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Interdependent Security: A General Model
Geoffrey Heal,Howard Kunreuther +1 more
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors characterize the smallest coalition to tip an equilibrium, the minimum critical coalition, and show that this is also the cheapest coalition, so that there is no less expensive way to move the system from the sub-optimal to the optimal equilibrium.
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Abstract: In an interdependent world the risks faced by any one agent depend not only on its choices but also on those of all others. Expectations about others' choices will influence investments in risk-management, and the outcome can be sub-optimal investment all round. We model this as the Nash equilibrium of a game and give conditions for such a sub-optimal equilibrium to be tipped to an optimal one. We also characterize the smallest coalition to tip an equilibrium, the minimum critical coalition, and show that this is also the cheapest critical coalition, so that there is no less expensive way to move the system from the sub- optimal to the optimal equilibrium. We illustrate these results by reference to airline security, the control of infectious diseases via vaccination and investment in research and development.
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Citations
A Survey of Interdependent Security Games
Aron Laszka,Mark Felegyhazi,Levente Butty +2 more
- 01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: This survey summarizes game-theoretic interdependence models, characterize the emerging security ineciencies and present solution methods, and identifies the areas that need more attention from the research community.
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An economic exploration of prevention versus response in animal related bioterrorism decision making
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Interdependence of Reliability and Security.
Peter Honeyman,Galina A. Schwartz,Ari Can Assche +2 more
- 01 Jan 2007
TL;DR: This paper studies manufacturer incentives to invest in the improvement of reliability andSecurity of a software system when (i) reliability and security failures are caused by the same errors in the development of the software components and (ii) naive users find it too costly to distinguish between these two classes of system failures.