

Distributed Selfish Replication*

Nikolaos Laoutaris, Orestis Telelis, Vassilios Zissimopoulos, Ioannis Stavrakakis

Abstract

A commonly employed abstraction for studying the object placement problem for the purpose of Internet content distribution is that of a distributed replication group. In this work the initial model of distributed replication group of Leff, Wolf, and Yu (IEEE TPDS '93) is extended to the case that individual nodes act selfishly, i.e., cater to the optimization of their individual local utilities. Our main contribution is the derivation of equilibrium object placement strategies that: (a) can guarantee improved local utilities for all nodes concurrently as compared to the corresponding local utilities under greedy local object placement; (b) do not suffer from potential mistreatment problems, inherent to centralized strategies that aim at optimizing the social utility; (c) do not require the existence of complete information at all nodes. We develop a baseline computationally efficient algorithm for obtaining the aforementioned equilibrium strategies and then extend it to improve its performance with respect to fairness. Both algorithms are realizable in practice through a distributed protocol that requires only limited exchange of information.

1 Introduction

Recent efforts to improve the service that is offered to Internet users have considered supplementing the traditional bandwidth-centric Internet with a rather non-traditional network resource – storage. A network node installs storage to replicate popular Internet content locally, and then provide it to local users and others efficiently (i.e., at a small end-to-end

*The authors are with the Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, University of Athens, 15784 Athens, Greece. Email: {laoutaris, telelis, vassilis, istavrak}@di.uoa.gr.

delay) and economically (i.e., without having to access the origin servers each time, thereby consuming bandwidth). Several technologies have been developed for this purpose, such as web caching, web mirroring, content distribution networks (CDNs), and lately peer-to-peer applications (P2P).

A commonly employed abstraction for studying such systems is that of a distributed replication group [1]. Under this abstraction, nodes utilize their storage capacity to replicate information objects and make them available to local and remote users. Replication amounts to maintaining fixed copies of objects which, contrary to caching, cannot be removed before the re-invocation of the placement algorithm (caching amounts to storing temporary copies of objects upon request and then releasing them through a replacement algorithm in order to free storage for newer ones). A user's request is first received by the local node. If the requested object is stored locally, it is returned to the requesting user immediately, thereby incurring a minimal access cost. Otherwise, the requested object is searched and fetched from other nodes of the group, at a potentially higher access cost. If the object cannot be located anywhere in the group, it is retrieved from an origin server, which is assumed to be laying outside the group (maximum access cost). Depending on the particular application, the search for objects at remote nodes may be conducted through query protocols [2], succinct summaries [3], DNS redirection [4] or distributed hash tables [5].

Several placement problems can be defined regarding a distributed replication group. The proxy (or cache, or mirror, or surrogate) placement problem refers to the selection of appropriate physical network locations (routers or AS's) for installing content proxies [6, 7, 8, 9]. Another relevant problem is the object placement problem, which refers to the selection of objects for the nodes, under given node locations and capacities [1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Joint formulations of the above mentioned problems have also appeared, e.g., in [15, 16], where the proxy placement, proxy dimensioning, and object placement problems are combined into a single problem.

All the aforementioned work has focused on the optimization of the so called *social utility* (sum of the individual *local utilities* of the nodes, defined as the delay and bandwidth gains from employing replication). Optimizing the social utility is naturally the objective in environments where a central authority dictates its replication decisions to the nodes. It

suits well applications such as web mirroring and CDNs, which are operated centrally by a single authority (this being the content creator or the content distributor). Applications that are run by multiple authorities, such as web caching networks and P2P networks, may also seek to optimize the social utility. This, however, requires some nodes to act in a spirit of voluntarism, as the optimization of the social utility is often harmful to several local utilities.

Consider as an example a group of nodes that collectively replicate content. If one of the nodes generates the majority of the requests, then a socially optimal (SO) object placement strategy will use the storage capacity of other nodes to replicate objects that do not fit in the over-active node's storage space. Consequently, the users of these other nodes will experience a service deterioration as a result of their storage being hijacked by potentially irrelevant objects with regard to their local demand. In fact, such nodes would be better served if they acted independently and employed a greedy local (GL) object placement strategy (i.e., replicated the most popular objects according to the local demand). A similar situation can arise if caching, rather than replication, is in place: remote hits originating from other nodes may evict objects of local interest in an LRU-operated cache that participates in a web caching network (we study this problem in [17]). Concern for such exploitation can prevent rational nodes from participating in such groups, and, instead, lead them to operating in isolation in a greedy local manner. Such a behavior, however, is far from being desirable.

Being GL is often ineffective in terms of performance, not only with respect to the social utility, but with respect to the individual local utilities too. For example, when the nodes have similar demand patterns and the inter-node distances are small, then replicating multiple times the same most popular objects, as done by the same repeated GL placement at all the nodes, is highly ineffective. Clearly, all the nodes may gain substantially in this case, if they cooperate and replicate different objects. In fact, it is even possible that an appropriate cooperation of the nodes can lead to a simultaneous improvement of all local utilities as compared to the GL performance. However, nodes cannot recognize such opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation, since they are generally unaware of the remote demand patterns. On the other hand, they cannot know the impact (bad or good) that the SO object placement strategy may have on their own local utility.

To address the above mentioned deadlock, we use as reference the object replication prob-

lem defined by Leff et al. [1], and extend it to account for the existence of selfishly motivated nodes. We use a strategic game in normal form [18] to model the contention between the selfish nodes and set out to identify pure Nash equilibrium object placement strategies (henceforth abbreviated EQ). There are several advantages in employing EQ strategies. First, by their definition, they can guarantee for each and every node of the group that its local utility under EQ will be at least as good as under GL, and possibly better. The first case (“at least as good”) precludes mistreatment problems such as those that can arise under the SO placement which cause the nodes to leave the group in pursuit of GL placement. The second case (“possibly better”) is the typical one, and points to the fact that implicit cooperation is induced even by selfishly behaving nodes as they attempt to do better than GL. Consequently, the EQ strategy is in position to break the above mentioned deadlock, as it forbids the mistreatment of any one node, while it also guards against the disintegration of the group, and the poor performance associated with the GL strategy.

Our main result is that such EQ object placement strategies can be obtained by simple distributed algorithms that do not require the existence of complete information at all the nodes. We describe a two-step local search (TSLS) algorithm for this purpose. TSLS requires each node to know only its local demand pattern and the objects selected for replication by remote nodes, but not the remote demand patterns of other nodes (the demand pattern of a node defines explicitly its utility function, thus in the presented framework it is not assumed that nodes know the utility functions of other nodes). Knowing the remote demand patterns requires the transmission of too much information and thus is seldom possible in large distributed replication groups. On the other hand, knowing the objects selected for replication by remote nodes requires the exchange of much less information, which can be reduced further by employing simple encoding schemes such as Bloom filters [19] (see also [20, 21] for real distributed applications/protocols that utilize such information). Thus in terms of the required information, the proposed EQ strategies fit between the GL strategy that requires only local information, and the SO strategy that requires complete information.

The TSLS algorithm employs the logical ordering of the nodes as a device for obtaining EQ in a simple and distributed manner. The ordering, however, can give some nodes an advantage which, sometimes, is difficult to justify, e.g., in the case of nodes that are identical,

hence lack any kind of difference in “merit” based on which a preferential treatment can be justified. To address such issues we develop the TSLS(k) algorithm, a constrained version of the baseline TSLS, which diminishes any advantage that a node may have over other nodes due to its particular turn in the execution of the algorithm. We implement both algorithms through a common protocol that requires the exchange of a limited amount of information and, thus, is rather simple to apply.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes formally the distributed replication group and the distributed selfish replication (DSR) game. Section 3 describes the baseline TSLS object placement algorithm. Section 4 establishes that the TSLS algorithm produces a pure Nash equilibrium object placement strategy for the DSR game. Section 5 includes a discussion concerning the need for node ordering as well as its implications on the individual gains of the nodes. Section 6 is devoted to the presentation of the TSLS(k) algorithm. Section 7 describes a common protocol for implementing the two algorithms. Section 8 demonstrates some numerical examples for highlighting the operation of the algorithms and the properties of the various placements. Section 9 reviews related game theoretic approaches to replication and caching. Finally, Section 10 concludes the article and points to some interesting problems for future work.

2 Definitions

Let o_i , $1 \leq i \leq N$, and v_j , $1 \leq j \leq n$, denote the i th unit-sized object and the j th node, and let $O = \{o_1, \dots, o_N\}$ and $V = \{v_1, \dots, v_n\}$ denote the corresponding sets. Node v_j is assumed to have a storage capacity for C_j unit-sized objects and a demand described by a rate vector r_j over O , $r_j = \{r_{1j}, \dots, r_{Nj}\}$, where r_{ij} denotes the rate (requests per second) at which node v_j requests object o_i ; let also $\rho_j = \sum_{o_i \in O} r_{ij}$ denote the total request rate from v_j .

We follow the access cost model defined in [1] and later used in several works, including [10, 22, 23]. Under this model, accessing an object from a node’s local cache costs t_l , from a remote node’s cache t_r , and from the origin server t_s , with $t_l \leq t_r \leq t_s$ (Fig. 1 depicts the envisaged distributed replication group). Such a definition of cost, in addition to allowing for a much clearer analysis of the dynamics of selfish replication, has also a strong relevance to practice.

This is because distributed replication groups, like the ones studied here, become meaningful when there is a high degree of proximity among the nodes, while the corresponding distances to reach the origin servers are far too larger. Such is, for example, the case of nodes belonging to the same organization or autonomous system. In such environments, the inter-node distances may be considered to be approximately equal to an average value t_r , when compared to the much larger distance to the remote servers. On the other hand, it is clear that when the inter-node distances for each pair of nodes vary significantly, possibly approaching t_s , then it becomes less meaningful to seek an efficient cooperation between such distant nodes.

Let $R_j = \{o_i \in O : r_{ij} > 0\}$ denote the request set of node v_j . Let P_j denote the placement of node v_j , that is the set of objects replicated at this node; $P_j \subseteq O$ and $|P_j| = C_j$ (in principle it can be $|P_j| \leq C_j$ if, for example, less than C_j objects have none zero request rate, but we can safely assume that each node takes full advantage of its capacity by also replicating zero-rated objects arbitrarily, until $|P_j| = C_j$). Let $P = \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}$ be referred to as a global placement and let $P_{-j} = P_1 \cup \dots \cup P_{j-1} \cup P_{j+1} \cup \dots \cup P_n$ denote the set of objects collectively held by nodes other than v_j under the global placement P . The gain for node v_j under P is defined as follows:

$$G_j(P) = \sum_{o_i \in P_j} r_{ij} \cdot (t_s - t_l) + \sum_{\substack{o_i \notin P_j \\ o_i \in P_{-j}}} r_{ij} \cdot (t_s - t_r) \quad (1)$$

This definition of gain considers all the objects that exist somewhere in the group under the global placement P , and returns a weighted summation of v_j 's local request rate for each one of them, and the distance spared by having v_j accessing them from the closest position in the group (either locally, or from a remote node) and thus avoiding going to the origin server, which is assumed to be the furthest away. Notice that we model only the “read” operations from the users. We could possibly include “write” operations in the same setting but this is not required by our targeted application which is the dissemination of large electronic content (audio files, movies, software distributions). Such content is rarely altered. On the other hand, web-pages are regularly updated, but such content should probably be investigated under a different setting, one without storage capacity constraints as the ones considered here (the small size of typical web-pages in conjunction with the large capacity of hard disk drives allows for assuming the existence of “infinite storage” at content nodes for web content [16]).




Figure 1: A distributed replication group.

Step 0 (initialization):	$P_j^0 = Greedy_j(\emptyset), 1 \leq j \leq n.$
Step 1 (improvement):	$P_j^1 = Greedy_j(P_{-j}^1), 1 \leq j \leq n,$
	where, $P_{-j}^1 = P_1^1 \cup \dots \cup P_{j-1}^1 \cup P_{j+1}^0 \cup \dots \cup P_n^0$

Table 1: The TSLS algorithm.

In the sequel, we define a game that captures the dynamics of distributed object replication under selfishly behaving nodes.

Definition 1 (*DSR game*) *The distributed selfish replication game is defined by the tuple $\langle V, \{P_j\}, \{G_j\} \rangle$, where:*

- *V is the set of n players, which in this case are the nodes.*
- *$\{P_j\}$ is the set of strategies available to player v_j . As the strategies correspond to placements, player v_j has $\binom{N}{C_j}$ possible strategies.*
- *$\{G_j\}$ is the set of utilities for the individual players. The utility of player v_j under the outcome P , which in this case is a global placement, is $G_j(P)$.*

DSR is a n -player, non-cooperative, non-zerosum game [18]. For this game, we seek equilibrium strategies, and in particular, pure Nash equilibrium strategies.

Definition 2 (*pure Nash equilibrium for DSR*) *A pure Nash equilibrium for DSR is a global placement P^* , such that for every node $v_j \in V$, $G_j(P^*) \geq G_j((P_1^*, \dots, P_{j-1}^*, P_j, P_{j+1}^*, \dots, P_n^*))$, for all $P_j \in \{P_j\}$.*

That is, under such a placement P^* , nodes cannot modify their individual placements unilaterally and benefit.

In the sequel, we develop polynomial time algorithms that, given an instance of the DSR game, can produce several Nash equilibrium placement strategies for it.

3 A two-step local search algorithm

In this section we present a two-step local search algorithm (TSLS) that computes a placement for each one of the nodes. In Section 4 we show that these placements correspond to a Nash equilibrium global placement, that is they are EQ strategies. In Section 6, we modify the two-step local search algorithm in order to overcome some of its limitations.

Let P_j^0 and P_j^1 denote the GL placement strategy and the placement strategy identified by TSLS for node v_j , respectively. Let also $Greedy_j(\mathcal{P})$ denote a function that computes the optimal placement for node v_j , given the set $\mathcal{P}$ of distinct objects collectively held by other nodes; we elaborate on this function later on in the section. Table 1 outlines the proposed TSLS algorithm.

At the initialization step (Step 0) nodes compute their GL placements P_j^0 . This is done by evaluating $Greedy_j(\emptyset)$ for each v_j , capturing the case in which nodes operate in isolation ($\mathcal{P} = \emptyset$).

At the improvement step (Step 1) nodes observe the placements of other nodes and, based on this information, proceed to improve their own. The order in which nodes take turn in improving their initial placements is determined based on their ids (increasing order). Thus at v_j 's turn to improve its initial placement, nodes $v_1, \dots, v_{j-1}$ have already improved their own, while nodes $v_{j+1}, \dots, v_n$, have not as yet done so. Node v_j obtains its improved placement P_j^1 by evaluating $Greedy_j(P_{-j}^{1-})$, where $P_{-j}^{1-} = P_1^1 \cup \dots \cup P_{j-1}^1 \cup P_{j+1}^0 \cup \dots \cup P_n^0$ denotes the set of distinct objects collectively held by other nodes (hence the $-j$ subscript) at the time prior to v_j 's turn at Step 1 (hence the 1^- superscript). The placement P_j^1 is, thus, a *best response* to P_{-j}^{1-} .

We return now to describe how to compute the optimal placement for node v_j , when the set of distinct objects collectively held by other nodes is $\mathcal{P}$; such an optimization is employed twice by the TSLS algorithm: at Step 0 where $\mathcal{P} = \emptyset$, and at Step 1 where $\mathcal{P} = P_{-j}^{1-}$. To carry it out, one has to select objects according to their relative excess gain, up to the limit set by the storage capacity of the node. Let g_{ij}^k denote the excess gain incurred by node v_j from replicating object o_i at step $k \in \{0, 1\}$ of TSLS; g_{ij}^k depends on v_j 's demand for o_i and

also on whether o_i is replicated elsewhere in the group.

$$g_{ij}^k = \begin{cases} r_{ij} \cdot (t_s - t_l) & , \text{ if } k = 0 \quad \text{or} \quad k = 1, o_i \notin P_{-j}^{1-} \\ r_{ij} \cdot (t_r - t_l) & , \text{ if } k = 1, o_i \in P_{-j}^{1-} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

$r_{ij} \cdot (t_s - t_l)$ is the excess gain for v_j from choosing to replicate object o_i that is currently not replicated at any node in V . If o_i is replicated at some other node(s), then v_j 's excess gain of replicating it locally is lower, and equal to $r_{ij} \cdot (t_r - t_l)$. Such excess gains are determined by the request frequency for an object, multiplied by the reduction in access cost achieved by fetching the object locally instead from the closest node that currently replicates it (either some other node in V or the origin server).

Finding the optimal placement for v_j given the objects replicated at other nodes ($\mathcal{P}$) amounts to solving a special case of the 0/1 Knapsack problem [24], in which object values are given by Eq. (2), object weights are unit, and the Knapsack capacity is equal to an integer value C_j . The optimal solution to this problem is obtained by the function $Greedy_j(\mathcal{P})$. This function first orders the N objects in a decreasing order according to g_{ij}^k ($k = 0$ at Step 0 and 1 at Step 1), and then it selects for replication at v_j the C_j most valuable ones.¹ As the objects are of unit size and the capacity is integral, this greedy solution is guaranteed to be an optimal solution to the aforementioned 0/1 Knapsack problem.

We now proceed to connect the 0/1 Knapsack problem under the excess gains g_{ij}^k 's, with the gain $G_j(\cdot)$ for v_j under a global placement. We will show that solving the 0/1 Knapsack for v_j under given P_{-j}^{1-} is equivalent to maximizing $G_j(\cdot)$, given the current placements of nodes other than v_j .

Proposition 1 *The placement $P_j^1 = Greedy_j(P_{-j}^{1-})$ produced by the TSLS algorithm for node v_j , $1 \leq j \leq n$, satisfies:*

$$G_j(P_1^1, \dots, P_{j-1}^1, P_j^1, P_{j+1}^0, \dots, P_n^0) \geq G_j(P_1^1, \dots, P_{j-1}^1, P_j, P_{j+1}^0, \dots, P_n^0), \text{ for all } P_j \in \{P_j\}.$$

The proof and all subsequent ones are in Appendix A

An important observation is that at the improvement step, a node is allowed to retain its initial GL placement, if this is the placement that maximizes its gain given the placements of

¹Ties are solved arbitrarily at Step 0 and not re-examined at Step 1, i.e., an object that yields the same gain as other objects and is selected at Step 0, is not replaced in favor of any one of these equally valuable objects, later on at Step 1. Thus at Step 1, new objects are selected only if they yield a gain that is strictly higher than that of already selected ones.

other nodes. Thus, the final gain of a node will be at least as high as its GL one, irrespectively of the demand characteristics of other nodes; this eliminates the possibility of mistreatment due to the existence of overactive nodes.

Step 0 of TSLS has complexity $O(nN \log N)$, as there are n initial placements to be computed and each one has complexity $O(N \log N)$, which is due to the evaluation of the function $Greedy_j(\emptyset)$. Step 1 is computationally more expensive since the evaluation of $Greedy_j(P_{-j}^{1-})$ requires the evaluation of gain functions g_{ij}^1 , which depend on the contents of other nodes, thus require $O(n)$ complexity (whereas the evaluation of g_{ij}^0 at Step 0 requires $O(1)$ complexity as it does not depend on other nodes). The complexity of Step 1 becomes $O(n^2N + N \log N)$ if the g_{ij}^1 's are computed on the fly, that is if P_{-j}^{1-} 's are constructed from the beginning for each v_j . The complexity, however, can be reduced to $O(nN \log N)$, if a single P_{-j}^{1-} is maintained, and updated between turns as nodes change their placements (this requires implementing the set P_{-j}^{1-} as a bit-vector in which all operations between the set and individual elements can be carried out in $O(1)$).

4 Existence of a pure Nash equilibrium for DSR

In this section it is shown that the global placement $(P_1^1, P_2^1, \dots, P_n^1)$ produced by the TSLS algorithm is a pure Nash equilibrium of the distributed replication game. To prove this result we introduce the following additional definitions. Let $E_j^1 = \{o_i \in O : o_i \in P_j^0, o_i \notin P_j^1\}$ denote the eviction set of v_j at Step 1; it is a subset of the initial placement, comprising objects that are evicted in favor of new ones during v_j 's turn to improve its initial placement. Similarly, $I_j^1 = \{o_i \in O : o_i \notin P_j^0, o_i \in P_j^1\}$ denotes the insertion set, i.e., the set of new objects that take the place of the objects that belong to E_j^1 . At any point of TSLS an object is dubbed a *multiple*, if it is replicated in more than one nodes, and an *unrepresented one* (*represented one*), if there is no (some) node replicating it. Regarding these categories of objects, we can prove the following:

Proposition 2 (*only multiples are evicted*) *The TSLS algorithm guarantees that the eviction set of node v_j is such that $E_j^1 \subseteq (P_j^0 \cap P_{-j}^{1-})$.*

Proposition 3 *(only unrepresented ones are inserted) The TSLS algorithm guarantees that the insertion set of node v_j is such that $I_j^1 \subseteq (R_j \setminus (P_j^0 \cup P_{-j}^{1-}))$.*

The previous two propositions enable us to prove that TSLS finds a pure Nash equilibrium for DSR.

Proposition 4 *The global placement $P^1 = (P_1^1, P_2^1, \dots, P_n^1)$ produced at the end of Step 1 of the TSLS algorithm is a pure Nash equilibrium for the distributed replication game.*

Assuming that no two g_{ij}^k are the same, then the maximum number of different equilibria that may be identified by the TSLS algorithm is $n!$, i.e., a different equilibrium for each possible ordering (permutation) of the n nodes.

At this point we would like to comment on a subtle difference between the DSR game and the TSLS algorithm, which is just a solution for the DSR game, and not an augmented game that also models the ordering of nodes. The DSR game is a well defined game as it is, i.e., without reference to node ordering, or any other concept utilized by the particular TSLS solution. The ordering of nodes is hence just a device for deriving equilibrium placements, and not a concept of the DSR game itself. The ordering of nodes is not required for defining the DSR game.

5 Ordering of the nodes

In the first part of this section we discuss the reason for using the ordering of nodes in TSLS, and in the second part, its consequences on the individual gains of the nodes.

5.1 The need for synchronization

The use of a specific ordering of nodes in the improvement step of TSLS is central to the algorithm's ability to find equilibrium placements. What the ordering provides is, essentially, synchronization of the placement decisions of different nodes. This is required in order to avoid "looping" phenomena. In [25] we present two examples in which the nodes do not line up for the improvement step, but rather operate in a completely asynchronous manner, and show that distributed algorithms that follow the spirit of TSLS, cannot lead to stable placements

in such cases. Ordering avoids such phenomena by enforcing an absolute synchronization scheme. Other types of synchronization can also be considered, especially ones that introduce parallelism in the execution of the improvement step. Such possibilities exist, as it might be feasible to “lock” the state of fewer objects (those that would appear in multiple eviction and insertion sets) and thus permit all other changes to progress asynchronously in parallel. Increasing the parallelism in such a way is, however, a non-trivial task, and is left open for future research.

5.2 Node ordering and its impact on the local gains

The order in which nodes take turns in improving their initial placements affects the produced equilibrium placement, with different orderings leading to potentially different equilibria. Choosing one out of the many possible orderings, thus, amounts to choosing a specific equilibrium. The device for defining the desired ordering is the assignment of an appropriate id j to each one of the n nodes. Then the node with id 1, v_1 , becomes the first one to take turn, v_2 becomes the second one, and so forth.

When the demand patterns of the nodes are similar (which is the most interesting case because it allows for higher mutual benefit), nodes naturally prefer to be assigned larger ids so as to have the chance to be the last ones to improve their placements. The key idea is that it is better for a node to maintain its initial placement intact, and let others eliminate multiple ones and insert unrepresented ones. Such a node gets a larger share of the collective extra gain because it succeeds in keeping locally a larger proportion of the most popular objects that get to be replicated in the group at the end of TSLS while it gets the newly inserted ones from the other nodes. In Sect. 8 we give an example of this situation. To apply TSLS under such demands, we propose in Sect. 7 a simple “merit-based” protocol which assigns turns to the nodes according to their relative importance for the group (with more important nodes getting a better turn). This represents a simple approach for implementing equilibrium strategies with only a small exogenous intervention (the merit based protocol).

When the demand patterns of the nodes differ, a higher turn is not necessarily better and, in fact, there are situations in which a node can take advantage of a lower turn. In the sequel we give such a “lower-turn-is-better” example. Suppose that there exist $n = 2$ nodes with the

following properties: (1) each node has a capacity for only one object in a universe composed of $N = 3$ distinct objects, and (2) each one of the two nodes employs a different request vector, namely, $r_1 = \{0.51, 0.49, 0\}$ and $r_2 = \{0.51, 0, 0.49\}$. Assume also that $t_l = 0, t_r = 1, t_s = 2$. It is easy to verify that the first node has the advantage now. By changing its initial placement $P_1^0 = \{1\}$ (which is also the initial placement for the second node) to $P_1^1 = \{2\}$, v_1 can increase its gain from $G_1(\{\{1\}, \{1\}\}) = 2 * 0.51 = 1.02$ to $G_1(\{\{2\}, \{1\}\}) = 2 * 0.49 + 1 * 0.51 = 1.49$; v_2 on the other hand cannot benefit, because the remotely available object $\{2\}$ is useless to it, so it has to settle with $G_2(\{\{2\}, \{1\}\}) = 2 * 0.51 = 1.02$ (whereas it could be the one getting gain 1.49 if it had the first turn and made a switch to object 3).

The previous example demonstrates that an optimal turn depends, among others, on the resemblance of the individual demand patterns. This also means that without a priori knowledge of the remote demand patterns, which is the typical case in distributed replication groups, *nodes are essentially unable to act strategically and determine an optimal turn for them.*

Irrespective of which turn is optimal (whether higher or lower), it remains that under TSLS the final gain of a node is affected by its turn during the improvement step and thus some nodes end up having a higher gain than others. Although these differences are small under typically request workloads, there are situations in which they cannot be tolerated. An example is the case of a *homogeneous group*, i.e., a group composed of nodes with identical characteristics in terms of capacity, total request rate, and demand distribution. Since such nodes are identical, it is natural to expect that they should be treated equally by a placement strategy. The TSLS algorithm and the merit-based protocol of Sect. 7, however, can treat such nodes unequally. This can be hard to justify since homogeneous nodes lack any kind of difference in merit, based on which a preferential treatment could be justified.

To remedy this issue, we propose in the next section a modified version of the baseline TSLS algorithm in which the *ordering of nodes has a diminishing effect on the achieved gains*. This precludes any possibility for strategic behavior with respect to the chosen order (assuming a node had the required information for realizing such a strategic behavior), while it also addresses the unfairness issue in homogeneous groups.

6 TSLS(k): Improving on the TSLS fairness

The TSLS(k) algorithm is a slight variation of the baseline TSLS algorithm. Under TSLS(k), *each node may perform only up to k changes during a round of the improvement step*, i.e., evict up to k objects to insert an equal number of new ones. Note that under TSLS, any number of changes are permitted during the single round of the improvement step. Under TSLS(k), the improvement step might require multiple rounds to reach an equilibrium placement, whereas under TSLS, an equilibrium placement is reached only after a single round. Intuitively, TSLS(k) works in a round-robin fashion based on some node ordering, and allows each node to perform up to k changes of its current placement during a given round, even if the node would like to perform more changes; for the additional changes, the node has to wait for subsequent rounds. The effect of this round-robin, k -constrained selection of objects, is that TSLS(k) is at least as and generally more fair than TSLS with respect to the achieved individual gains. By selecting sufficiently small values of k , e.g., $k = 1$, which is an extreme case, it is possible to almost eliminate the effect of a node's turn on the amount of gain that it receives under the final placement. Essentially, when k is small, TSLS(k) is able to overcome the inherent limitations of having to decide a specific node ordering in order to produce an equilibrium placement. For k sufficiently large (approaching the maximum node capacity), TSLS(k) reduces to the baseline TSLS.

6.1 Description of the algorithm

Table 2 outlines the proposed TSLS(k) algorithm. After computing the initial placements P_j^0 , the algorithm enters the improvement step, which comprises multiple rounds. At round m , node v_j computes its current placement $P_j^{1,m}$ by executing the function $kSwitch_j(P_j^{1,m-1}, P_{-j}^{1-,m})$. This function selects the most valuable objects for v_j in a greedy manner (similarly to the $Greedy_j(\cdot)$ function of Sect. 3), under the added constraint that $P_j^{1,m}$ may differ from the previous round's placement $P_j^{1,m-1}$, in up to k objects. $P_{-j}^{1-,m} = P_1^{1,m} \cup \dots \cup P_{j-1}^{1,m} \cup P_{j+1}^{1,m-1} \cup \dots \cup P_n^{1,m-1}$ denotes the set of distinct objects collectively held by other nodes at the time prior to v_j 's turn at the m th round of Step 1; $P_j^{1,0} = P_j^0$. The algorithm terminates at round M , in which case it holds that $P_j^{1,M} = P_j^{1,M-1}, \forall j$, i.e., when there are no more changes to be

Step 0 (initialization):	$P_j^0 = Greedy_j(\emptyset), 1 \leq j \leq n.$
Step 1 (improvement):	while there exists a node with more changes
	perform another round
Round m :	$P_j^{1,m} = kSwitch_j(P_j^{1,m-1}, P_{-j}^{1-,m}),$
	$1 \leq j \leq n$

Table 2: The TSLS(k) algorithm.

made on the placements.

Proposition 5 (*TSLS(k) terminates*) *The TSLS(k) algorithm terminates after a finite number of rounds $M \leq \lceil C^{max}/k \rceil$, where C^{max} denotes the capacity of the largest node.*

Proposition 6 *The global placement $P^{1,M} = (P_1^{1,M}, P_2^{1,M}, \dots, P_n^{1,M})$ produced at the last round of Step 1 of the TSLS(k) algorithm is a pure Nash equilibrium for the distributed replication game.*

What the TSLS(k) algorithm provides is essentially a tradeoff between an increased fairness and an increased execution time due to the multiple rounds during the improvement step.

6.2 Approximate analytic expression for the extra gain under TSLS(k)

Consider the ratio $q_j = G_j^{EQ}/G_j^{GL}$ which captures the relative increase of gain for node v_j when employing the EQ placement of TSLS(k) as opposed to employing the GL placement. Since $G_j^{EQ} \geq G_j^{GL}$ it is guaranteed that $q_j \geq 1$.

Our goal in this section will be to study some of the basic performance properties of the TSLS(k) algorithm through the development of an approximate analytic expression for the ratio q_j . Specifically, we will approximate q_j with the quantity q which is given in Eq. (3). q is derived under the following assumptions, which correspond to a distributed replication group that is composed of similar nodes: all nodes are assumed to have the same amount of storage C , all nodes are assumed to be generating requests drawn from the same generalized power-law distribution, (called also a Zipf-like distribution²) which states that the request probability for object o_i is $p_i = K/i^a$ where $K = (\sum_{i'=1}^N \frac{1}{i'^a})^{-1}$; the skewness parameter a

²Such distributions have been observed in many real-world measurement studies, including [26, 27].

captures the degree of concentration of requests. The details of the derivation are presented in Appendix B.

$$q = \frac{t_r \left(\left(\frac{C(1+n)(\frac{t_r}{t_s})^{\frac{1}{a}} - 1}{n(\frac{t_r}{t_s})^{\frac{1}{a}} + 1} \right)^{1-a} - 1 \right) + (t_s - t_r) \left(\left(\frac{nC+n+C}{n(\frac{t_r}{t_s})^{\frac{1}{a}} + 1} \right)^{1-a} - 1 \right)}{t_s(C^{1-a} - 1)} \quad (3)$$

By inspecting Eq. (3) we can observe that it includes information about the basic ingredients of the distributed group such as: the number of nodes (n), the storage capacity of each node (C), the demand (a), the ratio of remote access costs (t_r/t_s). It is also evident that the number of objects N does not affect q (N appears only in the constant K of the power-law demand, which, however, is eliminated when considering the ratio G_j^{EQ}/G_j^{GL} , see Appendix B for details). It might also come as a surprise that both the exact identity of a node (j) and the parameter of TSLS(k) are not present. The parameter k is implicitly mapped to q because q becomes relevant as an approximation only when there are many rounds in the improvement step of TSLS(k). When there is only one round (as in TSLS) or just a few (when k is large), then the method by which q is derived becomes less accurate. For sufficiently small k (that lead to many rounds), the exact value of k does not affect q .³ Similarly, the lack of j in Eq. (3) means that q captures the amount of improvement that is available to all nodes, irrespectively of the exact identity (turn) of each one. As will be shown shortly, this is the basic amount of improvement to consider under TSLS(k), whereas the exact identity has a negligible additional contribution.

Due to the rather elaborate form of Eq. (3) it is difficult to understand the behavior of q by inspection only; it is very easy, however, to use (3) for producing graphs that reveal its behavior. For this purpose, we consider a group in which the access costs are $t_l = 0, t_r = 1, t_s = 2$ and we plot q for two kinds of power-law demands, $a = 0.4$ and $a = 0.8$ (Fig. 2) and for varying n, C . The two figures show that there are significant performance gains under TSLS(k). The gain of each and every node of the group can double with respect to the corresponding GL one under $a = 0.4$ whereas it can be significant (25% improvement) under the more skewed demand $a = 0.8$. The improvement increases with larger groups (n) as more

³The value of k affects G_j^{EQ} , and thus q_j also, marginally through the gain component (iii) (defined in Appendix B). As this gain component is typically very small, it is ignored in the derivation of Eq. (3).




Figure 2: Illustration of the behavior of q under power-law demand for two values of the skewness parameter: $a = 0.4$ (left graph) and $a = 0.8$ (right graph). The access costs are: $t_l = 0, t_r = 1, t_s = 2$.

objects become available from remote nodes. It decreases as the nodes become larger (C), in which case the GL placement includes most of the valuable objects.

In Tables 3, 4 we compare the q obtained from the previous examples with $\min q_j$ and $\text{avg } q_j$ obtained by executing $\text{TSLs}(k)$ for $k = 1$. The main conclusion from these tables is that the approximate analytic expression q is very close (typically within 1-2%) to the actual $\min q_j$ and $\text{avg } q_j$ from the execution of $\text{TSLs}(k)$. The fact that $\min q_j$ and $\text{avg } q_j$ and the approximation (that does not consider specific nodes) are so close to each other, points to the fact that for sufficiently small k , the identity of a node has a negligible effect on its gain under $\text{TSLs}(k)$.

7 A protocol for applying the Nash equilibrium for DSR

In this section we outline a protocol for implementing TSLs or $\text{TSLs}(k)$ in a distributed replication group.

7.1 Deciding turns for the improvement step

First, we describe a simple way for deciding turns that can be used with both TSLs and $\text{TSLs}(k)$; for TSLs the ordering has an impact on the individual gains, whereas for $\text{TSLs}(k)$ under small k , the ordering has a diminishing effect on the gains. Consider an arbitrary labelling of nodes, not related to the ordering in which nodes take turns. Let T_h denote a “merit” quantity associated with node v_h , $1 \leq h \leq n$, based on which v_h ’s turn is decided. T_h

		C		
		50	75	100
n	q	1.404	1.392	1.385
	5 min q_j	1.438	1.432	1.430
	avg q_j	1.440	1.422	1.431
	q	1.620	1.602	1.592
	10 min q_j	1.632	1.625	1.621
	avg q_j	1.634	1.626	1.622
	q	1.725	1.704	1.692
	15 min q_j	1.726	1.718	1.711
	avg q_j	1.728	1.719	1.712
	q	1.787	1.764	1.752
	20 min q_j	1.776	1.764	1.761
	avg q_j	1.778	1.765	1.761

Table 3: Comparison of the approximate analytic expression q to the actual q_j 's from executing TSLS(k) under power-law demand $a = 0.4$ and $t_l = 0, t_r = 1, t_s = 2$.

		C		
		50	75	100
n	q	1.096	1.089	1.085
	5 min q_j	1.101	1.096	1.093
	avg q_j	1.102	1.096	1.093
	q	1.131	1.121	1.116
	10 min q_j	1.125	1.119	1.116
	avg q_j	1.125	1.119	1.116
	q	1.145	1.135	1.129
	15 min q_j	1.135	1.130	1.125
	avg q_j	1.136	1.130	1.126
	q	1.152	1.142	1.136
	20 min q_j	1.140	1.135	1.130
	avg q_j	1.141	1.135	1.130

Table 4: Comparison of the approximate analytic expression q to the actual q_j 's from executing TSLS(k) under power-law demand $a = 0.8$ and $t_l = 0, t_r = 1, t_s = 2$.

will be defined in such a way that larger ids will be assigned to nodes having larger values of T_h . At the end, a node whose value of T_h is the j th largest one, will be re-labelled v_j , thus taking the j th turn. There are many ways to define T_h for a node; among them the following three are of particular interest because they can be naturally associated with a common case in which nodes have similar demand patterns and where a higher turn is better (see Sect. 5.2):

$$T_h = \begin{cases} C_h & \text{(proportional fairness)} \\ \rho_h & \text{(pro social benefit)} \\ C_h \cdot \rho_h & \text{(hybrid)} \end{cases}$$

The first one caters to *proportional fairness*. It suggests that a node's turn, or equivalently its share of the extra gain produced through the cooperation, be proportional to the amount of resource (storage capacity) that the node contributes. Under such T_h , v_j is the j th largest node.

The second definition is a *socially* inclining one. It favors nodes that generate more requests, as these nodes have the largest influence on the social utility. Under such T_h , v_j is the j th more active node. Notice that following such a criterion for deciding turns is by no means equivalent to the Socially Optimal (SO) strategy. An equilibrium placement under the pro social benefit criterion favors active nodes by allocating them a bigger share of the extra

gain produced through the cooperation; this is to say that all other nodes will have (at least) their GL gain intact, whereas under SO, the benefited nodes may cause other nodes to fall below the GL level of gain.

The third expression for T_h is a hybrid way of splitting the gains of the cooperation; it favors nodes that contribute more storage and also produce more requests. Having defined the criterion based on which turns are decided, we move on to defining a protocol for implementing the algorithms and obtaining the equilibrium placement that corresponds to the decided ordering.

7.2 Distributed protocol

A straightforward centralized implementation would require each node to report r_j and C_j to a central node responsible for executing the TSLs algorithm and sending back the placements P_j . The problem with such a centralized architecture is that it requires transmitting n rate vectors r_j , with each one containing N (object id, request probability) pairs; for large N this can lead to the consumption of too much bandwidth by all nodes as much as by the central node, which has to send back the placements. We, therefore, turn our attention to the development of the following fully distributed protocol which involves three phases:

Phase DT: During this phase, turns are decided.

1. Each node v_h multicasts⁴ to the group its merit pair (C_h, ρ_h) , while listening for, and storing, such pairs from other nodes. The truthfulness of the transmitted pair is cross-checked later on by other nodes during the operation of the distributed group.
2. Having listened to $n - 1$ other merit pairs, each node may compute its turn j based on a pre-agreed definition of T_h .

Phase 0: In this phase the initial placements according to TSLs are computed and distributed.

1. Each node v_j computes its initial placement P_j^0 and multicasts it to the group. Taking turns is not required at this phase and nodes may transmit their information concurrently.

⁴Native, or end-system, multicast can be employed.

2. Nodes listen and store the initial placements of other nodes.

Phase 1: In this phase, the initial placements of TSLS are improved.

1. Node v_j waits for its turn (i.e., until v_{j-1} completes its own turn and transmits) and then computes its improved placement P_j^1 as described by TSLS.
2. Following the computation of P_j^1 , node v_j transmits E_j^1 and I_j^1 to the group.
3. Nodes $v_{j'}, j < j' \leq n$ receive E_j^1 and I_j^1 and use them to produce $P_{j'}^1$ using also $P_{j'}^0$, which they have from Phase 0.

To implement the TSLS(k) algorithm, Phase 1 needs to be repeated until no node has any more changes to perform. As was mentioned earlier, TSLS(k) provides a tradeoff between the improved fairness and the increased time required to perform multiple rounds at Phase 1. The volume of transmitted information, however, is essentially the same as with the baseline TSLS.

The aforementioned protocol has several advantages. It achieves a degree of parallelism, by permitting nodes to compute their initial placements during Phase 0 independently and concurrently with other nodes. Phase 1 involves a distributed computation too, albeit a sequential one. The major advantage, however, relates to the reduction in the amount of transmitted information as compared to a centralized computation which requires the transmission of $n \cdot N$ pairs (object id, request frequency) towards the central point and then $\sum_{v_j \in V} C_j$ object ids sent back from the central point to the nodes carrying the placements P_j^1 . Our protocol limits the amount of transmitted information to less than $3 \cdot \sum_{v_j \in V} C_j$ object ids (initial placements plus eviction and insertion sets, with the worst case occurring when all nodes change all their objects at the improvement step). This represents a substantial reduction in the amount of transmitted information, as typically the number of available objects is several orders of magnitude larger than the aggregate storage capacity of the group. Furthermore, lists of object ids can be represented succinctly by employing simple compression techniques such as Bloom filters [19, 3], whereas rate vectors composed of (object id, request frequency) elements, are much harder to represent and communicate.

In the above protocol, the transmitted information could be reduced further by not sending E_j^1 's. The TSLS algorithm needs to know whether at least one copy of an object exists

somewhere in the group, and not its exact location. Proposition 2 guarantees that evicted objects are multiple ones, so specifying the eviction set of each node is not required for the execution of TSLS as it is guaranteed that evicted objects exist elsewhere in the group. Transmitting the E_j^1 's, however, is valuable for the purpose of truthfulness checking. Having P_j^0 , I_j^1 and E_j^1 , every node can compute the final placement P_j^1 of every other node v_j . Then, if a node requests an object o_i that appears to belong to P_j^1 , but v_j fails to deliver it, then this can be taken as an indication that v_j has been untruthful. A node may be tempted to be untruthful and, say, declare at Phase DT a storage capacity that is larger than its actual one. The purpose for doing that is that under TSLS and the proportional fairness criterion, such a false declaration can lead to the assignment of a higher, thus better, turn (on the other, if TSLS(k) is employed, ordering is of limited importance). Knowing the exact placement of other nodes guards against such exploitations as untruthful nodes can be disclosed. Similar checks can be performed regarding the declared request rate.

8 Numerical examples

In this section we present some simple numerical examples mostly for the purpose of demonstrating the operation of TSLS and TSLS(k). When comparing against the social optimal placement, we use the method of Leff et al. [1] (Appendix C) to obtain it. In the first example, there are two nodes that generate requests following the exact same Zipf-like distribution, i.e., $r_{ij} = \rho_j \cdot K/i^a$. The local access cost is, $t_l = 0$, the remote one, $t_r = 1$, and the cost of accessing the origin server, $t_s = 2$; this leads to a hop-count notion of distance. There are $N = 100$ distinct objects, and each node has a capacity for $C = 40$ objects.

In Table 5 we show the objects replicated under the GL, SO, and EQ replications strategies for fixed $\rho_1 = 1$ and varying ρ_2 ; here the EQ strategy is produced by the baseline TSLS. The GL strategy selects for each node the first 40 most popular objects, i.e., those with ids in $\{1:40\}$, independently of ρ_2 . The SO strategy, however, is much different. As the request rate from Node 2 increases, SO uses some of the storage capacity of Node 1 for replicating objects that do not fit in Node 2's cache, thereby depriving Node 1 of valuable storage capacity for its own objects. For $\rho_2 = 10$, Node 1 gets to store only 3 of its most popular objects, while

placement strategy	Node 1 objects	Node 2 objects
GL, $\rho_2 = X$	{1:40}	{1:40}
SO, $\rho_2 = 1$	{1 : 16} $\cup$ {41 : 64}	{1:40}
SO, $\rho_2 = 2$	{1 : 12} $\cup$ {41 : 68}	{1:40}
SO, $\rho_2 = 3$	{1 : 9} $\cup$ {41 : 71}	{1:40}
SO, $\rho_2 = 4$	{1 : 7} $\cup$ {41 : 73}	{1:40}
SO, $\rho_2 = 5$	{1 : 6} $\cup$ {41 : 74}	{1:40}
SO, $\rho_2 = 6$	{1 : 5} $\cup$ {41 : 75}	{1:40}
SO, $\rho_2 = 7$	{1 : 4} $\cup$ {41 : 76}	{1:40}
SO, $\rho_2 = 8$	{1 : 4} $\cup$ {41 : 76}	{1:40}
SO, $\rho_2 = 9$	{1 : 3} $\cup$ {41 : 77}	{1:40}
SO, $\rho_2 = 10$	{1 : 3} $\cup$ {41 : 77}	{1:40}
EQ, $\rho_2 = X$	{1 : 23} $\cup$ {41 : 57}	{1:40}

Table 5: An example with v_1, v_2 having the same Zipf-like demand pattern with $a = 0.8$. The number of available objects is $N = 100$ and the storage capacity of each node is $C = 40$. Also, $t_l = 0$, $t_r = 1$, $t_s = 2$, $\rho_1 = 1$.

it uses the rest of its storage for picking up the next 37 more popular objects for Node 2, starting with the one with id 41. Under the EQ strategy Node 1 (v_1) stores 23 of its most popular objects. Node 2 (v_2) is the second one (i.e., the last one) to improve its placement, and it naturally selects the initial 40 most popular objects.

We now turn our attention to the gain G_j of the two nodes under the various placement strategies (the corresponding access cost can be obtained from the expression $t_s - G_j$). Figure 3 shows that as ρ_2 increases, the gain of v_2 under SO increases as it consumes storage from v_1 for replicating objects according to its preference; v_1 's gain under SO decreases rapidly as a result of not being able to replicate locally some of its most popular objects. In fact, for $\rho_2 > 2.5$, v_1 's gain becomes worse (lower) than the corresponding one under GL. From this point and onwards, v_1 is being mistreated by the SO strategy and thus has no incentive in participating in it, as it can obviously do better on its own under a GL placement.

By following an EQ strategy, a node's gain is immune to the relative request intensities and this is why the EQ lines are parallel to the x-axis of Fig. 3. v_1 's gain under the EQ produced by TSLS is immune to the increasing ρ_2 and strictly higher than its gain under GL. This demonstrates the fact that the EQ strategy avoids the mistreatment problem. Under the EQ produced by TSLS both nodes achieve higher gains than with GL, but it is v_2 that benefits the most, and thus incurs a higher gain than v_1 . This owes to the fact that v_2 is




Figure 3: Individual node gains for the example of Table 5. “ $v_j - XX$ ” denotes the gain for node v_j under the placement strategy XX .

algorithm	Node 1 objects	Node 2 objects
TSLs	$\{1 : 23\} \cup \{41 : 57\}$	$\{1:40\}$
TSLs(1)	$\{1 : 23\} \cup \{25, 27, 29, 31 \dots, 55, 57\}$	$\{1 : 23\} \cup \{24, 26, 28, 30, \dots, 54, 56\}$
TSLs(2)	$\{1 : 23\} \cup \{25, 26, 29, 30 \dots, 53, 54, 57\}$	$\{1 : 24\} \cup \{27, 28, 31, 32 \dots, 55, 56\}$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$
TSLs(17)	$\{1 : 23\} \cup \{41 : 57\}$	$\{1:40\}$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$
TSLs(40)	$\{1 : 23\} \cup \{41 : 57\}$	$\{1:40\}$

Table 6: An example of the placement produced by TSLs and TSLs(k). Here v_1, v_2 have the same Zipf-like demand pattern with $a = 0.8$. The number of available objects is $N = 100$ and the storage capacity of each node is $C = 40$. Also, $t_l = 0$, $t_r = 1$, $t_s = 2$.

the second (last) one to improve its placement and, thus, has an advantage under TSLs as discussed in Sect. 5.2. The difference in performance between the two nodes can be eliminated by employing the TSLs(k) algorithm. To show this, Fig. 3 includes the gains of the two nodes under the EQ strategy that is produced by TSLs(1). The corresponding lines almost coincide, which demonstrates the ability of TSLs(k) to be fair and to assign identical gains to v_1 and v_2 (as opposed to TSLs which, in this example, favors v_2).

The placements produced by TSLs(k) (for the previous example) are exemplified in Table 6 for different values of k . The round-robin k -constrained operation of TSLs(k) is evident in the produced placements. For example TSLs(1) places in each one of the two nodes the first 23 most popular objects, while it assigns the next 34 objects (object 24 - object 57) to the two nodes interchangeably. TSLs(2) similarly, assigns the initial most popular objects to both nodes, while it assigns the rest most popular ones (up to the available storage capacity) interchangeably, two objects at a time. TSLs(k) operates similarly for larger k , up to $k = 17$, at which point it reduces to the baseline TSLs.

In the previous example, the equilibrium strategy for v_2 identified by the TSLs algorithm, P_2^1 , was identical to its GL strategy P_2^0 , i.e., v_2 made no changes to its initial placement during the improvement step of TSLs (on the other hand, v_1 changed its initial placement during the improvement step). This has been a consequence of the fact that both nodes followed the exact same demand pattern. This is not, however, the case in general. The following example, depicted in Table 7, demonstrates an example in which both nodes improve their initial placements. The left portion of the table shows the object popularity ranking which,

node	object popularity ranking (decreasing order)	init. placement	impr. placement	eviction set	insertion set
v_1	4 7 5 3 2 9 1 8 10 6	$P_1^0 = \{4, 7, 5, 3\}$	$P_1^1 = \{4, 7, 5, 1\}$	$E_1^1 = \{3\}$	$I_1^1 = \{1\}$
v_2	2 9 3 5 6 1 4 8 7 10	$P_2^0 = \{2, 9, 3, 5\}$	$P_2^1 = \{2, 9, 3, 6\}$	$E_2^1 = \{5\}$	$I_2^1 = \{6\}$

Table 7: An example with v_1, v_2 having different demand patterns. Here the number of available objects is $N = 10$ and the storage capacity of each node is $C = 4$. The demand pattern of each node is Zipf-like with $a = 0.8$ but the popularity ranking is different for the two nodes.

in this example, is not the same for both nodes; v_1 's object ranking in decreasing order of popularity is 4, 7, 5, $\dots$, 6, while for v_2 it is 2, 9, 3, $\dots$, 10. The right part of the table depicts the initial placement, the improved placement, as well as the insertion and eviction sets for the two nodes. Notice that v_1 evicts object 3 which is included in the initial placement of v_2 and inserts in its position the next most valuable object that is not included in the initial placement of v_2 , which is object 1. Then v_2 takes turn in improving its initial placement and evicts object 5 to insert object 6. The resulting placement (P_1^1, P_2^1) is an equilibrium pair.

9 Related work

We are aware of only a few very recent works on game-theoretic aspects of object replication. The most relevant to our work is the one due to Chun et al. [28], which studies distributed selfish replication (despite calling it caching). However, this work does not consider storage capacity limits on the nodes, while it also addresses more complex payment games and, thus, differs substantially from our approach. Another related work is due to Erçetin and Tas- siulas [29], on market-based resource allocation in content delivery networks. Their focus, however, is on a three-part market game between content providers, distributors, and consumers, and thus they consider only very simple object replication strategies (greedy local ones). Our work on distributed selfish caching in [17] is, to the best of our knowledge, the only one studying similar problems under distributed caching (looking at different replacement algorithms, cache configurations and inter-cache cooperation schemes). Recent works on incentives in P2P networks, e.g., Antoniadis et al. [30], study the problem of attracting users to a P2P network and making them contribute more content. The aforementioned work and other similar ones, formulate the problem at a completely different level as compared to our work, as they focus on the number of files shared by each node, without identifying the

identities of these files, whereas we focus on identifying the exact set of files shared.

10 Conclusions and future work

This work has described two algorithms and an efficient distributed protocol for implementing equilibrium object placement strategies in a distributed selfish replication group. Such placement strategies become meaningful when replication nodes cater to their local utilities, as is the case with some content distribution applications that are run under multiple authorities (e.g., P2P, distributed web caching). In such applications, following a socially optimal placement strategy may lead to the mistreatment of some nodes, possibly causing their departure from the group. Our equilibrium strategies on the other hand, guarantee that all nodes are better off participating in the group as opposed to operating in isolation in a greedy local manner. This keeps a distributed group from splitting apart, by creating an excess gain for all (stemming from the cooperation) while forbidding the mistreatment of any one of the nodes.

An interesting line for future work is to investigate the case that nodes are allowed to communicate and negotiate to form alliances. Such alliances would cooperate and try to secure for each one of their members a gain that is potentially higher than the one that each member can achieve by acting selfishly on its own. This would require, however, additional protocols and mechanisms to be installed, thus increasing the overall complexity (computational and exchange of information) as compared to the complexity which is required for implementing the presented equilibrium strategies.

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A Proofs of Propositions 1-6

A.1 Proposition 1

Re-write $G_j(P)$ from Eq. (1) as follows:

$$G_j(P) = \left(\sum_{\substack{o_i \in P_j \\ o_i \notin P_{-j}}} r_{ij} \cdot (t_s - t_l) + \sum_{\substack{o_i \in P_j \\ o_i \in P_{-j}}} r_{ij} \cdot (t_r - t_l) \right) + \sum_{o_i \in P_{-j}} r_{ij} \cdot (t_s - t_r) \quad (4)$$

The new expression is derived by considering objects that are replicated at v_j and again elsewhere in the group, and re-expressing their gain by splitting it into two parts through $r_{ij} \cdot (t_s - t_l) = r_{ij} \cdot (t_s - t_r) + r_{ij} \cdot (t_r - t_l)$. Notice now that given P_{-j} , the quantity outside the parenthesis of Eq. (4) becomes a constant, i.e., it does not depend on the objects selected for replication at v_j . Thus to maximize $G_j(P)$ amounts to maximizing the quantity inside the parenthesis. The quantity inside the parenthesis depends on both the objects replicated at other nodes, and the objects selected for replication at v_j ; it is the exact quantity that is maximized by solving the aforementioned 0/1 Knapsack problem (notice that Eq. (4) is composed of the g_{ij}^k values of objects that are considered in the 0/1 Knapsack formulation). This proves the claim of the proposition.

A.2 Proposition 2

Consider two objects $o_{i_e} \in E_j^1$ and $o_{i_i} \in I_j^1$. By their definition $o_{i_e} \in P_j^0$ and $o_{i_i} \notin P_j^0$ which implies that:

$$g_{i_e j}^0 \geq g_{i_i j}^0 \quad (5)$$

Suppose now that contrary to the claim of the proposition $o_{i_e} \notin (P_j^0 \cap P_{-j}^{1-})$ which translates to $o_{i_e} \notin P_{-j}^{1-}$ since $o_{i_e} \in P_j^0$. Since o_{i_i} is inserted in place of the evicted o_{i_e} at the improvement step, it must be that:

$$g_{i_i j}^1 > g_{i_e j}^1 \quad (6)$$

Since $o_{i_e} \notin P_{-j}^{1-}$, o_{i_e} retains its Step 0 gain (by definition of g_{ij}^k), hence:

$$g_{i_e j}^1 = g_{i_e j}^0 \quad (7)$$

Finally, from the definition of the gain function in Eq. (2):

$$g_{i_i j}^1 \leq g_{i_i j}^0 \quad (8)$$

Combining equations (6), (7) gives:

$$g_{i_i j}^1 > g_{i_e j}^0 \quad (9)$$

Multiplying Eq. (8) by -1 and adding side-by-side with Eq. (9) leads to $g_{i_e j}^0 < g_{i_i j}^0$ which is clearly false as it contradicts Eq. (5). Thus it must be that $o_{i_e} \in (P_j^0 \cap P_{-j}^{1-})$, which proves the claim of the proposition.

A.3 Proposition 3

Before going into the proof, notice that since all accesses to objects at remote nodes cost the same, the following observation can be written with regard to the ratio between the gain of a represented object and the gain of the same object when it is unrepresented.

Observation 1 For all $o_i \in P_{-j}^{1-}$ and all $v_j \in V$, $\frac{g_{ij}^1}{g_{ij}^0} = \frac{r_{ij}(t_r - t_l)}{r_{ij}(t_s - t_l)} = \frac{t_r - t_l}{t_s - t_l} = \tau < 1$.

In other words, the relative reduction of gain between represented and unrepresented objects is the same for all different objects and all different nodes.

Consider now two object $o_{i_e} \in E_j^1$ and $o_{i_i} \in I_j^1$. By their definition $o_{i_e} \in P_j^0$ and $o_{i_i} \notin P_j^0$ which implies that:

$$g_{i_e j}^0 \geq g_{i_i j}^0 \quad (10)$$

Since o_{i_i} is inserted in place of the evicted o_{i_e} at the improvement step, it must be that:

$$g_{i_i j}^1 > g_{i_e j}^1 \quad (11)$$

Proposition 2 gives that $o_{i_e} \in P_{-j}^{1-}$; combined with Observation 1 this leads to:

$$g_{i_e j}^1 = \tau \cdot g_{i_e j}^0 \quad (12)$$

Suppose now that contrary to the claim of the proposition, $o_{i_i} \in (P_j^0 \cup P_{-j}^{1-})$ which translates to $o_{i_i} \in P_{-j}^{1-}$ since $o_{i_i} \notin P_j^0$. By using Observation 1, this assumption leads to:

$$g_{i_i j}^1 = \tau \cdot g_{i_i j}^0 \quad (13)$$

Substituting (12), (13) in (11) we can write $\tau \cdot g_{i_i j}^0 > \tau \cdot g_{i_e j}^0$, which simplifies to:

$$g_{i_i j}^0 > g_{i_e j}^0 \quad (14)$$

Inequality (14) is clearly false as it contradicts with (10). Thus it must be that $o_{i_i} \notin (P_j^0 \cup P_{-j}^{1-})$, which proves the claim of the proposition.

A.4 Proposition 4

Let $P_{-j}^1 = P_1^1 \cup \dots \cup P_{j-1}^1 \cup P_{j+1}^1 \cup \dots \cup P_n^1$ denote the set of objects collectively held by nodes other than v_j at the end of TSLS; notice that generally $P_{-j}^1 \neq P_{-j}^{1-}$ (the latter refers to the set of objects collectively held by the other nodes during v_j 's turn at the improvement step).

To prove the proposition, it suffices to show that for every node $v_j \in V$, $G_j(P^1) \geq G_j((P_1^1, \dots, P_{j-1}^1, P_j, P_{j+1}^1, \dots, P_n^1))$, for all $P_j \in \{P_j\}$ (recall that $\{P_j\}$ denotes the set of placement strategies for node v_j). As Proposition 1 states that solving the 0/1 Knapsack problem under given P_{-j}^{1-} maximizes v_j 's gain, what we need to show here is that solving the 0/1 Knapsack, this time under P_{-j}^1 instead of P_{-j}^{1-} , leads again to the same placement P_j^1 , i.e., $\text{Greedy}_j(P_{-j}^1) = \text{Greedy}_j(P_{-j}^{1-})$, and that this holds true for all v_j , $1 \leq j \leq n-1$ (it obviously holds true for $j = n$). In other words, we need to show that for all v_j , the changes in the

global placement contributed by the nodes that improved their placements following v_j 's turn, do not affect the optimality of v_j 's placement, as it was determined at the time of its turn.

Looking at a given v_j , the differences between the global placements at v_j 's turn and at the termination of TSLS are determined by: (a) the multiples that were evicted, i.e., E_h^1 's, and (b) the unrepresented ones that were inserted, i.e., I_h^1 's, $j+1 \leq h \leq n$. We will show that these changes do not affect the optimality of P_j^1 , i.e., $P_j^1 = \text{Greedy}_j(P_{-j}^1) = \text{Greedy}_j(P_{-j}^{1-})$. Consider o_{i_e} , an object that belonged to P_{-j}^{1-} , but was later evicted by some of the node(s) that were holding it during v_j 's turn. Proposition 2 guarantees that in the end at least one node will still be replicating o_{i_e} , i.e., $o_{i_e} \in P^1$. This precludes the case that v_j would decide to modify P_j^1 so as to include o_{i_e} , in the case that $o_{i_e} \notin P_j^1$. If on the other hand, $o_{i_e} \in P_j^1$ then again the evictions of some multiple copies of o_{i_e} at remote nodes cannot trigger changes to P_j^1 .

Consider now o_{i_i} , an object that was inserted by a node following v_j 's turn. Proposition 3 guarantees that o_{i_i} is an unrepresented one, which in turn means that $o_{i_i} \notin P_j^1$. This in effect means that its insertion may not cause the reduction of the g_{ij}^k value of any object $o_i \in P_j^1$, as the only such object that would be affected (its value be reduced thus making it eligible for eviction), would be $o_i = o_{i_i}$; o_{i_i} however does not belong to P_j^1 . The previous two arguments regarding o_{i_e} and o_{i_i} guarantee that node v_j has no reason to change P_j^1 as a result of the transition from P_{-j}^{1-} to P_{-j}^1 , and this holds true for all v_j . Combining the previous with the fact that P_j^1 maximizes G_j given P_{-j}^1 (stems from Proposition 1), establishes that P^1 is a pure Nash equilibrium for DSR.

A.5 Proposition 5

Since N and C_j 's are all finite, in order for TSLS(k) not to terminate in a finite number of rounds, it would require it to enter a loop, in which some objects would be evicted and then be re-inserted indefinitely. Propositions 2 and 3, however, which also apply to TSLS(k), don't permit for such loops to occur. This is because they establish: (1) that only multiple objects may be evicted, and (2) that only unrepresented objects may be inserted. Since the number of objects N is finite, this guarantees that the elimination of the unprofitable multiple objects will be completed after a finite number of rounds M . It also points to the fact that

M will be small, as each inserted object may be inserted by only one node (this precludes the visiting of all possible global placements, whose number is exponentially dependent on the input). To realize the stated upper bound on M , observe that it is the largest node that may perform the maximum number of changes, and thus cause the maximum number of rounds. For appropriately selected rate vectors r_j , the largest node may change all its initial objects for new ones⁵, and thus cause up to $\lceil C^{max}/k \rceil$ rounds.

A.6 Proposition 6

The Nash equilibrium property follows from the fact that at round M , all nodes are given the opportunity to improve their placements after observing the contents of other nodes, but no node has such an improvement to perform.

B Derivation of q of Eq. (3)

A *full round* of the improvement step of TSLS(k) is defined to be a round in which each one of the n nodes performs the maximum number of allowed changes, that is k . Let R denote the last full round and let i be the index of the last object that is inserted by the last (the n th) node at the last full round. As each inserted object gets replicated only once in the group (Proposition 3) it is clear that i will be larger than any other index of an inserted object. Taking into consideration that objects $1 \dots C$ are represented in the group due to the initial GL placement, that the inserted objects are consecutive ones, and that nk unrepresented objects are inserted in total at each full round, we obtain that $R = \frac{i-C}{nk}$.

It is also possible to identify h , the index of the object whose place on the n th node is taken by i at the last full round. To do that we must take into consideration that with every batch of $n - 1$ consecutive full rounds: (i) nk of the least popular objects of the GL placement become “unique-ized”, i.e., are forced (through the evictions) to reside in only one node of the group (Proposition 2 guarantees that it is impossible to evict all the copies of an initially represented object); (ii) $(n - 1)nk$ consecutive unrepresented objects are inserted; (iii) h reduces by nk as

⁵This would require that all the objects in its initial placement be multiple ones, and that at least C^{max} unrepresented objects may profitably take their place. The second requirement can easily occur if the largest node requests objects with rates that tend to be uniformly distributed to the different objects.

compared to its value prior to the current batch of $n - 1$ full rounds.⁶ If R was a multiple of $n - 1$ then we would be able to accurately identify h through the following equation.

$$h = C - \frac{i - C}{nk} \cdot k + 1 = \frac{(n + 1)C - i + n}{n} \quad (15)$$

Given that the approximation that we are deriving is relevant when $\text{TSLs}(k)$ performs many rounds, we can ignore the remainder of the integer division of R with $n - 1$ and retain (for the sake of simplicity) the h given by Eq. (15). Since we assumed that object i gets the position of object h , it must be that it leads to a higher excess gain for node n , i.e.:

$$p_i(t_s - t_l) \geq p_h(t_r - t_l) \quad (16)$$

Substituting in Eq. (16) p_i and p_h (making use of our assumption that all nodes follow the same generalized power-law demand) and using also h from Eq. (15), we can write the following inequality for i :

$$i \leq \min \left\{ \frac{(n + 1)C + n}{n\phi + 1}, nC \right\}, \quad \text{where } \phi = \left(\frac{t_r - t_l}{t_s - t_l} \right)^{\frac{1}{a}} \quad (17)$$

At this point we are ready to write an expression for G_j^{EQ} , the gain of the j th node under the EQ placement produced by $\text{TSLs}(k)$. We will split G_j^{EQ} into three components: (i) the gain contributed by the initial (most popular) objects of the GL placement that are not affected by the improvement step (objects $1 \dots h - 1$ which we denote by the set (H)); (ii) the gain contributed by any other object that does not belong to (H), but exists somewhere – locally or remotely – in the group (objects $h \dots i$ fall in this category); (iii) the gain contributed by any object that does not belong to (H) but is replicated locally (in this category we have the set of objects (U) which comprises the unique-ized k -tuples that were kept locally, and the set of objects (I) which comprises the locally inserted objects). These sets are illustrated in Fig. 4.

The objects of category (i) contribute to the overall gain with the product of their request probability times a weight $(t_s - t_l)$. The objects of category (ii) contribute similarly, but

⁶To understand the eviction/insertion process see that at the first full round nodes $1 \leq j \leq n - 1$ evict the same objects $C - k + 1 \dots C$ and insert different consecutive ones $C + (j - 1)k + 1 \dots C + jk$, while node n evicts a different set of objects $C - 2k + 1 \dots C - k$ and inserts objects $C + (n - 1)k + 1 \dots C + nk$. The “unique-ized” objects of the first round ($C - k + 1 \dots C$) remain at node n . The unique-ized objects of the next full round ($C - 2k + 1 \dots C - k$) will remain at node $n - 1$, and so on until the completion of the $(n - 1)$ th full round. Then another $n - 1$ batch of full rounds will begin, with node n being the one to sustain the currently unique-ized k -tuple of objects.




Figure 4: Tomography of the objects that are replicated at a node after the end of TSLS(k). (H) denotes the set of objects that belong to the “head” of the GL placement, i.e., objects that are left intact by the improvement step because they are too valuable. (U) denotes the set of unique-sized objects, that is objects that were on the GL placement of all the nodes but were subsequently eliminated from all the nodes but the local one. (I) denotes the set of objects that were inserted locally by the improvement step.

with a smaller weight ($t_s - t_r$) (the weight that amounts to a remote object). The objects of category (iii) are local objects; they have already contributed to G_j^{EQ} by a partial weight ($t_s - t_r$) as they also belong to (ii), but must contribute by an additional weight ($t_r - t_l$), so as to fill up to the weight ($t_s - t_l$) that amounts to local objects (we have split the contribution of such objects in two parts similarly to what we have done in the proof of Proposition 1). The following approximate expression for G_j^{EQ} considers only the contribution of (i) and (ii) and disregards the contribution of (iii) which is typically very small (see Sect. 6.2):

$$\begin{aligned} G_j^{EQ} &\approx (t_s - t_l)K \sum_{l=1}^{h-1} \frac{1}{l^a} + (t_s - t_r)K \sum_{l=h}^i \frac{1}{l^a} \\ &= (t_s - t_l)KH_{h-1}^{(a)} + (t_s - t_r)K \left(H_i^{(a)} - H_{h-1}^{(a)} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

In the previous expression, $H_m^{(a)} = \sum_{l=1}^m 1/l^a$ denotes the m th Harmonic number of order a . When $0 \leq a < 1$, $H_m^{(a)}$ can be approximated by its integral expression (see also [31]):

$$H_m^{(a)} \approx \int_1^m 1/l^a dl = \frac{m^{1-a} - 1}{1-a} \quad (19)$$

The expression of v_j 's gain under the GL placement is much simpler:

$$G_j^{GL} = G^{GL} = (t_s - t_l)KH_C^{(a)} \quad (20)$$

The approximation q of q_j that is given in Eq. (3) is obtained by dividing G_j^{EQ} from Eq. (18) with G_j^{GL} from Eq. (20), employing the integral approximation of Eq. (19), normalizing t_r, t_s by considering $t_l = 0$, and substituting h, i from Eqs (15), (17).

C Socially optimal replication

Leff, Wolf and Yu [1] have derived the socially optimal replication strategy under a global utility by transforming the replica placement problem into a *capacitated transportation problem* [32] that can be solved efficiently in polynomial time. Let $X = \{X_{ij} : 1 \leq i \leq N, 1 \leq j \leq n\}$ be a matrix of binary decision variables X_{ij} that equal 1 if object o_i is replicated at node v_j , and 0 otherwise; X defines a global placement. Also define z_{ij} , $1 \leq i \leq N$, $1 \leq j \leq n+1$, as follows:

$$z_{ij} = \begin{cases} r_{ij} \cdot (t_r - t_l) & \text{for } 1 \leq j \leq n \\ \sum_{j'=1}^n r_{ij'} \cdot (t_r - t_s) & \text{for } j = n+1 \end{cases}$$

Leff, Wolf and Yu showed that the socially optimal replication strategy is given by the solution of the following capacitated transportation problem.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{maximize} \quad & f(X) = \sum_{j=1}^{n+1} \sum_{i=1}^N z_{ij} \cdot X_{ij} \\ \text{subject to} \quad & \sum_{j=1}^{n+1} X_{ij} \geq 1, \quad 1 \leq i \leq N \\ & \sum_{i=1}^N X_{ij} \leq C_j, \quad 1 \leq j \leq n \\ & \sum_{i=1}^N X_{ij} < \infty, \quad j = n+1 \end{aligned}$$