Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking
TL;DR: The authors untersuche Transparenz anhand eines kleinentheoretischen models, das das vorausschauende Verhalten des privaten Sektors hervorhebt.
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Abstract: Den meisten Akademikern und politischen Entscheidungstragern zufolge ist Transparenz
in der Geldpolitik wunschenswert. Ich untersuche diese Behauptung anhand eines kleinen
theoretischen Models, das das vorausschauende Verhalten des privaten Sektors hervorhebt.
Transparenz erleichtert es denjenigen, die Preise festsetzen, auf die kunftigen
geldpolitischen Absichten der Zentralbank zu schliesen, wodurch die laufende Inflation
starker auf stabilitatspolitische Masnahmen reagiert. Dies fuhrt dazu, dass die Zentralbank
sich eher auf die Inflation als auf die Stabilisierung der Produktionslucke konzentriert. In
diesem Fall kann Transparenz negative Folgen haben. Sie kann sich sogar als eine die
Geldpolitik verzerrende Zwangsjacke herausstellen, wenn die Zentralbank sich
stabilitatspolitischer Glaubwurdigkeit erfreut und eine aktive monetare
Stabilisierungspolitik benotigt wird.
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References
A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information
Alex Cukierman,Allan H Meltzer +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a positive theory of credibility, ambiguity, and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information is developed. But the authors do not consider the impact of monetary control on the public's ability to distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors.
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TL;DR: The authors adopts a principal-agent framework to determine how a central banker's incentives should be structured to induce the socially optimal policy, and shows that the optimal contract ties the rewards of the central banker to realized inflation.
The Volatility of Long-Term Interest Rates and Expectations Models of the Term Structure
TL;DR: This paper showed that long rates show a tendency to fall when they are high relative to short rates rather than rise as predicted by expectations models, and that the volatility of actual long-term interest rates, as measured by the variance of short-term holding yields on longterm bonds, appears to exceed limits imposed by the models.
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Inflation and Reputation
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model the government's credibility explicitly, using Kreps and Wilson's analysis, and show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession, even with perfectly flexible prices.
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