Journal Article10.1111/J.1475-6765.1980.TB00737.X
Nine second‐order national elections – a conceptual framework for the analysis of european election results
Karlheinz Reif,Hermann Schmitt +1 more
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TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that the composition of the directly elected European Parliament does not precisely reflect the real balance of political forces in the European Community. But the European elections are determined more by domestic political cleavages than by alternatives originating in the EC, but in a different way than if nine first-order national elections took place simultaneously.
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Abstract: The composition of the directly elected European Parliament does not precisely reflect the 'real' balance of political forces in the European Community. As long as the national political systems decide most of what there is to be decided politically, and everything really important, European elections are additional national second-order elections. They are determined more by the domestic political cleavages than by alternatives originating in the EC, but in a different way than if nine first-order national elections took place simultaneously. This is the case because European elections occur at different stages of the national political systems' respective 'electoral cycles'. Such a relationship between a second-order arena and the chief arena of a political system is not at all unusual. What is new here, is that one second-order political arena is related to nine different first-order arenas. A first analysis of European election results satisfactorily justifies the assumption that European Parliament direct elections should be treated as nine simultaneous national second-order elections.
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Citations
Parties and elections in the European Union
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose an institutional mechanism to facilitate competitive party government in the European Union, which is needed to facilitate the setting up of real parties and the creation of real federations.
6
‘Same, same, but different’: Assessing the politicisation of the European debate using a lexicometric study of the 2014 Euromanifestos
Clément Jadot,Camille Kelbel +1 more
- 01 Oct 2017
Abstract: Les programmes politiques elabores par les partis politiques au niveau europeen
sont reputes consensuels et peu attrayants, a l’image leurs concepteurs, et sont
a ce titre marginalises. Les Euromanifestes constituent neanmoins un materiau
dynamique et un indicateur pertinent de la structuration de l’espace politique
europeen. A partir d’une analyse lexicometrique, cet article examine comment
les programmes publies en amont des elections europeennes de 2014 par les
13 Europartis officiellement reconnus donnent a voir une politisation de la
sphere politique europeenne. Les resultats montrent que, bien qu’ils partagent
un espace discursif commun, chaque Europarti se singularise en mobilisant cet
espace de maniere specifique, soulignant la diversite des projets europeens en
competition.
6
Populism as a Challenge to Liberal Democracy in Europe
Sofie Blombäck
- 01 Jan 2020
TL;DR: In this paper, Blomback argues that what primarily defines populism is the anti-pluralist notion that a homogeneous people stands in moral opposition to a more or less corrupt elite.
6
International Treaty Ratification and Party Competition: Theory and Evidence from the EU's Constitutional Treaty
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use a game of second-order electoral competition to argue that the relative likelihood of a party endorsing a referendum is highest at the beginning and end of the electoral cycle, and when the public supports the treaty.
6
Political Learning and the Number of Parties: Why Age Matters
Ekaterina R. Rashkova
- 24 Jun 2010
Abstract: Party system fractionalization was re-invented as an unsolved puzzle after the fall of the Berlin Wall. While scholars agree that the stability of the party system is imperative for the proper functioning of democracy, many note the high number of political parties in the East European states. Still, we lack a systematic analysis of party system development in those countries. A possible reason for this gap is that extant theories on the number of parties were written with established democracies in mind and are thus unequipped to explain the dynamics taking place in young democracies. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap providing at least preliminary answers for the variation in the number of parties between new and more established democracies. My theory proposes that learning the effect of institutions is crucial to whether they actually have an effect or not and is integral to understanding the number of parties in a given system. Furthermore, I argue that certain institutional arrangements, for example the translation of votes into seats, may play a more important role than the district magnitude when present. I view learning as coming from trial-and-error experience which elite members get by political participation over time, as well as experience with a changing institutional environment both within and external to the party system as such. To test my propositions I use a three-level hierarchical model on district data of 20 European democracies. The results show that at the district level, age of democracy has a positive effect on the level of party system convergence and the effect is stronger in young democracies. The analysis further reveals that pre-electoral institutional constraints such as signatures and deposits have a positive and significant effect on party system convergence, while in the presence of EU-related events the convergence index drops, likely due to the additional incentives for political competition that such events bring. Public funding does not prove significant and the effect of age of democracy on party system convergence in mature democracies remains inconclusive as alternate specifications elicit varying results.
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Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
Albert O. Hirschman
- 01 Jan 1970
Abstract: 1. Introduction and Doctrinal Background Enter "exit" and "voice" Latitude for deterioration, and slack in economic thought Exit and voice as impersonations of economics and politics 2. Exit How the exit option works Competition as collusive behavior 3. Voice Voice as a residual of exit Voice as an alternative to exit 4. A Special Difficulty in Combining Exit and Voice 5. How Monopoly Can be Comforted by Competition 6. On Spatial Duopoly and the Dynamics of Two-Party Systems 7. A Theory of Loyalty The activation of voice as a function of loyalty Loyalist behavior as modified by severe initiation and high penalties for exit Loyalty and the difficult exit from public goods (and evils) 8. Exit and Voice in American Ideology and Practice 9. The Elusive Optimal Mix of Exit and Voice Appendixes A. A simple diagrammatic representation of voice and exit B. The choice between voice and exit C. The reversal phenomenon D. Consumer reactions to price rise and quality decline in the case of several connoisseur goods F. The effects of severity of initiation on activism: design for an experiment (in collaboration with Philip G. Zimbardo and Mark Snyder) Index
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