Journal Article10.1111/J.1468-0068.2010.00746.X
Knowledge of Validity
TL;DR: In this paper, a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity is raised, namely that a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the basis of reasoning about an arbitrary object.
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Abstract: What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the basis of reasoning about an arbitrary object. I argue in favor of a more sophisticated constraint on reasoning by universal generalization, one which undermines a rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity.
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Citations
Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a Modus Ponens inference and ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference.
Lewis Carroll’s regress and the presuppositional structure of arguments
TL;DR: In this article, a diagnosis of the moral of the regress is that arguments are constitutively presuppositional, and it is argued that this diagnosis allows to vindicate the key insights of the rule-following account.
What’s the matter with epistemic circularity?
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that there is nothing especially wrong about using a questionable source to evaluate its own reliability, with the matter of the source's own reliability serving only as a special case.
Induction, Normality and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects
TL;DR: It is argued that these cases show that the authors cannot reason inductively about arbitrary objects, and this prohibition is neatly explained by a certain hypothesis about the rational basis of inductive reasoning.
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