1. What are the contributions mentioned in the paper "Privacy in implementation∗" ?
In this paper I consider the problem of full implementation with agents who may prefer to protect their privacy.
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Privacy in Implementation
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the problem of full implementation with agents who may prefer to protect their privacy and analyze the extent to which privacy-protecting mechanisms can be constructed under various assumptions about agents' predilection for privacy and the permissible game forms.
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Abstract: In most implementation frameworks agents care only about the outcome, and not at all about the way in which it was obtained. Additionally, typical mechanisms for full implementation involve the complete revelation of all private information to the planner. In this paper I consider the problem of full implementation with agents who may prefer to protect their privacy. I analyze the extent to which privacy-protecting mechanisms can be constructed under various assumptions about agents’ predilection for privacy and the permissible game forms.
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Citations
Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy
Michael Kearns,Mallesh M. Pai,Aaron Roth,Jonathan Ullman +3 more
- 12 Jan 2014
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms" which is one that does not have the power to enforce outcomes or to force participation, rather, it only has the capability to suggest outcomes on the basis of voluntary participation.
Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy
Yiling Chen,Stephen Chong,Ian A. Kash,Tal Moran,Salil Vadhan +4 more
- 16 Jun 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, a general way of modelling privacy in players' utility functions is proposed, which assumes that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has small privacy cost to player i. The authors give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to their modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities.
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Privacy and Mechanism Design
Mallesh M. Pai,Aaron Roth +1 more
TL;DR: A survey of recent work at the intersection of mechanism design and privacy can be found in this article, where the authors survey several facets of this study, and differential privacy plays a role in more than one way.
Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent.
To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions
Ned Augenblick,Aaron Bodoh-Creed +1 more
TL;DR: This model models two agents who wish to determine if their types match, but who also desire to reveal as little information as possible to non-matching types.
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References
A Theory of Conformity
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of social interaction in which individuals care about status as well as "intrinsic" utility (which refers to utility derived directly from consumption) is presented.
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Revealing information while preserving privacy
Irit Dinur,Kobbi Nissim +1 more
- 09 Jun 2003
TL;DR: A polynomial reconstruction algorithm of data from noisy (perturbed) subset sums and shows that in order to achieve privacy one has to add perturbation of magnitude (Ω√n).
Psychological games and sequential rationality
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that although backward induction cannot be applied, and perfect psychological equilibria may not exist, subgame perfect and sequential equilibrium always do exist, and that the payoff to each player depends not only on what every player does but also on what he thinks every player believes, and on what they think they believe others believe.
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Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Moni Naor,Benny Pinkas,Reuban Sumner +2 more
- 01 Nov 1999
TL;DR: An architecture for executing protocols for auctions and, more generally, mechanism design is suggested to preserve the privacy of the inputs of the participants while maintaining communication and computationaliency.
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A Signaling Explanation for Charity
Amihai Glazer,Kai A. Konrad +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined a novel but plausible motive for charitable giving, which is based on the assumption that people are willing to make charitable donations even if they will not increase provision of the public good.
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