Journal Article10.1257/0002828054201369
Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers
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TL;DR: In this article, the optimal contract between a monopolist and a consumer whose preferences follow a Markov process is characterized, which is nonstationary and has infinite memory, but is described by a simple state variable.
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Abstract: To study how a firm can capitalize on a long-term customer relationship, we characterize the optimal contract between a monopolist and a consumer whose preferences follow a Markov process. The optimal contract is nonstationary and has infinite memory, but is described by a simple state variable. Under general conditions, supply converges to the efficient level for any degree of persistence of the types and along any history, though convergence is history-dependent. In contrast, as with constant types, the optimal contract can be renegotiation-proof, even with highly persistent types. These properties provide insights into the optimal ownership structure of the production technology.
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