Open AccessBook
Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
Eric van Damme
- 01 Nov 1983
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a survey of games and game theory, including games in normal form, matrix games and Bimatrix games with control costs, as well as regular equilibria.
read more
Abstract: 1. General Introduction.- 1.1. Informal description of games and game theory.- 1.2. Dynamic programming.- 1.3. Subgame perfect equilibria.- 1.4. Sequential equilibria and perfect equilibria.- 1.5. Perfect equilibria and proper equilibria.- 1.6. Essential equilibria and regular equilibria.- 1.7. Summary of the following chapters.- 1.8. Notational conventions.- 2. Games in Normal Form.- 2.1. Preliminaries.- 2.2. Perfect equilibria.- 2.3. Proper equilibria.- 2.4. Essential equilibria.- 2.5. Regular equilibria.- 2.6. An "almost all" theorem.- 3. Matrix and Bimatrix Games.- 3.1. Preliminaries.- 3.2. Perfect equilibria.- 3.3. Regular equilibria.- 3.4. Characterizations of regular equilibria.- 3.5. Matrix games.- 4. Control Costs.- 4.1. Introduction.- 4.2. Games with control costs.- 4.3. Approachable equilibria.- 4.4. Proper equilibria.- 4.5. Perfect equilibria.- 4.6. Regular equilibria.- 5. Incomplete Information.- 5.1. Introduction.- 5.2. Disturbed games.- 5.3. Stable equilibria.- 5.4. Perfect equilibria.- 5.5. Weakly proper equilibria.- 5.6. Strictly proper equilibria and regular equilibria.- 5.7. Proofs of the theorems of section 5.5..- 6. Extensive Form Games.- 6.1. Definitions.- 6.2. Equilibria and subgame perfectness.- 6.3. Sequential equilibria.- 6.4. Perfect equilibria.- 6.5. Proper equilibria.- 6.6. Control costs.- 6.7. Incomplete information.- References.- Survey.
read more
Chat with Paper
AI Agents for this Paper
Find similar papers on Google Scholar, PubMed and Arxiv
Write a critical review of this paper
Analyze citations of this paper to find unaddressed research gaps
Citations
•Book
Institutions and the path to the modern economy
Avner Greif
- 01 Jan 2006
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a multi-disciplinary perspective to study endogenous institutions and their dynamics, including the influence of the past, the ability of institutions to change, and the difficulty to study them empirically and devise a policy aimed at altering them.
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a non-cooperative game, from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess.
1.5K
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Jeffrey S. Banks,Joel Sobel +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a new solution concept called divine equilibrium is introduced, which refines the set of sequential equilibria by requiring that off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction.
Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions
Eric Maskin,Jean Tirole +1 more
TL;DR: This work defines Markov strategy and Markov perfect equilibrium and shows that an MPE is generically robust: if payoffs of a generic game are perturbed, there exists an almost Markovian equilibrium in the perturbed game near the initial MPE.
1K
References
Equilibrium points in n-person games
TL;DR: A concept of an n -person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n -tuple ofpure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player.
Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
TL;DR: In this paper, a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model was presented, focusing on a strategic approach adopted for the study and details of the bargaining situation used; discussion on perfect equilibrium.
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
TL;DR: The concept of perfect equilibrium point has been introduced in order to exclude the possibility that disequilibrium behavior is prescribed on unreached subgames [Selten 1965 and 1973]. Unfortunately this definition of perfectness does not remove all difficulties which may arise with respect to unreached parts of the game.
Related Papers (5)
John von Neumann,Oskar Morgenstern +1 more
- 01 Jan 1944