Journal Article10.1007/BF01212327
Perfect Bayesian implementation
TL;DR: In this paper, a necessary condition called condition β was proposed for subgame perfect implementation of Social Choice Sets (SCS) in games of complete information, which is weaker than the Bayesian Monotonicity condition stated in Jackson [1991].
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Abstract: We study Social Choice Sets (SCS) implementable as perfect Bayesian equilibria of some incomplete information extensive form game. We provide a necessary condition which we callcondition β. The condition is analogous tocondition C that Moore and Repullo [1988] show to be necessary for subgame perfect implementation in games of complete information, and it is weaker than the Bayesian Monotonicity condition stated in Jackson [1991]. Our first theorem establishes that Incentive Compatibility, Closure and Conditionβ are necessary for implementation.
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Citations
Chapter 5 Implementation theory
Eric Maskin,Tomas Sjöström +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social choice rule.
207
Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization
TL;DR: A complete characterization of the SPE implementable choice rules is provided and α * , which strengthens α of Abreu–Sen by adding it a restricted veto-power condition, and the unanimity condition.
36
Enriching information to prevent bank runs
TL;DR: The authors recover a role for bank suspensions based on early acquisition of information about opportunistic behavior, which is similar to the role of bank runs in the early stages of a bank failure.
Chapter 61 Implementation theory
TL;DR: In this paper, the branch of implementation theory initiated by Maskin (1999) is surveyed and results for both complete and incomplete information environments are covered, with a focus on complete information environments.
25
Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games*
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that in economic environments with incomplete information, incentive compatibility and a preference reversal condition are sufficient for implementation in sequential equilibrium, and they show that incentive compatibility is sufficient for sequential equilibrium.
21
References
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
TL;DR: The concept of perfect equilibrium point has been introduced in order to exclude the possibility that disequilibrium behavior is prescribed on unreached subgames [Selten 1965 and 1973]. Unfortunately this definition of perfectness does not remove all difficulties which may arise with respect to unreached parts of the game.
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
Drew Fudenberg,Jean Tirole +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a formal definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for multi-period games with observed actions is introduced, where the strategies form a Bayes equilibrium for each continuation game, given the specified beliefs, and beliefs are updated from period to period in accordance with Bayes rule whenever possible.
663
Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Dilip Abreu,Hitoshi Matsushima +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the implementation of social choice functions that map to lotteries over alternatives, and they show that if there are three or more players, any social choice function may be so implemented.
330
Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences using the concept of undominated Nash equilibrium, i.e., Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy.
Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
TL;DR: The augmented revelation principle as discussed by the authors states that if there exists any mechanism that implements a given choice rule, then an augmented revelation mechanism will also implement it, which enables us to obtain necessary conditions for implementation.
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