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Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance
Douglass C. North,John Alt +1 more
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time.
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Abstract: Examines the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time. Institutions are separate from organizations, which are assemblages of people directed to strategically operating within institutional constraints. Institutions affect the economy by influencing, together with technology, transaction and production costs. They do this by reducing uncertainty in human interaction, albeit not always efficiently. Entrepreneurs accomplish incremental changes in institutions by perceiving opportunities to do better through altering the institutional framework of political and economic organizations. Importantly, the ability to perceive these opportunities depends on both the completeness of information and the mental constructs used to process that information. Thus, institutions and entrepreneurs stand in a symbiotic relationship where each gives feedback to the other. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient institutions ought to be rapidly replaced. This symbiotic relationship helps explain why this theoretical consequence is often not observed: while this relationship allows growth, it also allows inefficient institutions to persist. The author identifies changes in relative prices and prevailing ideas as the source of institutional alterations. Transaction costs, however, may keep relative price changes from being fully exploited. Transaction costs are influenced by institutions and institutional development is accordingly path-dependent. (CAR)
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Citations
Institutions, Transaction Costs, and Entry Mode Choice in Eastern Europe
TL;DR: The authors analyzes how the costs of organizing business in transition environments influence entry mode choice and finds that host country institutions in transition economies, have an impact on the choice of entry modes.
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Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior
Pippa Norris
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TL;DR: In this paper, the impact of electoral engineering on voting behavior is discussed. But the authors focus on the role of electoral rules and do not consider the effect of the rules on the behavior of voters.
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The Resource-Advantage Theory of Competition: Dynamics, Path Dependencies, and Evolutionary Dimensions:
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TL;DR: The authors respond to the thoughtful concerns raised by Dickson (1996) about the issue of path dependencies and the dynamics of resource-advantage (R-A) theory with a reply that R-A theory fully accommodates path dependencies, because it is an evolutionary, nonconsummatory theory.
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Privatised Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy Regime
TL;DR: There have now been two successive policy regimes since the Second World War that have temporarily succeeded in reconciling the uncertainties and instabilities of a capitalist economy with democracy's need for stability for people's lives and capitalism's own need for confident mass consumers.