When the Party Breaks Up: Exit and Voice among Japanese Legislators

TL;DR: In this article, an explanation for why no opposition party has been able to offer itself as a credible challenger in Japan has been proposed, arguing that a far more plausible explanation rests on the predominance in Japan of clientelism, combined with a centralized government structure and electoral protection for groups that benefit from client-ism.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that intra-party competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes, but unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions (for example, by privileging form over content).

TL;DR: In this article, the benefits and costs to legislators in democratic legislatures of joining and acting collectively and individualistically within political parties are explored. And the empirical evidence on how a multiplicity of systemic, party-level and situational factors supposedly impact cohesion/discipline levels.

TL;DR: In Italy, one out of four deputies in the Chamber of Deputies switched parties at least once, compared to only 20 switches in the U.S. Congress from 1947 to 1997 as mentioned in this paper.

Abstract: 1. Introduction and Doctrinal Background Enter "exit" and "voice" Latitude for deterioration, and slack in economic thought Exit and voice as impersonations of economics and politics 2. Exit How the exit option works Competition as collusive behavior 3. Voice Voice as a residual of exit Voice as an alternative to exit 4. A Special Difficulty in Combining Exit and Voice 5. How Monopoly Can be Comforted by Competition 6. On Spatial Duopoly and the Dynamics of Two-Party Systems 7. A Theory of Loyalty The activation of voice as a function of loyalty Loyalist behavior as modified by severe initiation and high penalties for exit Loyalty and the difficult exit from public goods (and evils) 8. Exit and Voice in American Ideology and Practice 9. The Elusive Optimal Mix of Exit and Voice Appendixes A. A simple diagrammatic representation of voice and exit B. The choice between voice and exit C. The reversal phenomenon D. Consumer reactions to price rise and quality decline in the case of several connoisseur goods F. The effects of severity of initiation on activism: design for an experiment (in collaboration with Philip G. Zimbardo and Mark Snyder) Index

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the causes and consequences of the expansion of the public economy following Schumpeter's discussion of the tax state, in terms of the extractive role of government and found that some nations have experienced a far greater rate of increase in recent years and, as a result, have a much larger public economy than other nations.

TL;DR: The politics of coalition in Europe who plays the coalition game? what are the stakes? how do you win? who gets in? will it last? who get what? coalitions in a constrained real world.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation, which is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions.