Journal Article10.2307/2938301
Nash Implementation: A Complete Characterization
John Moore,Rafael Repullo +1 more
251
TL;DR: In this article, the authors extend Maskin's results on Nash implementation to the case of three or more agents and derive simpler sufficiency conditions that are applicable in a wide variety of economic environments.
read more
Abstract: The authors extend E. Maskin's results on Nash implementation. First, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability if there are three or more agents (the case covered by Maskin's sufficiency result). Second--and more important--they examine the two-agent case (for which there existed no general sufficiency results). The two-agent model is the leading case for applications to contracting and bargaining. For this case, too, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient. The authors use their theorems to derive simpler sufficiency conditions that are applicable in a wide variety of economic environments. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.
read more
Chat with Paper
AI Agents for this Paper
Find similar papers on Google Scholar, PubMed and Arxiv
Write a critical review of this paper
Analyze citations of this paper to find unaddressed research gaps
Citations
•Book
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Jean-Jacques Laffont,David Martimort +1 more
- 26 Dec 2001
TL;DR: Laffont and Martimort as mentioned in this paper focus on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract, the essence of management and contract theory.
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that any social choice rule that satisfies monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals.
1.3K
Chapter 5 Implementation theory
Eric Maskin,Tomas Sjöström +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social choice rule.
207
An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games
TL;DR: In this article, the authors report the results of a series of experiments on a version of the centipede game in which the total payoff to the two players is constant, and find that subjects frequently fail to select the unique Nash outcome prediction.
Implementation with evidence
Navin Kartik,Olivier Tercieux +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence, which can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states.
References
Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences using the concept of undominated Nash equilibrium, i.e., Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy.
Strategy space reduction in maskin's theorem: sufficient conditions for nash implementation
TL;DR: In this paper, a reduction in the strategy space and a proof for an arbitrary alternative set of arbitrary size of the game is presented, where each participant announces a preference profile of all participants and also a socially optimal alternative with respect to the announced preference profile.
151
Subgame Perfect Implementation
John Moore,Rafael Repullo +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provided a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules, showing that in many economic environments, virtually an f choice rule can be implemented.
Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide an example of a social choice rule which can be implemented in Nash-equilibrium strategies by a discontinuous mechanism, while there does not exist a smooth implementing mechanism.