Proceedings Article10.1145/1007352.1007356
Network games
Éva Tardos
- 13 Jun 2004
pp 341-342
386
TL;DR: This talk will give an overview of recent progress in many of the traditional algorithmic questions in networks from the perspective of game theory, and show strong ties to certain algorithmic techniques.
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Abstract: Network games approach some of the traditional algorithmic questions in networks from the perspective of game theory, which gives rise of a wide range of interesting issues. In this talk we will give an overview of recent progress in many of these areas, and show strong ties to certain algorithmic techniques.
read more
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TL;DR: The degradation in network performance due to unregulated traffic is quantified and it is proved that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency.
Algorithmic Mechanism Design
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Algorithms, games, and the internet
Christos H. Papadimitriou
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TL;DR: If the Internet is the next great subject for Theoretical Computer Science to model and illuminate mathematically, then Game Theory, and Mathematical Economics more generally, are likely to prove useful tools.
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation
Elliot Anshelevich,Anirban Dasgupta,Jon Kleinberg,Éva Tardos,Tom Wexler,Tim Roughgarden +5 more
- 17 Oct 2004
TL;DR: It is established that the fair cost allocation protocol is in fact a useful mechanism for inducing strategic behavior to form near-optimal equilibria, and its results are extended to cases in which users are seeking to balance network design costs with latencies in the constructed network.
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