Proceedings Article10.1109/CSFW.2001.930151
Logical relations for encryption
Eijiro Sumii,Benjamin C. Pierce +1 more
- 11 Jun 2001
- pp 256-269
TL;DR: A cryptographic λ-calculus is defined and syntactic logical relations are introduced (in the style of Pitts and Birkedal-Harper) for this calculus that can be used to prove behavioral equivalences between programs that use encryption.
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Abstract: The theory of relational parametricity and its logical relations proof technique are powerful tools for reasoning about information hiding in the polymorphic A-calculus. We investigate the application of these tools in the security domain by dejining a cryptographic A-calculus-an extension of the standard simply typed A-calculus with primitives for encryption, decryption, and key generation-and introducing logical relations for this calculus that can be used to prove behavioral equivalences between programs that rely on encryption. We illustrate the framework by encoding some simple security protocols, including the Needham-Schroeder publickey protocol. We give a natural account of the well-known attack on the original protocol and a straighgorward proof that the improved variant of the protocol is secure.
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Citations
Language-based information-flow security
Andrei Sabelfeld,Andrew C. Myers +1 more
TL;DR: A structured view of research on information-flow security is given, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information- flow policies, and some important open challenges are identified.
Automatic proof of strong secrecy for security protocols
Bruno Blanchet
- 09 May 2004
TL;DR: A new automatic technique for proving strong secrecy for security protocols that relies on an automatic translation of the protocol into Horn clauses, and a resolution algorithm on the clauses.
A Model for Delimited Information Release
Andrei Sabelfeld,Andrew C. Myers +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce a new security property, delimited release, which is an end-to-end guarantee that declassification cannot be exploited to construct laundering attacks.
Information hiding, anonymity and privacy: a modular approach
TL;DR: An extensive case study is presented, in which the function view framework is used to systematically classify and rigorously define a rich domain of identity-related properties, and to demonstrate that privacy and anonymity are independent.
Verified interoperable implementations of security protocols
Karthikeyan Bhargavan,Cédric Fournet,Andrew D. Gordon,Stephen Tse +3 more
- 05 Jul 2006
TL;DR: The approach is developed for protocols written in F#, a dialect of ML, and verified by compilation to ProVerif a resolution-based theorem prover for cryptographic protocols, and illustrated with protocols for Web services security.
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References
On the security of public key protocols
Danny Dolev,Andrew Chi-Chih Yao +1 more
TL;DR: Several models are formulated in which the security of protocols can be discussed precisely, and algorithms and characterizations that can be used to determine protocol security in these models are given.
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
TL;DR: Use of encryption to achieve authenticated communication in computer networks is discussed and example protocols are presented for the establishment of authenticated connections, for the management of authenticated mail, and for signature verification and document integrity guarantee.
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Martín Abadi,Andrew D. Gordon +1 more
TL;DR: The spi calculus is introduced, an extension of the pi calculus designed for describing and analyzing cryptographic protocols and state their security properties in terms of coarse-grained notions of protocol equivalence.
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
Martín Abadi,Cédric Fournet +1 more
- 01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: A simple, general extension of the pi calculus with value passing, primitive functions, and equations among terms is introduced, and semantics and proof techniques for this extended language are developed and applied in reasoning about some security protocols.
•Proceedings Article
Types, Abstraction and Parametric Polymorphism.
John C. Reynolds
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TL;DR: The findings of a Web-based questionnaire aimed at discovering both patterns of use of videoconferencing systems within HP and the reasons people give for either not using, or for using such systems are discussed.
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