Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem 1
David J. Chalmers
- 10 Dec 2019
- pp 353-373
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the prospects for the one who comes to think that there is little reason to believe in anything beyond consciousness and that the physical world is wholly constituted by consciousness, thereby endorsing idealism: the move to idealism.
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Abstract: This chapter examines the prospects for the one who comes to think that there is little reason to believe in anything beyond consciousness and that the physical world is wholly constituted by consciousness, thereby endorsing idealism: the move to idealism. It also examines the prospects for micro-idealism, macro-idealism, and cosmic idealism, looking also at combined versions along the way. The chapter focuses especially on the merits as a solution to the philosophical mind-body problem. It gives a satisfactory theory of the physical world, consciousness, and the relation between them. The chapter argues that all these views face significant challenges but that micro-idealism and especially cosmic idealism have some promise as approaches to these issues. Macro-idealism holds that the mental states of humans and perhaps other macroscopic systems are fundamental and that all of reality is grounded in these states.
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Citations
Panpsychism and Pantheism. An Uneasy Alliance?
TL;DR: This article argued that panpsychism meets the minimal requirements for pantheism, defined as a view that the world is identical to all-encompassing Unity and that this Unity is divine.
Atsisveikinant su svajone: kodėl suvokiamumo argumentai nepajėgia atskleisti sąmonės metafizikos
TL;DR: The phenomenal concept strategy is a sound explanation for why the conceivability of zombies does not imply their metaphysical possibility.
Progress in Understanding Consciousness? Easy and Hard Problems, and Philosophical and Empirical Perspectives
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References
What is it like to be a bat
TL;DR: Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable as mentioned in this paper, which is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong.
•Book
The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory
David J. Chalmers
- 01 Jun 1996
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of consciousness and information is proposed, which is based on naturalistic dualism and the paradox of Phenomenal Judgment, and the Coherence between Consciousness and Cognition.
3.6K
Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an epistemological version of Kripke's argument against materialism, which they call the Cartesian argument against mate- rialism.
1.7K
•Book
A materialist theory of the mind
David M. Armstrong
- 01 Jan 1968
TL;DR: A classification of theories of mind can be found in this paper, with a focus on dualism, dualism and the attribute theory of the central-state theory of mind, as well as on the nature of mind.
1.2K
The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory
TL;DR: In this article, a clutch of '-isms' characterises the approach to consciousness which David Chalmers defends: dualism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, anti-reductionism, and -probably -panpsychism.
1.2K
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