Journal Article10.2307/1911364
Subgame Perfect Implementation
John Moore,Rafael Repullo +1 more
534
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provided a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules, showing that in many economic environments, virtually an f choice rule can be implemented.
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Abstract: This paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules. It is shown that, in many economic environments, virtually an y choice rule can be implemented. To illustrate the power of this approach, the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first-best (although it wouldn't have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms). The diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.
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References
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
TL;DR: The concept of perfect equilibrium point has been introduced in order to exclude the possibility that disequilibrium behavior is prescribed on unreached subgames [Selten 1965 and 1973]. Unfortunately this definition of perfectness does not remove all difficulties which may arise with respect to unreached parts of the game.
Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences using the concept of undominated Nash equilibrium, i.e., Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy.
Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
TL;DR: In this paper, a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity, and it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents.