Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests

TL;DR: A survey of experimental research on these three canonical contests can be found in this paper, where the basic structure of contests, including the contest success function, number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, and incomplete information are investigated.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide an overview of experimental literature on contests and point out the two main phenomena observed in most contest experiments: (i) overbidding relative to the standard Nash equilibrium prediction and (ii) heterogeneous behavior of exante symmetric contestants.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors design an experiment to compare individuals' decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality, and find that in aggregate the single-prize contest generates lower expenditures than either the proportional priors or the multi-pripriors.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate how inequality in endowment between teams might influence the beneficial effect from competition and find that the rich respond to moderate inequality "doggedly" by expending more effort compared to competition with equality, but this doggedness disappears too when inequality is high.

TL;DR: The problem here is that the average cost and marginal cost are not necessarily identical as mentioned in this paper, and the reality is much more complicated than most of the papers in this volume* assume that rent-seeking activity discounts the entire rent to be derived.

TL;DR: In this article, the additive CSF employed in most contests is axiomatized, with an independence from irrelevant alternatives property as the key axiom, and two frequently used functional forms are also axiomated: one in which winning probabilities depend on the ratio of players' efforts, and the other in which winners' probability depends on the difference in efforts.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discriminating contests, focussing on existence, uniqueness and rent dissipation.