Journal Article10.1111/J.1468-0262.2004.00499.X
Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible voting rules
Dipjyoti Majumdar,Arunava Sen +1 more
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TL;DR: For a special type of priors, i.e., the uniform priors as mentioned in this paper, there exists a large class of social choice functions that are OBIC, and for priors that are generic in the set of independent beliefs, a social choice function is OBIC if it is dictatorial.
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Abstract: We study strategic voting after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truth-telling is required to maximize the expected utility of every voter, expected utility being computed with respect to the voter's prior beliefs and under the assumption that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that for a special type of priors, i.e., the uniform priors, there exists a large class of social choice functions that are OBIC. However, for priors that are generic in the set of independent beliefs, a social choice function is OBIC only if it is dictatorial. This result underlines the robustness of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.
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Citations
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
TL;DR: This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively and offers detailed introductions to each of the field's major themes.
Optimal social choice functions
TL;DR: This work adopts a utilitarian perspective on social choice, assuming that agents have (possibly latent) utility functions over some space of alternatives and studies optimal social choice functions under three different models, and underscores the important role played by scoring functions.
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Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
Craig Boutilier,Ioannis Caragiannis,Simi Haber,Tyler Lu,Ariel D. Procaccia,Or Sheffet +5 more
- 04 Jun 2012
TL;DR: This work adopts a utilitarian perspective on social choice, assuming that agents have (possibly latent) utility functions over some space of alternatives, and studies optimal social choice functions under three different models, and underscores the important role played by scoring functions.
Strategy-Proofness in the Large
Eduardo M. Azevedo,Eric Budish +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a criterion of approximate strategyproofness, strategy-proofness in the large (SP-L), was proposed, and it was shown that SP-L approximates the benefits of SP, but at approximately no cost relative to Bayes-Nash.
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
Lars Ehlers,Jordi Massó +1 more
TL;DR: It is shown that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores.
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Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
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