Non-Analytic Conceptual Knowledge

TL;DR: The authors argue that a priori conceptual knowledge is possible even if analytic knowledge is not, and that Quine's doubts about analyticity still have considerable force and must therefore be reckoned with by any proponent of conceptual knowledge.

Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to argue that a priori conceptual knowledge is possible even if unrevisable analytic knowledge is not. The considerations put forward by Quine (1951, 1960) against the possibility of unrevisable knowledge resting on analysis of linguistic meanings and deduction from definitions do not weigh against the possibility of a priori discovery by the kind of conceptual thinking I will outline and illustrate in this paper. A secondary aim is to show that Quine's doubts about analyticity still have considerable force and must therefore be reckoned with by any proponent of conceptual knowledge.