The Ruling Class

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions, where the main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the exercise of de jure and de facto political power.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss whether or not "governance" is an important source of variation in development experiences and draw four main conclusions: governance is best thought of a subset of "institutions" and as such emphasis on governance is consistent with much recent academic work Nevertheless, governance is a quite vague rubric which is difficult to unbundle.

TL;DR: In this article, a revised index of political democracy that overcomes some of these limitations is presented, and the indicators of the revised index are analyzed by means of confirmatory factor analysis and the reliability of the measure is discussed.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the main determinants of differences in prosperity across countries are differences in economic institutions, and they illustrate this with a series of pitfalls of institutional reforms.