Search Diversion and Platform Competition

TL;DR: Empirical analysis shows that the position of a hotel in the search results of OTAs is better when the prices charged by the hotel on other channels are higher, consistent with the hypothesis that OTAs alter their search results to discipline hotels for aggressive prices on competing channels, thereby reducing the search quality for consumers.

TL;DR: In this paper , the authors studied how personalized product recommendations and their accuracy affect seller competition in an online marketplace and found that the accuracy of personalized product recommendation is correlated with seller competition.

TL;DR: In this article , a model of platform search design is developed to study how the search design interacts with its revenue models, and the model is applied to the problem of mobile ad placement.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study how a marketplace's profit-based recommendation system and its consumer profiling accuracy influence the marketplace, sellers, and consumers, and find that when the profiling accuracy increases, the equilibrium price first decreases and then increases, and interestingly, the marketplace's profits can decrease despite its more accurate predictions about consumer preferences.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors survey recent theoretical work on two-sided markets and the main questions are (i) what determines which side of the market is subsidized (if either) in order to attract the other side, and (ii) is the resulting outcome socially e¢cient?

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present theoretical models for three variants of such markets: a monopoly platform, a model of competing platforms where each agent must choose to join a single platform, and a case of "competing bottlenecks", where one group wishes to join all platforms.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers, and analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers, showing that efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium, as well as some specific form of inefficient structures.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce a formal model of two-sided network externalities based in textbook economics, a mix of Katz and Shapiro network effects, price discrimination, and product differentiation.