Open AccessPosted Content
Modelling Reciprocal Trade Liberalization: The Political-Economy and National-Welfare Perspectives
55
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present results of recent research that provide a positive theory of reciprocal trade liberalization policies by governments with political support concerns, where the exchange of market access permits governments to benefit each others' exporters, thereby reciprocally facilitating political-support enhancing income transfers that could not have been made unilaterally.
read more
Abstract: We present results of recent research that provides a positive theory of reciprocal trade liberalization policies by governments with political support concerns. The exchange of market access permits governments to benefit each others' exporters, thereby reciprocally facilitating political-support enhancing income transfers that could not have been made unilaterally. In contrast to the optimum tariff-bargaining literature, our explanation of reciprocal liberalization is consistent with the political-economy explanation of protection, and with the objectives of international trade negotiators who seek to improve foreign market access for their exporters in exchange for "concessions" in opening the access to domestic markets.
read more
Chat with Paper
AI Agents for this Paper
Find similar papers on Google Scholar, PubMed and Arxiv
Write a critical review of this paper
Analyze citations of this paper to find unaddressed research gaps
Citations
•Posted Content
Politically Optimal Tariffs: An Application to Egypt
TL;DR: Dorsati and Olarreaga as discussed by the authors provided a political economy analysis of the difficulties of liberalizing tariffs in Egypt in general, and in its specific industries, and explored the potential effects of the Euro-Med agreement for Egypt.
Endogenous tariff formation: the case of mercosur
Marcelo Olarreaga,Isidro Soloaga +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the results of the theoretical literature on endogenous tariff formation with evidence from Mercosur and show that the common external tariff and member countries' deviations from it and from internal free trade can be explained by sector or industry lobbying as predicted by the endogenous tariff literature.
Political economy and political correctness
TL;DR: The economic and social philosophy of political economy of the economic right takes the precisely opposite view, that market allocation is preferable to political allocation, and that individuals are better judges of the requisites of their own welfare than social planners as mentioned in this paper.
The Purpose of Trade Agreements
TL;DR: A review of the literature on governments' motivations for negotiating and joining international trade agreements can be found in this article, where the authors discuss both normative explanations for trade agreements and explanations based on political-economy concerns.
The Political Economy of Protection
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a survey of international trade theory from a normative perspective: What are its consequences and when is it justified from the point of view of national welfare?
References
•Posted Content
Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives: Errata
TL;DR: In this paper, the Stigler-Peltzman regulatory model is used to describe a political support equilibrium for a protected industry, and a distinction between changes in the gainers' and losers' welfare that derive from administrative decisions and changes that are the consequence of exogenous market forces is made.
655
Is Bilateralism Bad
TL;DR: In this paper, a simple model of the effects of regional trading blocs is developed, and it is shown that consolidation of the world into a smaller number of such blocs may indeed reduce welfare, even when each bloc acts to maximize the welfare of its members.
•Posted Content
Trade Wars and Trade Talks
Gene M. Grossman,Elhanan Helpman +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups are studied, revealing the determinants of the structure of protection in a non-cooperative trade war and in a cooperative trade agreement.
288
An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs Unions
TL;DR: The traditional approach to the theory of tariffs, which is embodied in the recently elaborated analysis of the effects of customs unions pioneered by Viner, Meade, Lipsey, and others, is concerned with such matters as the possibility of increasing real income by using the tariff to exploit monopoly or monopsony power in world markets, the welfare costs of the tariff in terms of foregone real income, and the effects on real income of changes in particular tariffs or in tariff structures, such as are entailed by the formation of customs union and free-trade areas.
262