Journal Article10.1109/tmc.2023.3310383
Multi-Task Diffusion Incentive Design for Mobile Crowdsourcing in Social Networks
Jianxiong Guo,Qiufen Ni,Weili Wu,Ding‐Zhu Du +3 more
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TL;DR: Multi-task diffusion incentive design for mobile crowdsourcing in social networks maximizes the total utility of performing multiple tasks under a budget.
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Abstract: Mobile Crowdsourcing (MCS) is a novel distributed computing paradigm that recruits skilled workers to perform location-dependent tasks. A number of mature incentive mechanisms have been proposed to address the worker recruitment problem in MCS systems. However, most of them assume that there is a large enough worker pool and a sufficient number of users can be selected. This may be impossible in large-scale crowdsourcing environments. To address this challenge, we consider the MCS system defined on a location-aware social network provided by a social platform. In this system, we can recruit a small number of seed workers from the existing worker pool to spread the information of multiple tasks in the social network, thus attracting more users to perform tasks. In this paper, we propose a Multi-Task Diffusion Maximization (MT-DM) problem that aims to maximize the total utility of performing multiple crowdsourcing tasks under the budget. To accommodate multiple tasks diffusion over a social network, we create a multi-task diffusion model, and based on this model, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism, MT-DM-L. To deal with the high complexity of computing the multi-task diffusion, we adopt Multi-Task Reverse Reachable (MT-RR) sets to approximate the utility of information diffusion efficiently. Through both complete theoretical analysis and extensive simulations by using real-world datasets, we validate that our estimation for the spread of multi-task diffusion is accurate and the proposed mechanism achieves individual rationality, truthfulness, computational efficiency, and <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$(1-1/\sqrt{e}-\varepsilon )$</tex-math></inline-formula> approximation with at least <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$1-\delta$</tex-math></inline-formula> probability.
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Citations
CIM-LP: A Credibility-Aware Incentive Mechanism Based on Long Short-Term Memory and Proximal Policy Optimization for Mobile Crowdsensing
Sijia Mu,Huahong Ma +1 more
Abstract: In the field of mobile crowdsensing (MCS), a large number of tasks rely on the participation of ordinary mobile device users for data collection and processing. This model has shown great potential for applications in environmental monitoring, traffic management, public safety, and other areas. However, the enthusiasm of participants and the quality of uploaded data directly affect the reliability and practical value of the sensing results. Therefore, the design of incentive mechanisms has become a core issue in driving the healthy operation of MCS. The existing research, when optimizing long-term utility rewards for participants, has often failed to fully consider dynamic changes in trustworthiness. It has typically relied on historical data from a single point in time, overlooking the long-term dependencies in the time series, which results in suboptimal decision-making and limits the overall efficiency and fairness of sensing tasks. To address this issue, a credibility-aware incentive mechanism based on long short-term memory and proximal policy optimization (CIM-LP) is proposed. The mechanism employs a Markov decision process (MDP) model to describe the decision-making process of the participants. Without access to global information, an incentive model combining long short-term memory (LSTM) networks and proximal policy optimization (PPO), collectively referred to as LSTM-PPO, is utilized to formulate the most reasonable and effective sensing duration strategy for each participant, aiming to maximize the utility reward. After task completion, the participants’ credibility is dynamically updated by evaluating the quality of the uploaded data, which then adjusts their utility rewards for the next phase. Simulation results based on real datasets show that compared with several existing incentive algorithms, the CIM-LP mechanism increases the average utility of the participants by 6.56% to 112.76% and the task completion rate by 16.25% to 128.71%, demonstrating its significant advantages in improving data quality and task completion efficiency.
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