How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions

TL;DR: Based on firm-level data of listed Chinese enterprises from 2010 to 2019, the authors found significant evidence that oil price shocks have a detrimental influence on enterprise total factor productivity (TFP), mediated by technical innovation and resource allocation.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that firms take more risks when one of their directors experiences a corporate bankruptcy at another firm where they concurrently serve as a director, and this increase in risk-taking is concentrated among firms where the director experiences a shorter, less-costly bankruptcy and where the affected director likely exerts greater influence and serves in an advisory role.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that firm financial performance depends on a complex configuration of several board features (board size, board independence, leadership structure and board activity) and several corporate characteristics (firm size, firm leverage and firm age).

TL;DR: The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit as mentioned in this paper, which is a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.

TL;DR: The core methods in today's econometric toolkit are linear regression for statistical control, instrumental variables methods for the analysis of natural experiments, and differences-in-differences methods that exploit policy changes.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present evidence consistent with theories that small boards of directors are more effective, using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation, and find an inverse association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations.

TL;DR: In this article, a principal-agent model that can explain why employment is sometimes superior to independent contracting even when there are no productive advantages to specific physical or human capital and no financial market imperfections to limit the agent's borrowings is presented.