Secure supply-chain protocols
Mikhail J. Atallah,Hicham G. Elmongui,Vinayak Deshpande,Leroy B. Schwarz +3 more
- 24 Jun 2003
- pp 293-302
TL;DR: This work proposes secure supply- chain collaboration (SSCC) protocols that enable supply-chain partners to cooperatively achieve desired system-wide goals without revealing the private information of any of the parties, even though the jointly computed decisions require the information of all the parties.
read more
Abstract: Supply chain interactions have huge economic importance, yet these interactions are managed inefficiently. One of the major sources of inefficiency in supply-chain management is information asymmetry; i.e., information that is available to one or more organizations in the chain (e.g., manufacturer, retailer) is not available to others. There are several causes of information asymmetry, among them fear that a powerful buyer or supplier will take advantage of private information, that information will leak to a competitor, etc. We propose secure supply-chain collaboration (SSCC) protocols that enable supply-chain partners to cooperatively achieve desired system-wide goals without revealing the private information of any of the parties, even though the jointly computed decisions require the information of all the parties. Secure supply-chain collaboration has the potential to improve supply-chain management practice, and by removing a major inefficiency therein, improves productivity. We present specific SSCC protocols for two types of supply-chain interactions: capacity allocation, and e-auctions (electronic auctions). In the course of doing so, we design techniques that are of independent interest, and are likely to be useful in the design of future SSCC protocols.
read more
Chat with Paper
AI Agents for this Paper
Find similar papers on Google Scholar, PubMed and Arxiv
Write a critical review of this paper
Analyze citations of this paper to find unaddressed research gaps
Citations
Applications of Data Mining in Computer Security
Daniel Barbará,Sushil Jajodia +1 more
- 01 May 2002
TL;DR: In this paper, a Geometric Framework for Unsupervised Anomaly Detection E. Eskin et al. fuse a Heterogeneous Alert Stream into Scenarios and use MIB II Variables for Network Intrusion Detection.
273
Private collaborative forecasting and benchmarking
Mikhail J. Atallah,Marina Bykova,Jiangtao Li,Keith B. Frikken,Mercan Topkara +4 more
- 28 Oct 2004
TL;DR: Protocols for forecasting and benchmarking that reveal to the participants the desired answers yet do not reveal to any participant any other participant's private data are given, including floating point arithmetic, in particular it provides protocols to securely and efficiently perform division.
FalconDB: Blockchain-based Collaborative Database
Yanqing Peng,Min Du,Feifei Li,Raymond Cheng,Dawn Song +4 more
- 11 Jun 2020
TL;DR: This paper presents FalconDB, which enables different parties with limited hardware resources to efficiently and securely collaborate on a database with high efficiency, low storage cost and blockchain-level security guarantees.
127
A reputation and trust management broker framework for Web applications
Kwei-Jay Lin,Haiyin Lu,Tao Yu,Chia-en Tai +3 more
- 29 Mar 2005
TL;DR: This paper presents a distributed reputation and trust management framework that addresses the challenges of eliciting, evaluating and propagating reputation for Web applications and proposes a broker framework where every service user is associated with a broker who may represent multiple users.
124
Secure supply-chain protocols
Mikhail J. Atallah,Hicham G. Elmongui,Vinayak Deshpande,Leroy B. Schwarz +3 more
- 24 Jun 2003
TL;DR: This work proposes secure supply- chain collaboration (SSCC) protocols that enable supply-chain partners to cooperatively achieve desired system-wide goals without revealing the private information of any of the parties, even though the jointly computed decisions require the information of all the parties.
References
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a struggling attempt to give structure to the statement: "Business in under-developed countries is difficult"; in particular, a structure is given for determining the economic costs of dishonesty.
Optimal Auction Design
TL;DR: Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object.
7K
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
TL;DR: The authors analyzes competitive markets in which the characteristics of the commodities exchanged are not fully known to at least one of the parties to the transaction, and suggests that some of the most important conclusions of economic theory are not robust to considerations of imperfect information.
Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect
TL;DR: The authors analyzes four sources of the bullwhip effect: demand signal processing, rationing game, order batching, and price variations, and shows that the distortion tends to increase as one moves upstream.
4.5K
Related Papers (5)
Andrew Chi-Chih Yao
- 27 Oct 1986
Oded Goldreich,Silvio Micali,Avi Wigderson +2 more
- 01 Jan 1987
Rakesh Agrawal,Ramakrishnan Srikant +1 more
- 16 May 2000
Jaideep Vaidya,Chris Clifton +1 more
- 23 Jul 2002