Open AccessProceedings Article
Universal Interactive Preferences.
Jayant V. Ganguli,Aviad Heifetz +1 more
- 01 Jan 2013
5
TL;DR: It is proved that a universal preference type space exists under much more general conditions than those postulated by [1] for a large class of preferences beyond [4], and it is enough that preferences can be encoded by a countable collection of continuous functionals.
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Abstract: We prove that a universal preference type space exists under much more general conditions than those postulated by Epstein and Wang (1996) To wit, it is enough that preferences can be encoded by a countable collection of continuous functionals, while the preferences themselves need not necessarily be continuous or regular, like, eg, in the case of lexicographic preferences The proof relies on a far-reaching generalization of a method developed by Heifetz and Samet (1998)
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Citations
Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty
TL;DR: In this paper, the standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an innite depth of reasoning, and generalizes the type to games with complete information.
38
Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
TL;DR: In this article, a universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional preferences; and so on
The Topology-Free Construction of the Universal Type Structure for Conditional Probability Systems
TL;DR: Strong soundness and strong completeness are proved by proved of an infinitary conditional probability logic with truthful and non-epistemic conditioning events by proving the belief-completeness in a constructive way.
4
•Proceedings Article
Common Belief in Choquet Rationality and Ambiguity Attitudes - Extended Abstract.
Adam Dominiak,Burkhard C. Schipper +1 more
- 01 Jan 2019
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define Choquet rationalizability and characterize it by Choquet rationality and common beliefs in the universal capacity type space in a purely measurable setting, and show that it is equivalent to iterative elimination of strictly dominated actions in an extended game.
2
•Posted Content
Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs
Aviad Heifetz,Dov Samet +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that a universal Harsanyi type space does exist even when spaces are defined in pure measure theoretic terms, and that coherent hierarchies of beliefs do not necessarily describe types.
References
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Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
TL;DR: In this paper, a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information has been described, and it has been shown that in consistent games, where a basic probability distribution exists, it is essentially unique.
1.5K
Temptation and Self-Control
Faruk Gul,Wolfgang Pesendorfer +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a two-period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision-maker in the second period was studied, where individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices.
•Book
Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity
Peter P. Wakker
- 22 Jul 2010
TL;DR: In this article, the general model of decision under uncertainty no-arbitrage (expected utility with known utilities and unknown probabilities) has been proposed and applications of expected utility for risk have been discussed.
Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
TL;DR: In this article, a formal model of Harsanyi's infinite hierarchies of beliefs is given, and it is shown that the model closes with some Bayesian game with incomplete information, and any such game can be approximated by one with a finite number of states of world.