Journal Article10.1007/BF00192882
On two-person Nash implementable choice functions
TL;DR: In this article, an elementary proof of a theorem on two-person Nash implementable choice functions is provided, based on which a two-player Nash choice function can be computed in polynomial time.
read more
Abstract: An elementary proof of a theorem on two-person Nash implementable choice functions is provided.
read more
Chat with Paper
AI Agents for this Paper
Find similar papers on Google Scholar, PubMed and Arxiv
Write a critical review of this paper
Analyze citations of this paper to find unaddressed research gaps
References
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of incentive compatibility for social choice rules in a general setting, where the characteristics of individual agents are not known by the planner a priori.
Nash Implementation: A Complete Characterization
John Moore,Rafael Repullo +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors extend Maskin's results on Nash implementation to the case of three or more agents and derive simpler sufficiency conditions that are applicable in a wide variety of economic environments.
259
•Posted Content
Implementing Social Choice Functions: A New Look at Some Impossibility Results
TL;DR: For some solution concepts, such as dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, and undominated strategies, only dictatorial social choice functions are implementable on a full domain of preferences with at least three alternatives.
1
The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
TL;DR: It is proved that strong positive association is equivalent to strategy-proofness and that no voting procedure exists that satisfiesStrong positive association, nondictatorship, and citizens’ sovereignty.
Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
Leonid Hurwicz,David Schmeidler +1 more
TL;DR: For more than two persons, if indifferences are ruled out or if only "weak" Pareto optimality is required, the answer is in the affirmative as discussed by the authors.