Object-Horizon, Act-Horizon, and Manifold.- 1.3. Horizon-Analysis as a New Method of Phenomenological Analysis.- 2. Husserl's Conception of Horizon.- 2.1. Early Notions of Object-Horizon: Ideas (1913).- 2.2. The Horizon of Possible Experiences Associated with an Act: Cartesian Meditations (1931).- 2.3. Act-Horizon and Object-Horizon.- 2.4. The Central Role of Perception in Horizon.- 2.5. The Maximal Horizon of an Act: An Act's Manifold of Associated Possible Acts.- 3. Horizon and Background Beliefs.- 3.1. The "Predelineation" of an Act's Horizon.- 3.2. Horizon and Fundamental Background Beliefs.- 3.3. Horizon and Concrete Background Beliefs Background Meaning.- 3.4. Counter-Evidence within an Act's Horizon.- 4. The Structure of an Act's Horizon 25.- 4.1. Internal and External Horizon.- 4.2. Temporal Structure in the Horizon.- 4.3. The Horizon's Breakdown into Verification Chains.- 4.4. Synthesis of Identification Within the Horizon.- 4.5. Summary of Husserl's Account of Horizon-Structure.- 5. Toward a Generalized Theory of Horizon.- VI/Horizon-Analysis and the Possible-Worlds Explication of Meaning.- 1. Horizon-Analysis as Explication of Sinn and Intention.- 1.1. Horizon-Analysis and the Verification Theory of Meaning.- 1.2. Horizon-Analysis and the Carnapian, or Possible-Worlds, Theory of Meaning.- 1.3. Sorting Husserl with the Carnapian.- 1.4. Horizon-Analysis as "Pragmatic" Explication of Intention.- 1.5. Husserl's Appraisal of Horizon-Analysis Revisited.- 1.6. The Significance of Horizon-Analysis: Beyond Frege to New Horizons.- 2. The Explication of Meaning in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 2.1. Intension and Extension.- 2.2. Intension and Comprehension.- 2.3. Intensions as Functions on Possible Worlds.- 2.4. Intensions as Functions: Explication versus Definition.- 2.5. Two Kinds of Intensional Entities and Their Explication.- 2.6. "Individual Concepts", or Individual Meanings.- 2.7. Rigid and Individuating Meanings.- 2.8. The Explication of Noematic Sinn in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 2.9. "Pragmatic" Explication of Intention in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 3. The Basis in Husserl for a Possible-Worlds Explication of Meaning and Intention.- 3.1. Possible Objects and Possible Worlds in Husserl.- 3.2. The Equivalence of Horizon-Analysis and Possible-Worlds Explication of Sinn and Intention.- 3.3. The Eliminability of Possible Entities from Husserl's Theory of Horizon.- VII/Intentionality and Possible-Worlds Semantics.- 1. Intentionality in Possible-Worlds Theory.- 1.1. Husserl's Theory of Intentionality With and Without Possible Worlds.- 1.2. The "Husserlian" Possible-Worlds Theory of Intentionality.- 1.3. The Pure Possible-Worlds Theory of Intentionality.- 1.4. The Possible-Worlds Approach to Intentionality.- 2. Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.1. Fregean, Tarskian, and Possible-Worlds Semantics.- 2.2. Hintikka's Possible-Worlds Approach to Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.3. The Account of Intensionality in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.4. Meaning Entities in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.5. Background Beliefs in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 3. Intentionality in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 3.1. Object and Content of Belief.- 3.2. The Aboutness of Indefinite, or De Dicto, Belief.- 3.3. The Aboutness of Definite, or De Re, Belief.- 3.4. Existence-Independence and Conception-Dependence of Aboutness.- 3.5. States of Affairs as Objects of Belief.- 4. A Husserlian Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- VIII/Definite, or De Re, Intention in a Husserlian Framework.- 1. The Characterization of Definite, or De Re, Intention.- 1.1. Modes of Definite Intention.- 1.2. Must the Object of a Definite Intention Exist?.- 1.3. Expressing and Describing Definite Intentions: Proper Names, Demonstrative Pronouns, and Quantifying-In.- 1.4. The Explication of Definite Intention in Terms of Horizon and Possible Worlds.- 2. Perceptual Acquaintance.- 2.1. The "Demonstrative" Acquainting Sense in Perception.- 2.2. The Explication of Perceptual Acquaintance in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 3. Identity, Individuation, and Individuation in Consciousness.- 3.1. Concerning Identity and Individuation.- 3.2. The Identity of a Natural Individual and Its "Transcendence".- 3.3. Husserl on Individuation Through Time.- 3.4. Husserl on Trans-World Individuation.- 4. Toward a Phenomenological Account of Individuative Consciousness.- 4.1. The Phenomenological Structure of Individuative Intention: Toward a "Pragmatic" Analysis of Individuative Definiteness.- 4.2. Knowing-Who and Individuative Consciousness.- 4.3. A Closer Look at the Structure of Individuative Intention.