Governing the commons — the evolution of institutions for collective action

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that among all policy fields exhibiting externalities of a global scale, energy stands out on four dimensions: vertical complexity, horizontal complexity, higher entailed costs, and stronger path dependency.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that institutional ecological economics has the greatest relative advantage in analysing the design, implementation and effectiveness of environmental governance solutions, and they show how evolutionary and collective action theories offer complementary takes on the choice and change of environmental Governance institutions.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated how gender differentiated social groups differ in their activities and outcomes for NRM and found that collaboration, solidarity, and conflict resolution all increase in groups where women are present.

TL;DR: The paper highlights the contribution of the 'cultural turn' taken by rural social scientists in helping to understand collective and individual voluntary behaviour and synthesizes three main areas of literature: psychological and institutional theories of behaviour; shifts in the approach to delivery of advice; and the increased interest in heterogeneous farming cultures.

TL;DR: The authors argue that community governance addresses some common market and state failures but typically relies on insider-outsider distinctions that may be morally repugnant and economically costly, and the individual motivations supporting community governance are not captured by either selfishness or altruism.

TL;DR: In this paper, a comparative cross-case analysis of six watershed programs is presented to examine how collaboration is used to enhance governance of networks where problem-solving capacity is widely dispersed and few organizations accomplish their missions by acting alone.

TL;DR: The authors argued that the current dominant discourse on institutions and economic development suffers from a number of theoretical problems, such as the neglect of the causality running from development to institutions, the inability to see the impossibility of a free market, and the belief that the freest market and the strongest protection of private property rights are best for economic development.

TL;DR: From interdependence and institutions to globalization and governance as mentioned in this paper, the concept of legalization has been proposed as an alternative to the Hobbe's Dilemma in international politics.