Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production

TL;DR: In this paper , a hybrid model based on Pythagorean fuzzy DEMATEL, TOPSIS and Shapley value to find appropriate policies to improve low-carbon renewable energy projects is presented.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define the "share function" of a simply reducible game and apply it to a model of open access resource exploitation, and suggest further applications and extensions of their approach.

TL;DR: A novel phenomenon is identified that is called complexity equilibrium in which agents quiesce, not because there is no way for any one of group of them to improve their situation, but because discovering the changes necessary for (individual or group) improvement is intractable.

TL;DR: Wilkens and Papadimitriou as discussed by the authors showed that a first-price auction offers substantially better performance guarantees when a single advertiser may benefit from multiple ads and that sampling can maintain incentive compatibility even when the auctioneer incorrectly predicts the user's behavior.

TL;DR: In this paper, Dodgson's Third Pamphlet 'A Method...' (1876) was used to discuss the Elasticity of Committee Decisions with an Altering Size of Majority.

TL;DR: In this article, an Axiomatic Bargaining Theory of Rational Prudence and Nash Bargaining Solution for EOP Mechanism Theory on Economic Environments has been proposed, which is based on the Arrow Impossibility Theorem with Utility Functions.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors characterized two surplus sharing methods (equal sharing, proportional sharing) with the help of four axioms: separationability, no advantageous reallocation, additivity and path independence.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss three allocation mechanisms: equal benefits, equal returns, and constant returns equivalent for a single input and a single output, and a lower and an upper bound on individual welfares play a key role in characterisation results.