Journal Article10.1007/S00182-013-0403-9
Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach
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TL;DR: The paper characterizes the optimal canonical mechanism and shows that this approach loses no generality with respect to the direct (multi-dimensional) mechanism.
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Abstract: The present paper studies the problem on multi-dimensional mechanisms in which the buyer’s taste and budget are his private information. The paper investigates the problem by way of a canonical mechanism in the traditional one-dimensional setting: function of one variable, the buyer’s taste. In our multi-dimensional context, this is an indirect mechanism. The paper characterizes the optimal canonical mechanism and shows that this approach loses no generality with respect to the direct (multi-dimensional) mechanism.
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Citations
First-price auctions with budget constraints
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget constraints and identify new sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
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Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism
TL;DR: The paper shows an easy proof of a two-dimensional optimal direct mechanism by a one-dimensional indirect mechanism: A canonical mechanism in the traditional one- dimensional setting, i.e., function of one variable, the buyer’s taste.
Two-Dimensional Mechanism Design and Implementability by an Indirect Mechanism
TL;DR: In this article, the problem of two-dimensional mechanism design where the buyer's taste and budget are his private information was investigated by the method of dimension-reduction, i.e., by focusing only on the buyer’s budget and constructing an indirect mechanism.
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TL;DR: In this article, the generalized Nash solution proposed by Harsanyi and Selten is applied to this set to define a bargaining solution for Bayesian collective choice problems, and it is shown that the set of expected utility allocations which are feasible with incentive-compatible mechanisms is compact and convex.
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