Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)

TL;DR: Which dimensions of culture matter for central bank independence? International evidence - TLDR: Individualism and uncertainty avoidance are significantly related to central bank independence.

TL;DR: This study examines the effectiveness of public certification of private financial education providers, using a political economy framework, and finds that third-party certification can mitigate financial literacy deterioration, but is influenced by political and bureaucratic incentives.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the effect of central banker incentive schemes when the principal delegate monetary policy through contracts but remains uncertain about the central banker's responsiveness to such schemes, and show that when a benevolent central banker accepts a contract designed for a selfish central banker, positive inflations occur and output exceeds its natural rate.

TL;DR: The authors investigate the effect of central bank independence on stock market returns in emerging economies and find evidence for a positive overall effect, but economic independence of the central bank appears to be more relevant than political independence.

TL;DR: This paper showed that what are today called "rules" do not fit into a Friedmanite tradition, basically because of Friedman's refusal to allow any discretion to monetary authorities and his model-uncertainty argument.

TL;DR: This article examined whether the interest rate preferences of Federal Reserve Bank presidents are subject to a regional bias and found that the preferences of some Federal Reserve bank presidents were not free of a local bias.