Journal Article10.2307/2951643
Mechanism design by competing sellers
498
TL;DR: In this paper, a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed and an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit, where the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous.
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Abstract: A dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed. Agents failing to trade may trade in the next period. An equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit. The distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous. An auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller's point of view, in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller's mechanism by altering the mechanism. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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References
Optimal Auction Design
TL;DR: Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object.
7K
A theory of auctions and competitive bidding
Paul Milgrom,Robert J. Weber +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
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A general theory of equilibrium selection in games
John C. Harsanyi,Reinhard Selten +1 more
- 01 Jan 1988
TL;DR: Harsanyi and Selten as mentioned in this paper proposed rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any non-cooperative game, and applied this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games, bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides.
2.8K
•Posted Content
Auctions and Bidding
R. Preston McAfee,John McMillan +1 more
TL;DR: Hayek as mentioned in this paper argued that the problem of rational economic order is determined by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
TL;DR: In this article, the principal can restrict himself to incentive-compatible direct coordination mechanisms, in which agents report their information to the principal, who then recommends to them decisions forming a correlated equilibrium.
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